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INTRODUCTION

Melinda Chateauvert¹*

The essays in this anthology have been written by scholars from across Europe and North America for the sixth meeting of the Socialism and Sexuality network in October 2004. The conference, hosted by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Sofia, was the first network meeting in Eastern Europe. The geographical expansion brought together scholars and topics from former Communist countries as well as western Europe and North America under the theme, “New Social Movements and Sexuality.” Most of the presenters have contributed their papers to this book; some scholars were unable to attend, but shared their work prior to the conference. The geographical diversity of conference participants is also reflected in the essays.

During the warm, late-summer days in Bulgaria’s capital, panel presentations ranged from theoretical issues in sexual politics to the history of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) activism in Europe to comparisons of various radical social movements since the 1980s. As the many presentations focusing on Eastern Europe showed, the sexual liberation and LGBT movements have, for the most part, been excluded from public discourse in many of those countries, even after the enormous political and social changes of the 1990s. Consequently, the lively and engaging discussions among participants soon focused on the reasons for this absence and possible ways to bring LGBT issues to public attention and on the political agenda, frequently citing movements in the West as examples. Leaping beyond the confines of the conference, these issues were taken up by Bulgaria’s newly founded LGBT organization, Queer Bulgaria.¹ Conference organizer Monika Pisankaneva and University of Amsterdam attendee Gert Hekma subsequently appeared on Bulgaria Public TV, drawing national attention to the conference and its theme.

The merging of scholarship and activism was not unexpected; previous meetings of the Socialism and Sexuality network have deliberately explored the connections between political discourse and scholarship. Founded by Francis Ronsin of the University of Burgundy and other scholars associated with the Institute of Contemporary History in Dijon as well as the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, the “SocandSex” network has annually held conferences since 1999, starting with its first meeting in Ghent in conjunction with the Archives and Museum of the Socialist Worker’s Movement conference on “Gender and Class.” The following year, the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam hosted the second conference on the topic of “Free Love and the Labor Movement” which considered the sexual ideologies of anarchist feminists, individualist socialists, anarcho-syndicalists, and utopian socialists in Europe. The third conference, “Labor Organizations and Sexuality,” held in October 2001, was organized by the Institute of Contemporary History at the University of Burgundy in Dijon to explore the sexual politics of Western labor organizations in the last two centuries. It was followed by the first North American meeting on the theme “Sexuality and Millennialism,” hosted by the Center for Millennial Studies at Boston University in April 2003 which considered movements whose ideologies held that the liberation of the body and its desires leads to spiritual redemption and the regeneration of society. The fifth conference on the theme “The Past and Present of Radical Sexual Politics,” was held in 2004, at the University of Amsterdam, organized by Gert Hekma and Saskia Poldervaart – who have both contributed to this volume. Thus, in Sofia, scholars from the East and West used an interdisciplinary ap-

¹ With the assistance of Antonia Levy.
proach in the study of radical social movements and their ideologies in an effort to understand the problems faced by contemporary activists.

As conference convener, Monika Pisankaneva wisely foresaw that a forum focusing on Eastern Europe would encourage participants to examine the historical and ongoing tensions over sexuality and citizenship. Certainly the requirements for joining the European Union promises to have a significant impact on sexual and gender politics in Poland, as Patrycja Pogodzinska demonstrates in her analysis of laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Similarly, gay and lesbian activists in Bulgaria, Slovenia and Turkey are hopeful that EU-mandated anti-discrimination laws will bring new freedoms for the GLBT communities in their countries.

Many of the essays here examine the emergence of national GLBT movements in the East since the collapse of the Soviet Union. For westerners, the growing pains of these new social movements are reminders of the late 1960's and early 1970's in the U.K., the Netherlands, and the United States. The Stonewall Riots of 1969 have assumed a worldwide significance, representing a halcyon moment of gay identity and political struggle that gay activists in Eastern Europe yearn to experience in Sofia, Krakow and Istanbul. Almost forty years later, activists in the west have perhaps forgotten the difficulties of establishing and sustaining new LGBT organizations, and the debates over protest strategies, the constant shifts in leadership and political alliances (which were sometimes based on current or former sex partners), even the frightening thrill of publicly marching in the first gay pride parade, or dancing all night at the city’s first gay club. But for activists in Eastern Europe, these are still new experiences.

Even as they struggle to create community and found organizations, activists realize that “out” communities are more likely to experience violence and harassment. Justifiable fears for personal safety may explain why some people who identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgendered appear to be active only in “cyberspace” and rarely venture into public space, as Pisankaneva notes in her paper on the LGBT movement in Bulgaria. Bogdan Lešnik reminds us of the deadlier consequences of public visibility in recounting the events that led to the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Bosnian and Serbian nationalists railed against “decadent” Slovenian liberalism, citing in particular a gay and lesbian film festival being organised in Ljubljana as a “worldwide congress of homosexuals.” As historian George Mosse showed many years ago in his study of German nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, in times of upheaval, nationalist assertions of sexual immorality represent a quest for stability and community. (Mosse 1985) Recent history reminds us that the visibility of gay men, lesbians and transgendered persons in public spaces can provoke a “sex panic” for which ethnic and religious minorities may be blamed.

The panic over public displays of sexuality can backfire in other ways too. The famous Dutch tolerance for religious fugitives has been challenged by gays and lesbians who blame the growing conservatism regarding sex and sexuality on the immigrant Muslim population. Gert Hekma questions the optimism with which many people view the sexual openness of the Netherlands, noting in his survey of recent developments the shifts away from frank and honest acknowledgment of human sexual behavior. Perhaps more disconcerting is that some GLBT leaders voice support for the policing of public displays of queer sexuality. In their embrace of “respectability,” Melinda Chateauvert compares the strategies of today’s GLBT movement in the U.S. to the African American civil rights movement of the 1950s, noting that both movements base their rights claims on notions of citizenship as a fixed, “biological” identity. As a result, the GLBT movement has focused on marriage, employment rights and other discrimination issues, while distancing itself from queers whose public cruising, paid sex, and other consensual sexual acts do not resemble bourgeois, monogamous heterosexuality.

For some Dutch political activists, however, transgressive sexuality and creative disorder
are the goals, argues Saskia Poldervaardt in her examination of the squatter, alterglobalization, and queer rights movements. By inverting bourgeois norms about living spaces, capitalist economic transactions, and modern gender and sexual norms, disparate groups of people seek to make “another world” possible. Indeed, while the scholars of the West do not say so, they seem to look eastward for alternate models of political activism that challenge sexual and gender stereotypes under repressive regimes. Certainly the popularity of Jefferson Mays’ one-man play, “I Am My Own Wife” about the life of Charlotte von Mahlsdorf, a transgendered woman who lived through both the Nazi regime and the Soviet-style communism of East Berlin, is an indication of this orientalist search.³

In the east’s desire to recreate a Stonewall uprising, Eastern scholars’ are engaged in close, worshipful readings of Foucault, Witting and even Butler for clues about how to organize a prairie fire of political queer consciousness. The historical particularity of the 1970s in France and Northern America however, shared a set of political and social conditions (against the backdrop of the Cold War) that cannot be re-created in the post-Communist Eastern bloc. Moreover, as these papers make clear, the weak laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are not the result of engaged political struggle and public dialogue: they are imposed from the outside, practically concessions forced upon poorer countries who are desperate to join the EU. Earlier laws guaranteeing women’s equality had little impact on the daily lives of ordinary women in the east. Karin Taylor’s analysis of women’s sexuality and gender propaganda in Communist Bulgaria demonstrates the disconnect between formal legal equality and obstacles to women’s self-determination.

Even the creation of organizations for the purpose of promoting LGBT solidarity through the new social movements in Slovenia, Turkey and Bulgaria, is dependent upon government subventions or other outside funding for their survival. Under the laissez-faire economic policies of the U.S. and Canada, governments do not directly fund democratic citizens’ organizations, and indeed, members of such groups would wisely question government funding offers as efforts to co-opt their work and control their speech.

Reviewing the differences between the LGBT movements in the east and west, we are reminded here of the metaphor of geological layers of sentiment suggested by subaltern scientist and scholar Susantha Goonatilake, which he uses to describe petrified layers of scientific knowledge in Asia. (Goonatilake, 1998) Chipping away at the frameworks used in classrooms in the East, he finds that scholars continued to teach what they had learned in graduate school decades ago in their student days in the imperial capitals of Europe. These petrified frameworks had long ago been discarded at Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard, and the Sorbonne where scholars continuously engaged in dialogue, the sharing of information and participation in popular cultures that also informed the development of scientific discourse.⁴ Goonatilake does not identify a similar phenomenon in the eastern bloc, but the alumni of Moscow University clearly dictated the approved methodologies and modes of inquiry for scholars in sciences and humanities until the early 1990s. That legacy is still apparent, and as young queer theorists such as Stanimir Panatov in this volume struggle to read Foucault outside of earlier guidelines.

Technology and cheap airfares have facilitated challenges to those earlier guidelines. At speeds unanticipated even a decade ago, the Internet encourages new dialogues on previously forbidden sexual subjects. For LGBT people and advocates of sexual freedom, the Internet has facilitated new friendships, enlarged social networks and encouraged political activism. In places where hostility toward non-normative sexuality can engender queer-bashings, street harassment and criminal arrest (which includes places in the United States as well as Eastern and Western Europe) the Internet can grant a degree of safety and sexual privacy. In addition, low-cost air travel has made it possible to attend huge events such as EuroPride, the Gay Games, the Miami White Party and International Mr. Leather possible. Even smaller networks
of like-minded people, like the SocandSex scholars, depend on the Internet and cheap international travel to meet, share papers and exchange ideas.

As important as these east-west conversations are for critiquing contemporary socialist and radical sex movements, subaltern scholars warn against the colonial’s habit of collapsing a heterogenous “other” into an essentialist, collective identity. (Goonatilake, 1998; Spivak, 1988) Doing so, in effect, resurrects the Berlin Wall, potentially recreating simplistic analyses dividing the “West” and “East.” For activists, heeding this warning demands that we recognize and encourage indigenous forms of protest and resistance, and that we seek culturally-specific movement centers from which we can develop the strategic resources needed for activism. (Morris, 1984) The challenge for scholars who study movements is equally difficult. The papers of Mustafa Kemal Coskun and Tuba Ozkan, and of Bogdan Lešnik both suggest that the emergence of gay and lesbian activism in Turkey and Slovenia can not be fully explained using Western analytical frameworks. These contortions of new social movement theory hint that it might be time to reconsider how culture, resistance, and activism fuse into movements for social change, particularly as activists interrogate and reconfigure matters of “identity,” “sexuality,” “gender,” “race,” and “ethnicity.”

“Sexuality” has various meanings in these papers and for movement activists. “Sexuality” often refers to sexual identity, or to sexual orientation or sexual preference; these are lawmakers’ terms referring to people who identify as gay men, lesbians or bisexuals (and in some cases, transgendersed people). Pogodzinska discusses the potential effects of banning discrimination on the basis of “sexual orientation” as one of the obligations of EU membership, which she interprets as discrimination against homosexuals as a fixed category of identity. In contrast, “sexual preference” is a much broader term that implies sexual choice rather than biological determinism; it is a term that can include a range of alternative sexual behaviors and possibly gender identities. (See for example, Guadio, 1988)

For activists, the distinction between “orientation” and “preference” presents a critical strategic choice. Organizations that emphasize sexual orientation seem likely to choose ideological arguments that reinforce identity politics, arguing in favor of civil protections for GLBT persons who cannot change their sexuality. An emphasis on “sexual preference,” however, has the potential to shift the legal burden to the State, by challenging laws that criminalize homosexual and other non-procreative sexual acts, including sex work and public sex.

The decriminalization of sexuality represents the next goal for GLBT and radical sex activists. It will require a different ideological framework than the identity-based approach used by many GLBT organizations. A human rights framework goes beyond seeking legal protections for specific citizens based on their (biological) identities, and seeks to affirm the right to sex, the right to pursue pleasure. Hekma proposes that activism focus on sexual citizenship, asserting that we all have sexual rights as well as sexual responsibilities. The pursuit of pleasure comes with the obligation of consent. In our view, people have the right to enjoy their bodies and the right to bodily integrity; “my body is my own,” declares African American activist Robin Stone. (Stone, 2005) Stone’s declaration of self-determination is echoed by sex worker activists and the squatter movement, Levy and Poldervaart describe in their papers.

Sexual citizenship helps to challenge the false dichotomy between “public” and “private” sex. The State does not recognize the (sexual) privacy for those who are not citizens. The sexual acts of non-citizens and second-class citizens are often policed more heavily than those with full citizenship privileges. It is a given that queer, female, immigrant and impoverished populations face a variety of legal restrictions regarding sexual behavior and procreation that heterosexual, married men do not face. Restrictions against the adoption of children by gay or lesbian parents, prohibitions against the artificial insemination of unmarried women, denial of social welfare benefits to the children of immigrants or guest workers, requiring welfare
recipients to use birth control, leveling rape charges in cases involving consensual inter-racial or inter-ethnic sexual relations, the refusal to issue tourist visas to sex workers and HIV-positive persons, even blaming race riots and civil unrest on non-nuclear family arrangements, are examples of the ways the State punishes the undesirable sexual behaviors of second class citizens and residents.

Sexual citizenship may not eliminate all of these prejudicial restrictions, but the political struggle to expand the definition of human rights to include sexual rights will be provocative. In this, as SocandSex founder Francis Ronsin suggests in the opening essay of this volume, it cannot be wrong to be utopian in our outlook.

Bibliography:


Mosse, George L., Nationalism and sexuality: respectability and abnormal sexuality in modern Europe (New York : H. Fertig, 1985)


Notes:


c. I am oversimplifying a much larger and complex argument. It is also worthwhile to note that Goonatilake views globalization positively as it has created new centers of scientific knowledge with the rise of China, India and Japan.

d. Critics of the biological determinative aspects of this debate have been particularly fierce in their denunciations because they believe that identifying a genetic marker for homosexuality could result in new form of scientific racism; some go so far as to suggest that homophobes might use genetics to identify and systematically eliminate homosexuals, evoking the Holocaust. At the same time, homophobic and fundamentalist religious activists in the U.S. attack the concept of “sexual preference,” arguing that since sexuality is culturally constructed, “reparative” or “conversion therapy” can eliminate homosexual tendencies. See also Francis Ronsin’s discussion of “scientism” in this volume.

e. According to government reports issued after the Harlem (New York City) riot of 1935, and the Kerner Commission report of 1968, one cause of the race riots was the unnatural, “matriarchal” structure of African American families. ([Frazier], 1935; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968)
IS SEXUALITY THE END OF UTOPIA?

Francis Ronsin

I - The trap of Utopia
My frequent use of the term-“utopia” has always posed problems that can basically be summarized under the two sets of ideas:

1) I was inevitably considered a “utopian” dreamer when I sometimes called for a great—or even a small – modification of the social order that appeared logical and necessary to me. Karl Mannheim knew these same setbacks when he wrote: “Whenever an idea is labeled utopian it is usually by a representative of an epoch that has already passed.”

The pejorative tone people used to announce this label bothered me because it implied my exclusion from ongoing “serious” discussions. My critics employ the ordinary definition of the term “Utopia,” which suggests imagining a harmonious, but unrealizable, society. This definition has forced me to accept, against my wishes and under penalty of ostracism, their vision of a world built on abstractions. It is fine to show agreement and desire to improve society, but apparently it is nonsense to want to thoughtfully criticize and deconstruct it.

My critics give the impression that they hold the most eccentric set of assumptions as “Truth”: a democratic republic, leaders concerned about the common interest, workers blossoming under a just wage-earning system, even humanity governed by divine providence. But this changed nothing: they could talk seriously among themselves, but not to me, the utopian dreamer!

2) I am from a generation that could choose among numerous types of socialism, at least provisionally. We were permitted to choose “scientific socialism” – although this choice routinely provoked condescension because it deviated from our other choice, “utopian socialism” which itself had happily been liberated from progressive opinion. May I confess here that I did not see what was particularly scientific in Marxism? Fortunately, I was already an experienced student: I recognized that the invocation of science was like the invocation of God: a frequently used method to squash free-thinking.

Since then, I have visited most of the countries that achieved “real socialism.” There I did not see the gulags or anything that was exceptionally revolting, but rather problems such as the aggregation of trams with hundreds of “dictators” trying to board them at five o’clock in the morning!

Some years ago, “real socialism” collapsed. “Scientific socialism,” the dictatorship of the proletariat, was based, in fact, largely on ill-fated utopias. Most of these former Marxists scorned the remaining socialists who had not lost their earlier convictions.

In the decades since socialism’s collapse, people have employed the term “utopian” to dismiss critical observations on the class state whose righteousness and power is an article of faith.

It is this sense of utopia that the critics sincerely believed in a society constructed on the most artificial of ideological bases. With the exception of Thomas More, thoughtful people have never claimed to be utopianists.

All things considered, the full value of my first schoolbook lesson in philosophy “He who says it, is it!” became particularly appropriate in the study of the history of ideas of sexuality.

II. Errors of Eros
The distinction between licit and illicit sexual practices was one of the essential concerns of the modern societies. The family was “the basic unit of society” and it frequently regarded this
distinction as the fundamental question for its survival.

In canon law, which largely fathered French law until the Revolution, sins are “the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: Adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness,” *(Gal., V, 19)*. Thus, the failure to repent sins of corruption of a divine creature results in exclusion from the community of God’s children, who are created in his image and without sin. It is then, impossible for the Church – for whom marriage is indissoluble – to accept laws that permit individuals to divorce, to remarry, or to live together openly in defiance of God’s law. This is clearly written in the books by undisputed authorities, and their interpretation of God’s laws cannot be challenged.

May I suggest that the Catholic vision of the world looks very utopian? Those who support the legalization of divorce have, from the day before the Revolution, observed these truths about marriage: it is an institution of arranged marriages, of frequent adultery and spousal abuse, of declining mutual interest and lost love. In the interest of individuals and of society, realistic marriage and divorce laws are needed.

The Republic authorized divorce and the Restoration forbade it again. In the repeated confrontations that followed, opponents of divorce ceased condemning it as a violation of Catholicism and began to oppose it as a liberal travesty. They ceased invoking God and called upon another unique and immaterial entity: Morality.-Society and law are the means of insuring the reign of the morality. As Baron d’Holbach dreamed, theocracy succeeded *éthocratie.*

The list of immoral sexual behaviors was almost identical to the list of sins. There was also an identical list attacking Nature, the new idol of authority. As d’Holbach declaimed,

“O Nature, sovereign of all beings! and ye, her adorable daughters, Virtue, Reason, and Truth! remain for ever our only Divinities.”

Nature abhors not only a vacuum, it abhors all those who are devoted to “unnatural” acts. Voltaire, who had some responsibility constitution of natural rights but whose humor saves him from ridicule, perfectly illustrated the scientific phenomenon of evolution in his entry on “Onan, onanism” in his *Philosophical Dictionary:* "Notice that among the species, men and monkeys are the only ones that fail in this defect against the wishes of the nature.”

Defense of the national interest was another bit of nonsense increasingly associated with secular morality. Thus néo-Malthusian propaganda advocating birth control has been pell-mell accused of offending God, for being contrary to Nature, for violating etiquette, and for threatening the economic development and military power of France. Natalism marshaled sexuality.

But am I not confusing ideology with Utopia? Karl Mannheim, cited earlier, used the two terms as powerful opposites:

Only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time. By limiting the meaning of the term ‘utopia’ to that type of orientation which transcends reality and which at the same time breaks the bonds of the existing order, a distinction is set up between the utopian and the ideological states of mind.

In *Jean-Christophe,* Romain Rolland ignores the Marxist engagement arising from this distinction, in writing about “‘Utopias’ à la française’: paix universelle, fraternité, progrès pacifique, droits de l’homme, égalité naturelle.” Furthermore, the ruling class is not in accord with the existing order – or, rather, the existing disorder – on matters of sexuality. While others want to abolish capitalism, the objective of this group is to eliminate sin, vice, and unnatural perversions: their Utopia would establish good manners! Scientism will achieve what sermons, stakes and prisons, have not. Employing science to explain everything, to rule over everything, to regulate everything, the state gains the allegiance of both its defenders and enemies who believe in science.
Scientism, which seeks a rational explanation for the causes of physical and human phenomena, became the dominant evidence of utopia in the nineteenth century. The Lamarckian classifications of invertebrate life forms influenced the classification of mental illnesses, deviant behaviors and perversions, culminating in the major works of von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis.

Krafft-Ebing’s personality and work illustrate remarkably the principal aspects of scientism in the field of sexology. He was a psychiatrist who studied the “perverse” that he observed in mental patients. He practiced as forensic surgeon; the State criminalized the behaviors he described, and he then testified for the State in prosecuting sexual behaviors. The title of his main work, republished several times, *Psychopathia sexualis* (1886), is in Latin. Latin, the language of science, is also the language of clerics who used the same methods to protect the common people from stories of increasing sexual debauchery told in their confessionals. Such precautions were quite an illusory; Krafft-Ebing taught little to brothel madams, while authors exploited these erudite treatises to satisfy the tastes of their readers.7 The Marquis de Sade was long dead and Sacher-Masoch’s *Venus in Furs*, appeared in 1870, well before Krafft-Ebing coined the terms “sadism” and “masochism.”

To construct an accurate natural history of perversions look, for example, at the definition provided in the electronic version of *Robert* (version 1.4, 1985): “Sexual perversion: any tendency to look for sexual satisfaction otherwise that by ‘normal’ sex act, defined as coupling up with a person of the opposite sex, to obtain the orgasm by genital penetration. Bestiality (or zoophilia), exhibitionism, fetishism, homosexuality, masochism, necrophilia, pedophilia, sadism, voyeurism.” The list is too short!8

In spite of the invocation of God, nature, justice and science, evil has not been rooted out. Some say its influence has only grown. Obviously, such attempts were utopian!

III End of Utopia?

There was a time when physics and philosophy tended toward consideration of unpredictable and erratic phenomena in which 1+1 equaled only 2. The twentieth century saw a succession of attacks against the well-fed modern Cartesianism that was the principal food of Utopia. Chaos theory, cubism, surrealism, the experimental music of John Cage, deconstructionism, avant-gardism – made the old debate over the sex-gender of angels obsolete. It is however very difficult to say at what point and to what measure those authors who radically transformed the philosophical and scientific to sexual questions – Freud, Magnus Hirschfeld, Michel Foucault, Kate Millet, Judith Butler – to quote only a few names – influenced public opinion. The second half of the twentieth century saw the end of the old clichés that had once supported a secular vision of a perfect sexual order.

In 1953, Harry Benjamin defended himself and his legitimacy before the Academy of Medicine of New York. In carefully limited cases, he was permitted to respond to the requests of transsexuals for surgical operation. The first public operation took place that same year in Denmark. A border, believed impassable, fell.

The fight for the freedom of women to control their fertility – without regard for divine will nor nature – is one of the main factors in the destruction of an institutionalized ideal sexual model. The Neuwirth law of 1967 authorized contraception in France, a country of old Catholic tradition and obsessed by a decreasing birth rate, but which recognized that sexual desire is not necessarily related to procreative instinct or the survival of the species.

This evolution in attitudes forced a variety of conservatives to revise their positions and recognize that it is not abnormal when a minor girl wishes to have sexual intercourse without wishing to start a family. On the contrary, it is now “conservative” to encourage girls to pro-
tect themselves from pregnancy by using contraception, and if that fails, to escape a “catastro-
phe” by obtaining the morning after pill without cost, even without the consent of her parents,  
from the school infirmary or from a pharmacy.

The other principle factor in the collapse of the “utopia of normality” was the theoretical  
and political fight of radical feminists and homosexuals, who often allied in praxis, the syn-
thesis of theory and practice.

In June 1969, homosexuals, the majority of them transvestites or transsexuals who pa-
tronized the Stonewall Inn, rioted for several days against the New York City. “Gay pride”  
marches erupted in public space becoming larger and increasingly more accepted. Hundreds  
of thousands of people take part each year in the Parisian “Gay Pride” march, with politicians  
of a certain kind of fame at the lead. It is fascinating and amusing to watch the procession of  
drag queens, transsexuals or sadomasochists, but certainly not appalling.

In France in 2004, other Gay pride marches took place in Angers, Biarritz, Bordeaux, Lille,  
Lyon, Marseilles, Metz, Montpellier, Nantes, Reims, Rennes, Rouen, Strasbourg, Toulouse.  
The subject of the popular public television program “Ca se discute” was “DJs, go-go danc-
ers, transsexuals, drag queens: When parents discover their children’s gay nights,” on 31 May  
2004. Does this mean a loss of moral values? Yes, and fortunately so. But it indicates, espe-
cially, an acceptance of reality, and of the diversity of natures and the sex drives.

European institutions had a major role in the eradication of discrimination against ho-
mosexuals, through the laws of European Community members. In 1981, the Council of Eu-
rope adopted a report that, among other things, requested World Health Organization to  
remove homosexuality of its list of psychoses. It is also proposed the suspension of reparative  
or conversion therapy, and related psycho-medical treatments, intended to modify the sexual  
inclinations of adults. Another recommendation was to stop classifying homosexuality as a  
psychological disorder and to talk instead of “sexual preferences.”

The opening section of the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, set forth in its principles  
Article 13 (formerly 6a) stating:

Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers  
conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from  
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action  
to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age  
or sexual orientation.

While the text proscribes a process undoubtedly too complicated to be workable, it non-
theless perfectly supports the idea recognizing the plurality of “sexual orientation.”

On 2 July 2004, Carla and Marie-Laure won a judgment giving them joint parental custody  
of their three girls, born as a result of artificial insemination in Belgium; such procedures are  
forbidden in France to unmarried single women. This was the first French family officially  
composed of two parents of the same sex.

Relying on genetic testing, numerous studies show that no what the law, social class, or ob-
served religion, numerous children were conceived by someone other than their legal father.  
The naïve distinction made in utopian socialism between “femmes à affection profonde” and  
“femmes à affections vives” could offer a more realistic option than the eternally utopian no-
tion that imposes fidelity on all wives.

Economic and commercial spaces promise personal fulfillment through work and paradise  
through consumerism; they sometimes seem a modern Utopian refuge. Even these arenas  
seem conscious of the need to acknowledge the anguished sexual premises that have inspired  
centuries of admirers and social critics. It is advertising values androgyny while making voy-
eurism, fetishism, masochism, and even pedophilia, commonplace. The great mysteries of  
clothing that buttoned on the left for women and on the right for men have disappeared with

11
rise of “unisex” fashion. Sexual behaviors are a means for escaping a permissive standardization that has become indeterminate and indifferent.

Logically, one consequence of these developments is that the distinctions regarding sexuality made by Utopian thinks such as Fourier are now inappropriate. They were free spirits who perceived as unrealistic the sexual standards their contemporaries declared normal and compulsory. On the contrary, they attempted to show the diversity of desires, pleasures and passions that are widely accepted today. They were delighted by all of them and called for a sexual freedom that is finally under way.

Notes:
4http://www.voltaire-integral.com/20/onan.htm
5Mannheim, p. 173
7In particular for the “flagellation” novels, whose success, at the start of the twentieth century, was remarkable.
8In my *Petit Robert*, edition of 1988, homosexuality does not appear any more in the list of the sexual perversions.
9Information drawn from work of Daniel Borrillo on homosexuality, homophobia and Europe.
THE ABSENT FOUCALUT:
BULGARIAN (MIS)USES*

Stanimir Panayotov

“There is no political position purified by power, and perhaps that impurity is what produces agency as the potential interruption and reversal of regulatory regimes.”

(Butler 1999: xxvi)

The history the LGBT movement in Bulgaria has rarely received support from theoretical premises, whether in academia, activism or public discussions. This is both worrisome and expected, and we should examine the situation and its organizational/emancipatory experience. This underused and underdeveloped stage of theory and theorizing of same-sex desire in Bulgaria’s movement and in academic circles is my object in this chapter.

Not much theory has been developed for or in the Bulgarian LGBT movement B not only in terms of activism, but also in arguing for sexual differences and for a more politicized, sustained and un-policied lives (see Pisankaneva’s paper in this volume). The situation refers to the organized movement itself, “moving” primarily its own officially declared existence, and not LGBT people generally, along with their strivings in the present day. Here, I examine how organizers’ resistance to adopting theoretical productions arising from Western movements is a factor for weakened activism. I also consider whether these are connected to the political changes that came with end of Soviet dominance in 1989, exploring the influence political changes had over the acceptance of alternative theories and schools of thought. I am referring here to the influence of Michel Foucault and his work on the history of sexuality with its “hypothesis of repression” (Foucault 1980: 43), as it is deployed by western scholars (for example Adam, Weeks, Altman, D’Emilio, Faderman, de Lauretis, Newton, Rubin, Sedgwick, Butler, etc.) Yet in the context of theoretically influenced public stances that are linked to LGBT emancipation, Foucault and other relevant queer theorists remains under-researched in SEE-countries and in Bulgaria in particular.

In order to give examples of the absence of theory in Bulgaria, I will begin with a personal encounter that exemplifies how Foucauldian theory is applied and perceived in Bulgaria. To demonstrate this, I will (theoretically) “sacrifice” my own experience and politicize it. Although my own example does not thoroughly exemplify my argument, neither is such an illustration needed; the patient reader will understand why soon enough. The policing of one’s life through the restrictions and structures of one’s livelihood destabilizes one’s life outside of one’s occupation. In the second part of the chapter I outline the Bulgarian reception of Foucault. This section, I hope, gives a clearer picture of the overall context. The concluding section explored why, after all, Foucault’s sexually-nuanced philosophy has not yet been developed in Bulgaria.

* This article represents a sketchy outline of a larger ethno-methodological study on Foucault’s reception in Bulgaria in terms both of theory and activism, where I use Harold Garfinkel’s ([1967] 1987) and Nicolas Mullins’s (1973) ethno-methodological theories in details. I am trying at mixing and bringing together at once two schools of thoughts and disciplines, since it is not only that such a reception does not quite exist, but also because the existing one is under-developed in terms of the Academia, placing Foucauldian analyses mostly in the direction of independent researches, held by third-sector institutes and centers. My original desire came from, on the one hand, the tradition of using ethno-methodology and symbolic interactionism along with gay and lesbian studies, and, on the other hand, from desire to work and contribute for a more sustained theoretically activist LGBT movement in Bulgaria, which is now still evolving in terms of a ‘democracy to come’
The Example

More than a year ago I had an academic quarrel with a teaching assistant of mine that prompted me to reflect on the encounter itself. It seemed to me that being a student in philosophy is not very comfortable venture; it is not comfortable to be gay in academia, but it is also discomforting when one attempts to incorporate theories about sexuality into your obligatory curriculum, if you are permitted to do so at all.

This quarrel took place in the subject of the Philosophy of History. As my class was obliged to prepare mandatory papers for passing the course, I was more concerned about incorporating my recent readings in queer theory into my paper, which led to the example. I eventually completed my paper on time, for which TA informed us we would have the “freedom” to be both innovative and creative. My paper was an overview of Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge in regards to the history of sexuality and its links to gay and lesbian studies/queer theory as a methodology. I applied Foucault in that respect, arguing my points, and passing the paper in to the TA. Unfortunately, at the end I was refused a grade: I did not receive the lowest possible grade, but no grade at all. Obviously, a discussion with the TA took place. The mixing of these two B a missing grade and a vehement discussion B led a failed exam and demands an analysis of the particular problem: why the grade was denied and for what reason. But beyond my own academic career, this example requires an analysis of the disciplining exercised by educational institutions as representatives of the State. I will discuss this latter question in the next section of the paper.

It is necessary to note my TA’s outstanding credentials and personality. He is a very knowledgeable teacher with a rather broad scope of views and world-outlook; even a personality such as his, far removed being from the conservative neo-liberalism and Habermasian accounts that the political domain failed to address such as recognizing same-sex desire as a subject for the philosophy of history/history of philosophy. The TA refused to name one’s (my) sexuality as the reason for denying the grade, but rather cited (one’s) Foucault’s unpopularity in Bulgaria as his work is used for critical deconstructionist gay and lesbian standpoints. However, a “personality” (a “one”, an “eventualized” one, in the sense of Badieu’s ethics) is the more important feature here. Was my TA an apparent non-liberal, or was he a hidden, underdeveloped (as Sade would put it) republican?

Butler’s political frame allows the unveiling of new political configurations out of the ruins of the old political domain (Butler 1999: 190), and provides the analytical structure I will employ here. Needless to say, none of the objections cited by the TA were given in the course syllabus. The conclusion was this: on the one hand, it was legitimate to theorize Foucault as long as the subject included his work, but it was illegitimate to theorize over the gay Foucault: the practical and particular linkages between sexual orientation (implicit) and philosophy (explicit) was not permitted, thus rendering my paper un-gradable. Meaning: the inter-relational account in-between theory and personality, gender and philosophy (as if they are always separable) could not be acknowledged.

The first obstacle was that should he acknowledge it, my TA would “recognize” or “unveil” my sexuality (as if I was hiding it). Rendered unimportant was the link between personality (Foucault being considered a leftist radical, both politically and sexually) and philosophy (a left-wing, “pederastically” proclaimed philosophy to cite my TA). The second obstacle, the linkage between my sexuality and this particular course on the philosophy of history, is also a rather important feature, although not explicitly discussed.

The result of this dispute was perhaps predictable: if I had theorized explicitly (which I did not) my own “confessed” sexuality, I would have definitely been disciplined for exposing it;
since I did not, I was “accused” by the denial of any grade for my paper B of course, without my sexuality being mentioned, and, perhaps, because of that. Thus, we can see that silence on these two issues produces one and the same result: silence time and again. Clearly, the linkage between my sexuality and the syllabus was evident in that it was not mentioned (‘hidden’ in theory but suggestive in the discourse), but remained unspoken B and not because of personal preference, but in order to “lay hold” into the real and active syllabus. Germanic-scientific rigidity clearly dominated (or masked?) the “sexually-oriented” philosophy, thus clarifying that the freedom “we” (the colleagues in charge) gained and “I” (the one with no grade) gained does not overlap.

A third obstacle appeared in discussing the issue scientifically (and this is something to be appreciated in a German-influenced higher education system, for not every TA would agree to get involved in a discussion “arguing for” his position). Was it permissible for one to choose an author and a topic by confining him/her/oneself according to the syllabus, or was it necessary to confine yourself in order to take the exam? It was allowed that one has the freedom to choose topics, but that some have more freedom than others. What remained undecided was which aspects Foucault’s works could be rendered as “subjects” of the philosophy of history, and which could not. It is here that Foucault B as an author’s discourse B could not rightly be considered a subject. Now, an evident distinction can be drawn between Foucault and Foucault: a rather inferior division of Foucault himself, thus inferiorly dividing the syllabus as well. Was it correct to say that I was the one who challenged the “sexual orientation” of the syllabus, or was it the TA, or perhaps it was Foucault “himself” (as if he could remain “himself” particularized as he was by the syllabus). For that matter, who’s the responsible subject of this problem? Is it the TA, the Professor or the policies of the University Faculty? And could this even be answered, since silencing, after all, was the reason for this matter remained unspoken?

Politics loomed large in these discussions: a fourth problem. The general argument went as follows. On the one hand, Foucault is a philosopher, whose philosophy is contradictio in adjec-to, since he both critiqued the politics of normality and preservation of populations (especially in his late period [Foucault 1977; 2000; 2004; Martin 1988]) and he discredited and contradicted his critiques to preserve himself politically through his own political engagements B left ones, as they were. “Preserving” here meant as a “pederast,” since Foucault was strengthened through his left-wing homosexual political circles where everyone depends sexually and politically on everyone. (This is the “gay lobby myth,” a very popular one in Bulgaria, a.k.a., the “velvet mafia.”).

Thus, the link between sexual and political orientation was over-emphasized, and the philosophy itself remained unimportant in that very discussion on the philosophy of history, in order to accuse, sustain and reject the inter-dependence between personal sexual behavior and publicly inscribed (and sexually-dependant) philosophy. After all, might there be dependency between philosopher and philosophy, as some ask? Is it possible or appropriate to deny or affirm the relation between the subject, which had been rendered missing in the philosophy of history: the relation between the philosopher and the philosophy, an eventually over-objective subjection of the graspable, of the intelligible, of the syllabically real? What could be said if one is not engaged politically in terms of philosophy, in terms of sexuality? Perhaps, that “one” is not responsible for the truth argued, but for the philosophy at large? Or perhaps that being preserved politically over-determinates the philosophy of the philosopher B Foucault himself? Either way, it turns out that even though the philosophy of history goes under the rubric of contemporary philosophy where particular values and methodologies that are proclaimed important (for example, French historical-cultural materialism, post-colonial theory, and even
the Habermasian “participation in the practical discourse”) requires becoming intimately involved in the discourse itself. Thus, the political participation and engagement of Foucault is rendered unimportant too, and there need not be any relation between theory and practice. Rather, the principle of non-participation is welcomed. And let us remember that this argument comes from one of the founding fathers of Liberalism, Kant. In the second edition of *The Perpetual Peace*, Kant adds the so-called “secret article” to the perpetual peace, where we read, “That kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings is not to be expected. Nor is it to be wished, since the possession of power inevitably corrupts the untrammeled judgment of reason” (Kant [1795] 1983). Yet here, the King and the philosopher (Foucault) are actually one and the same.

Let us experiment: Clearly, Kant never predicted sexual orientation would be claimed as mind-foreshadowing factor; and if we raise the problem of who is the “one” (the equivalent of the King) with whom Foucault had sex, then we have a oroborus, where Foucault might have penetrated himself and kept it secret. That is, precisely, both parody and literality B a literal parody, challenging of the history of philosophy, and with this, of its logical Hegelian reversal B the philosophy of history. Neither shelters (gay) Foucault, for he is divided in two. The problem Kant raised is as old as philosophy, and perhaps because it is, the secret article failed when put into practice in contemporary materialist schools of thought that bond together theory and activism. On the other hand, in the particular example I raise here, neither my personal-institutional controversy over Foucault has been recognized and declared, nor has Foucault’s account and influence in the political domain been developed theoretically from an activist standpoint. (This also suggest a more profound and provisionary methodology of truth and certainties as “taken-for-grantedness,” Butler 1999.) Unfortunately, Kant never had the opportunity to share the same “being” with Marx/ism because of the unpredictable, contingent and over-determined historical destiny of the history of philosophy.

The case now outlined, I will list some of its secondary determinations. On the one hand, the so-called Humboldian University model (the German one, having its tradition from Kant, Fichte and Schleiermacher to Mach) that usually prevents students and their professors from forming a closer bond, and instead substituted the assignment of reading hundreds, event thousands, of pages. However, as recently dictated by the Bologna Process,1 the Bulgarian university system, and Sofia University in particular, are undergoing gradual reforms that expose them to radical changes B a kind of “Americanization” and “pragmaticization” of the old German model. The reform itself is fairly shallow: it does not lead to a more conversational model (at not at present).

The paradox of receiving no grade for a paper on Foucault paper reveals also the tensions arising from these radical changes in the university system. On the one hand, the new model refers to the one who is responsible for the grade, without considering the university’s, the faculty’s, or the discipline’s philosophy. According to the Humboldt philosophy, the responsibility for grades will lie at the heart of an institutionalized philosophy in which no human resource is a factor for the subjects of the grade). On the other hand, according to the pragmaticist or American model, the grade is reliant on the relationship between the professor-student. This is very close to the joke earlier about Kant and Marx. In this regard, Humboldt never met Pierce or William James, and thus there is nothing but a contingent historical over-determination, drawing from the universality of the situation (I am referring here to Butler, Laclau, and Žižek’s (2000) elaboration of Gramsci’s concept of universality). I do not claim history as an instituted God, but I do claim my missing grade (is it?) reflects an institution with a trajectory charted through an institutional model and the teaching philosophy of a particular Teaching
Assistant who is occasionally a philosopher B of history, thus implying a degree of materialism. And precisely the decisions of my university and its faculty are also the markers of what they don’t say in making those decisions, thus preventing me from earning a grade, an award, an evaluation, perhaps even graduation the institution.

In addition, that kind of institutionalism turns out to be not about the philosophy of history in its entirety, but more specifically good old (schooled) Hegelian philosophy of history, and its attendant practitioners (e.g., Dilthey, Schpengler, Riceur, the “Annales” school and Brodel, Althusser, etc.). The particular gesture of refusing to assign a grade is an act of the philosophy of history incorporated into or performed by the syllabus; it is a masquerade, a false inversion, that re-inverts (or reverts) its logical structure, becoming an idealistic presupposition of what is included as subject-matter in principle on the basis of what is excluded immanently. This is so not only because of the EU-oriented reforms, but also as a cross-generational acceptance and understanding (on generations, see below).

Reception

In this framework, let me note that this same TA recalled an interesting story from a Foucauldian conference he attended in 1994 in Sofia. There, Danielle Defere - Foucault's life-long partner B asked why even a single gay activist did not participate in the conference. His question would have been relevant, but the first-ever officially registered gay organization (Gemini) had only appeared in 1992, and did little until 1999, when its received funding from the Dutch government for a larger service project (See Pinsankaneva in this volume). In light of an almost non-existent LGBT movement, Defere's question was irrelevant. However, if Defere or someone else posed this question today at another Foucauldian conference in Bulgaria, it would not be relevant. The question would still be irrelevant, in my opinion, because Foucault is still not included in the syllabus of LGBT-consciousness-raising.

In the early 1990s, Foucault's writings became available in Bulgarian, and now almost all of his works are available (excluding some late essays, “Fearless Speech,” “I, Pierre Rivierre…,” “Herquiline Barbin…,” and few other minor works). His works now preoccupies some disciplines in the humanities, especially in cultural studies, and are actively used in the sense of a political "toolkit" (as conceived by Bourdieu) for studying modern life. In this “academic” aspect, he has been useful predominantly in linking power to dissidence (as, say, Havel, Patocka); the ideological philosophy of the Communist regime versus “rotten bourgeois Western” theories and the intimate intellectual burden/terror that such struggles bring to dissident circles and intellectual life prior to 1989 political (Nikolchina 2002). Foucault is very useful as a social science methodology for introducing old and new theoretical schools and fields of research (Deyanov 1998; 1999; 2001; 2004; Raichev 1999; 2000). Furthermore, Foucault is very popular in art circles and alternative (sub)cultures of artists and writers, although not directly; rather, critical culture is interpreted through the lens of Foucauldian or Deleuzian analyses (e.g. Latchezar Bojadzhiev, Ventzislav Zankov, Rajna Markova, Rassim Krastev, AGITPROP). Finally, Foucault is cited very often as a theoretical framework for public intellectual discussions, or is incorporated by allusion and without citation, because some considered him “ungraspable” in some situations. Even such a popular cultural phenomenon such as the widely watched television reality-show “Big Brother” is discussed through a Foucauldian lens.

Foucault's influence on contemporary Bulgarian philosophy was officially possible and permitted only after 1989. His influence since then must be linked to the EU university reform, and impact of those changes on the discipline of philosophy in particular. Yet, there are people who still devote effort to Foucauldianism and the schools of thought linked to it, sometimes
going well beyond Foucault, considering him a “stage” in contemporary philosophical thinking. Among those who are known as Foucauldians (and not only Foucauldians) in contemporary Bulgarian philosophy are Koleva (Koleva, Marinova, Sabeva 1999; Koleva 2000) who has been active in translating, publishing and, for some time, writing on Foucault’s influence in the humanities, urban spaces, and the binaries of private/public and inside/out. Deyanov works predominantly in the area of social science methodologies and on the paradigm of “The Death of Man,” raising key debates in the development in humanities in Bulgaria today (see Kapriev 2002). This is also of interest to Raichev, except that he is keener to incorporate postmodern thought in politics and public spaces, in his interest as a media boss. Kiossev, one of the founders of cultural studies in Bulgaria, inevitably and (in)tentionally has inferred Foucauldian analyses; he has also focused on the binaries of private-public and East-West as well as matters of transition and integration (first-third world), Orientalism–Occidentalism/Westernization, and the making of literary canons (see Kiossev 2002, 2002a, 2000b; see also Deyanova 2002). Yet none of these scholars touch explicitly on gay and lesbian issues; not only are they silent regarding Foucault’s personal characteristics and his sexual orientation, but also because they seem to be totally unaware or uninterested in the LGBT movement, and reflexively, the LGBT movement’s disinterest in engaging Foucault along with activism B or rather, lack of activism.

Until 2003, the only Bulgarian philosophers to raise gay and lesbian issues in the humanities and cultural periodicals were Emil Grigorov and Vladimir Gradev. Grigorov has published only once on this topic (Grigorov 2001), declaring his support for the LGBT movement, but focusing on multiculturalism, ethics and aesthetics in general. Gradev, whose doctoral dissertation was on Foucault, has written several articles on gay and lesbian issues; he employs the critical lens of Foucault to incorporate explicitly the personal (gay) aspect of his philosophy, translated several articles, and taught a seminar, “Sexuality, Power, and Society” at Sofia University. This has not hurt his career: he is now the Bulgarian ambassador to the Vatican! (see Gradev 1999; 2000; 2001). My own work in LGBT studies and queer theory examines Foucault’s influence in relation to gay and lesbian issues and philosophical materialism and feminism (Panayotov 2003, 2003a; 2004, 2004a, 2004b). A special issue of the *Critique and Humanism* in 2004 was devoted to the politics of normalization; most of the papers mentioned or considered Foucault’s, applied to different schools and subjects.

Scholars in other fields are actively engaging Foucault. Pisankaneva also researches gay and lesbian issues, although not specifically Foucault; rather she considers gender mainstreaming and media discourses; she has also taught “Sexual Identities,” an elective course in New Bulgarian University. Translators of major works are Halperin, Butler, Hocqenguem, Dover, and Sedgwick (forthcoming); most of these scholars are published under the guidance of Antoaneta Koleva. In addition, Foucault’s work is read in feminist and gender studies, although there is little work discussing his influence in these fields (an excellent examples is Nikolchina 2002; Kamburov & Novikova 2003; see also Gochev 2003).

Briefly then since 1992, the year officially viewed as the birth date of the Bulgarian LGBT movement, these are the people who have devoted attention to Foucault and to theorizing gender identity and same-sex desire. We can show that Foucault has been used, analyzed, taught and discussed in the fields of sociology, cultural studies and political sciences, but little by philosophers; quantitative research of the articles and books on Foucault would demonstrate this unambiguously. Thus we can say he has been included in the university curricula and in discipline of philosophy, but in practice Foucault does not receive serious enough attention to declare philosophical commitment. Perhaps because Foucault once called himself “a journal-
ist” instead of a “philosopher,” and because he is considered a prominent left-wing post-Marxian B which fell out of favor in Bulgaria after the radical philosophical, ideological and political break with Marxism after 1989.

Marxism and Neo-Marxism are now slowly re-vitalizing fields for a small younger generation of Bulgarians. In practice, this revival does not depend on earlier generations Marxist thinkers in Bulgaria, yet does cite them as their “teachers” or “forefathers” (both formally or informally; see Karavelov 1999; 2002; Tenev 2002; Igov & Popivanov 2004; Ivancheva & Panayotov 2005), thus leading to a certain kind of non-causal citational deference. The situation with Marxism is double-bounded, like that of Foucault, in Bulgarian philosophy in particular.

Conclusions

It is pointless to ask why there is no gay and lesbian reading of Foucault if activists have only rarely heard of him. This is both early and belated; it is early if we consider the thirteen-year so-called “history” of the LGBT movement in Bulgaria, but is also belated precisely because of that foreshortened “history.” Rather, the more appropriate questions are 1) Why is the topic of normative sexuality and sexual life not raised in the LGBT movement? and 2) Why activists have not bonded with potentially useful philosophers who could contribute to the movement by politicizing sexual identities adequately? Here I do not hold responsible anyone for something he or she does not know, nor those who do not directly participate the movement or its discourses.

So far LGBT people in Bulgaria have not been a factor in their own existence. What I would call passive activism (derived from Gramsci’s notion of “passive revolution”) explains why Foucault was not instituted while being “normalized” (see below) in the corpus of LGBT studies/queer theory literary. Here I recall what one activist, a lesbian from the countryside, said at a national conference promoting an anti-discrimination law, “We have to have an MP and then everything will be alright.”

We can conclude that, in a sense, Foucault has been successfully integrated both in intellectual life and book markets; his is one of a few names in the humanities that always sell out. Yet, as I have shown above as “Foucault divided,” occupying a space between university and third-sector researchers (which, of course, happens to other authors) this same division leads to a double standard that exposes Foucault in particular: he is at once included into the syllabus, and remains excluded from them, sent out to the third sector (see for example as excellent studies as Ditchev, Kabakchieva, Mineva’s [2000], Mineva [2000]). Research funding in this sector is much more developed compared to that for intellectual life in the university system of Bulgaria, the latter is protected because it well “behind the firewall.” In sum, we can say that Foucault’s analysis of the private-public binary has been neither defeated nor surpassed, but sustained. In Bulgaria, Foucault seems to have flourished in the very binary he criticized.

This is probably because the intellectual dissident circle, commonly called “The Seminar” (Nikolchina 2002) dissipated from the university to NGOs and established independent institutes. This arises from the simple fact that, after 1989, these institutes gradually became the centers for former intellectual dissidents, while the figures consisting that invisible college (The Seminar) have scarcely bonded, to a large extent because a great many did not change their political engagements, but rather voiced them in private. These are engagements that hardly bridge the political gap before and after 1989, thus being doubly stigmatized. Members of the so-called “Seminar” opposed to the communist regime, however Left they were then and now. Before and after the political turmoil, these same figures were again intellectually
silenced as a result of their personal-ideological commitments and political and economic expectations of democracy. Ultimately, though they were ones who called for radical changes in 1989, they did not seem to benefit personally or intellectually from democratic system they advocated. The third sector, which consists of institutes, research centers, intellectual spaces that were prohibited prior to 1989 unless they are politically and ideologically sanctioned by the Communist party, can Foucauldian or Habermasian in intent, representing a kind of supplementary institution for intellectual interests considered unimportant or “politically incorrect” nowadays."

Thus, I see a connection between this belated social activism arising from a Foucauldian “third-sector”; this is neither to be belittled nor lamented. Although nothing is inevitable, it seems that in post-communist Bulgaria, with its EU-accession policies that affect university policy, Foucault is an example of integration, both normalized and under-developed, that serves to strengthen the private-public dichotomy.

A final way to answer my original question is that there is an obviously hindered correspondence between activism and the clustering of philosophy (Neo-Marxian or Foucauldian, or whatever alternative political situation theories). I really don't know if my TA has something to do with that, but either way he was the person responsible for my grade. Finally, let me confide you how I eventually passed my make-up exam: with Hegel.
Bibliography


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Notes:

1 An articulation initiative of the European Union that will, among other changes, make grades comparable in EU higher education institutions. See for example, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/educ/bologna/bologna_en.html](http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/educ/bologna/bologna_en.html).

2 Actually, why Bulgarian contemporary philosophy is so unpopular and unsold now in Bulgaria is another problem that I won’t consider here.

3 By “prominent Foucauldian figures” I do not mean merely those who have declared an interest in Foucault. I refer the works and contribution they have done, producing a certain stage where citation of their work is mandatory. Among these are: Antoaneta Koleva (publisher and translator of Foucault, *Critique & Humanism* PH), Deyan Deyanov (Institute for Critical Social Researches), Vladimir Gradev, Alexander Kiosev (Center for Advanced Studies), Ivaylo Ditchev (Ditchev 2000; Ditchev, Kabakchieva, Mineva 2000; Ditchev 2002), Miglena Nikolchina (Gender Studies Center at Sofia University).

4 A conservative and quantitative view would reveal the same passive activism: after the opening of Gemini’s safe-house office, the total price of Halperin’s Bulgarian edition (100 Years of Homosexuality) until now never exceeded 15 to 20.

5 *Critique and Humanism* 17.1: “Norm and Pathologies.”

6 “Maybe I’ll become a journalist - someone writing history in the present. But then I’d probably end up doing the same thing all over again.”

7 For reasons why this was not possible, see Pisankaneva’s paper in this volume.
MÊMETÉ
AND THE CRITIQUE OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE:
ON MONIQUE WITTIG’S DECONSTRUCTION
OF THE SYMBOLIC ORDER
AND THE SITE OF THE NEUTER

J. Edgar Bauer

When you meet a human being, the first distinction you make is ‘male or female?’
and you are accustomed to make the distinction with unhesitating certainty.

Sigmund Freud

The Opoponax (1964), Monique Wittig’s first novel, opens with the sentences: “The little boy whose name is Robert Payen comes into the classroom last, crying, Who wants to see my weewee-er? Who wants to see my weewee-er? He is buttoning his pants.” With this puerile scene of attempted genital exposure, Wittig anticipates emblematically the prevalent exhibitionism of phallic hegemony she intends to deconstruct. Although little Robert is afflicted and will die soon after his brief appearance at the novel’s overture, he does not fail to reveal to Catherine Legrand – Wittig’s alter ego – the clue to his delusive self-perception by declaring that he has a “weewee-er” because he is “a big boy.” Robert’s stress on his own phallic advantage illustrates Wittig’s basic claim concerning the way sexual difference is constructed: “Men have made what differentiates them from [women] the sign of domination and possession.” Contrasted with the phallus as the illusory, but effective mark of male self-empowerment, the female genitals are inscribed at the very center of Wittig’s theoretical and literary work as tokens of a literalness of meaning aiming to debunk the symbolic constellations of male pre-eminence. From this perspective, vaginal depth is not merely the abstract opposite of phallic apotheosis, but the sign of a deconstructive principle devised to reduce the phallus to the prosaic reality of a penis. Since Wittig’s basic credo is: “[…] I distrust symbols, I believe in the literal […]”, (Witting, 1989, 87) her critical project is not intended to lead up to a post-phallic sacralization of female genitals, but to explore femininity as an as yet not articulated dimension of the human. The critical scope of Wittig’s sexual de-mythologization is clearly conveyed when, at the end of her parable Paris-la-politique, she resumes the principle of her newly won insights: “ni dieux ni déesses, ni maîtres ni maîtresses” – “neither gods nor goddesses, neither masters nor mistresses.”

Against the patriarchal contenders of an immutable order grounded in nature or divine will, Wittig emphasizes the necessity of introducing “the diachronicity of history into the fixed discourse of eternal essences.” On the assumption that the beginning of history is identical with the inception of the human, Wittig contends that there is, strictly speaking, “no nature in society,” and, more importantly, that there is for mankind no “reality before it has been given shape by words rules regulations.” According to Wittig’s radical historicism, all cultural achievements and their institutional formations bear the imprint of human contingency, and therefore neither the beginning of history nor any of its salient epochs can lay claim to the status of an unquestionable paradigm. It is thus not surprising that Wittig rejects the presumption of naturalness or divine conformity attributed mostly to the historically victorious patriarchy, and at times even to its complementary heterosexual alternative: matriarchy. Both
are dismissed on the same grounds, since, as Wittig is careful to underline, “[m]atriarchy is no less heterosexual than patriarchy: it is only the sex of the oppressor that changes.” As a lesbian, Wittig refuses to idealize the normativity of matriarchy by underscoring that homosexuality is not merely the desire for one’s own sex, but “the desire for something else that is not connoted,” namely “resistance to the norm.” On account of the prevalent heterosexual framework in which cultural memory has been transmitted and transformed, it is no wonder that lesbian history has been deeply marked by its lacunary character. Being well aware that historical science can offer no adequate basis for grounding the emancipatory claims of her lesbianism, Wittig’s aim is not to reconstruct the lesbian past. Rather, she attempts to fill up the intervals and gaps left over by official heterosexual historiography with the lesbian topics of her jocular inventiveness. It is not by chance that Lesbian Peoples, the book Wittig wrote along with Sande Zeig, begins with a motto that seems to parody the Johannine and Gothean speculative contentions of an original Logos or Act. The quotation: “In the beginning, if there ever was such a time.”

The “materials for a dictionary” collected in Lesbian Peoples repeatedly refer to the presumptive origins of lesbianism at the dawn of history. Since the presented strains of vague recollection could serve at the most to sketch out a speculative narrative, they lay no claim to historical factuality. Nevertheless, the hypothetical depiction of the deeds of the immemorial Amazons sheds light on Wittig’s decision to inscribe present-day lesbian reflection in the framework of an age-old libertarian thrust toward the concrete realization of universal humanness. Tellingly, the entry on “conflict” in the French version of Lesbian Peoples begins with the quote: “There are traces of dark conflicts in the fables of the bearers of fables.” Hinting at the unreliability of the sources, the sentence, which is attributed to the probably imaginary “Julienne Borge,” is designed to introduce the extant data of a fable of origins, according to which an archetypical clash between “mothers” and “Amazons” not only marked the past indelibly, but also keeps repeating itself throughout history. The reason for this ur-dissension was the “breach” that the Amazons tried to find in the mothers’ “dream of absolute and totalitarian engendering.” The inevitable secession ultimately led to contradictory worldviews and practices manifested first and foremost at their gatherings. While the Amazons came together on the hills “for festivals, assemblies, [and] sojourns in the woods,” the mothers began building on the hills “places of worship” dedicated to the goddesses and surrounded by woods that became “sacred.” The introduction of the fundamental distinction between the sacred and the profane by the mothers, that is, by “those who reign and who engender,” signals a turning point of humanity on which Wittig and Zeig elaborate in the entry on “history.” Although some narrative details of the conflict between mothers and Amazons in this entry are at variance with other depictions of the same incident, mothers are still portrayed as playing a pre-eminent religious role, for they “began fabricating representations of themselves in dried mud, sculptured stone, or on flat surfaces with colors.” As “reigning goddesses who demanded sacrifices,” the mothers will eventually modify “the original tongue by introducing the sacred into the ‘meaning,’ confusing the basic literal sense with their symbols.” While in the first account Amazons manifested their opposition to the instauration of maternal sacrality by just occupying alternative spaces for their gatherings, according to the second account, they will resist the far more consequential induction of the sacred through symbolism by keeping “the ‘old language of letters and numbers.’” Thus, the amazons’ struggle functions as a proleptic cipher of Wittig’s own lesbian literature in the arena of re-appropriation of a literalness concealed by the alienating systems of symbolic representation that structure the history and historiography of heterosexual power.

The protagonists of Wittig’s narratives echo with profusion her principled rejection of the symbolic and the sacral world it articulates. The “women” in Les Guérillères, for example, de-
clare that “they have no need of myths or symbols,” and that religious ideologies are “no longer valid.” In spite of such contentions, however, Wittig does not refrain from making ample use of religious imagery and symbolism at all levels and in all contexts of her fictional work. From a biographical point of view this is hardly surprising, for, as The Opoponax suggests, biblical religiosity, literary mythology, and Catholic ceremonial, had a strong impact on the nascent worldview of the future writer. However, in Wittig’s work the echoes and reminiscences of these influences undergo a radical bending or alteration of meaning in correspondence to Wittig’s overall design to “foster disorder in all its forms.” In the most literal sense of the word, Wittig attempts to “pervert” the sacred by linguistic and literary strategies as diverse as the varieties of its manifestations. In The Lesbian Body, for instance, a characteristically “deviant” transference of meaning is apparent in the doxology of “the glorious supremely divine Astarte” when Wittig alludes, in a reverse temporal perspective, to the futurity implied in the Name of the biblical God by addressing the female divinity as: “she who cannot have been that which she will not be.” In another indicative passage, Wittig homosexualizes the imagery of the Christian passion, and apostrophizes her Beloved One as “m/y veil of Lesbos your face all flat painted on the linen of Veronica like the anguished features of Christa the much-crucified.” Eventually, even the mention of Mary’s Annunciation in Catholic ritual prayer undergoes a lesbian transmutation when it reads: “I say blessed are thou among women […] may you conceive yourself as I at last see you over the greatest possible space […].” In such sites of discursive “per-version,” knots of sacral meaning are disentangled and their constituents are re-contextualized within the dimensions of corporeal desire, from which they were once alienated by means of symbolic representation. In the last analysis, Wittig is not offering feminist-heathen variations on the Creator, Jesus or Mary, but debunking their symbolic function for the sake of re-appropriating the Body at the locus where the compulsory ideology of heterosexuality sealed its double-bind with the sacred.

Wittig’s lesbian resistance is directed primarily against the sexual implications of the disjunctive logic that perpetuates the pattern of mutual exclusion initiated by the sacred/profane binomial. Her strategy is that of the “Trojan horse,” that is, of a “war machine” functioning in the “hostile territory” of the heterosexual language with the aim of turning it against itself. While the immediate goal of Wittig’s warfare is “to pulverize the old forms and formal conventions,” the final aim of her belligerency is to recreate not a vision of things, but of “la première vision des mots, dans sa puissance” – “the primary vision of words, in its force.” This mention of a powerful vision of words – and not of “things,” as the American translation has it – remits to the actual kernel of Wittig’s reflection on a utopian new language that attempts to regain a non-symbolic access to reality by means of the literalness Wittig attributed to the amazons’ language of “letters and numbers.” Indicatively, the entry on “Language” in Lesbian Peoples insists that “the mothers lived in permanent representation,” and surmises that in the ancient language of the amazons “[t]he significations and the phonemes had […] a different relation between them.” Going into more detail, the entry points out that “[o]ne cannot imagine that this language was composed of ‘sentences’ with a construction and a syntax as rigid, rigorous, repressive as those we know.” Read against this precision, Wittig’s over-arching conviction that – with respect to language – “everything has to be remade starting from basic principles,” attains an unexpected scope, since it implies accomplishments far beyond the reach of what Wittig herself or any individual author could possibly achieve in a lifetime. What Wittig actually envisages is a “language without consonants,” which resembles the song of the “white whale” and therefore is not composed of sentences, but of modulations. Not by chance, these determinations are mentioned in the article on “vowel”/”voyelle,” which is the closing entry of the French version of Lesbian Peoples. In this prominent locus, Wittig depicts a utopian language, which, free from consonantal obstructions, consists only of acoustical continuities that
would seem to resonate with the ululation of Minerva’s owl, or, more significantly, with what in Les Guérillères is termed “the music of the spheres.” Such a language follows out the realization that “Being as being is not divided,” and is therefore capable of opening up a horizon where the principle of “either…or” is no more valid. By taking the literalness of continuous Being to its last consequences, this language supersedes the mark of the sacred and its opposite, and is liable to reflect the potentially infinite complexities of the sexual beyond the categorical disjunction of the male and the female.

While the mothers’ heteronormative regime can only be projected “poetically” into an actually irrecoverable past, the binary structures of thought that pervade patriarchal heterosexuality have an assignable beginning in the history of Western philosophy. According to Wittig, it was Aristotle who, after having contended that the Pythagorean school introduced duality in thought, went on to interpret metaphysically the Pythagorean conceptual series of opposites designed originally to serve only as tools for measurement and classification. Thus, in the first table of oppositions as recorded by Aristotle in the first book of Metaphysics (I, 5, 6) the series including the concepts of male, right, light and good function as the antithetical complement of the series including the concepts of female, left, dark and bad. Since, in this dialectical scheme, Being and the One mark the essence of godlike maleness, while non-Being and the Many constitute the ontological determinants of unrestful femaleness, the ideological distinction between male and female became an insurmountable axiological difference sanctioned by ontology. Despite the age-old allegations to the contrary, there is, according to Wittig, no “natural” or “eternal” necessity that would warrant this dichotomy and its asymmetry, but just the contingencies of political interests that have recast the ideological division between men and women as if it were a natural one. Basically, the ideology of sexual difference functions as a censorship that masks “on the ground of nature, the social opposition between men and women.” In this thoroughly constructed system of heterosexual distribution, females become not only the possession of men (as indicated in the etymology of “wo-men”: “those who belong to another”), but also carry the burden of compulsory reproduction. With this plight in view, Wittig pleads for “the destruction of heterosexuality as a social system which is based on the oppression of women by men and which produces the doctrine of the difference between the sexes to justify this oppression.” Far from implying the negation or rejection of sexual diversity as such, this critical line of argument assumes that the acknowledgment of the diversities of the sexual is sensu stricto only possible once the naturalizing ideology of sexual binarism has been overcome. Thus in the self-interpretive introduction to her parable Les Tchiches et les Tchouches, Wittig maintains that there is no “différence anatomique” that would justify the construction of two mutually exclusive groups which, in fact, correlate with “women” and “men.” On account of the oppression of one group by the other, the “aspects physiques” of the Tchiches and Tchouches are indeed divergent, but this ascertainable fact does not contradict Wittig’s fundamental contention that “on a affaire à la même race.” In reverting the parable to its sexual literalness, it becomes apparent that Wittig aims at depicting a commonality of the human liable of encompassing the undeniable diversities of the sexual, while at the same time suggesting that the traits of these diversities do not warrant the formation of two asymmetrical groups connected through the bond of male supremacy. For Wittig, the mark of diversity is, by itself, not a token of dominion.

Although the variability of sexed bodies does not warrant the assumption of an essential difference between two mutually exclusive sexes engaging in a unique combination of unilateral dependency, heterosexuality attempts to justify its system of female subordination and homosexual phobias by referring to an allegedly “already there” of the sexes.” It is essential to the dominant heterosexual thought to “refuse[] to turn inward on itself to apprehend that which questions it,” since only thus can it exempt itself from reflecting critically on the sexual
constraints imposed by historical factuality. Like the Tchouches of the parable, the contenders of heterosexuality have no inclination to justify their construction of sexual difference, since “[l]a domination suffit. La domination est la preuve.” Well aware that the force of arguments alone cannot shatter an ideology, Wittig developed a confrontation strategy based on the idea that an adequate perception of sexual oppression can only be obtained by “step[ping] out” of the foreseen tracks of politics and culture. Indicatively, the outlook of the lesbian, who refuses to assume the role of a woman and has no desire of becoming a man, is depicted in Wittig’s work as the vantage point of an “escapee” or “fugitive slave.” As a “not-woman” and as a “not-man,” the lesbian lays claim to a site beyond the categories of binomial sex difference resulting from the superseded of the heterosexual ideology in the name of what Wittig terms the “science of oppression.” Having had a first-hand experience and knowledge of the consequences of heterosexual non-reflectivity, Wittig carefully avoids grounding her emancipatory objectives in a dogmatic understanding of what nature is or is not. Since nature can only be conceived as the result of historical and cultural mediations, the escapee’s insight into the workings of the heterosexual regime eventually compels the acknowledgment that only an unprejudiced perception of the given sexual variability is capable of sustaining a configuration of society without reference to the exclusionary logic of dichotomic sexual difference. As The Lesbian Body would put it, what is at stake is the capacity to lose “the sense […] of the stupid duality with all that flows therefrom.” While this dull dualism is the characteristic scheme of thought of the “straight mind,” the “oblique point of view” of the lesbian “standing at the outposts of humankind” enables the envisioning of a non-exclusionary “beyond,” where—in the words of Terence—“humani nihil a me alienum puto.”

The figure of the Maroon or runaway slave, to which Wittig compares the rebellious lesbian throughout her writing, dwells in a no-man’s-land between the male “pouvoir qui se sait” and the female “esclavage qui signore.” For having exposed the alleged natural difference of sexes as a merely ideological construction, the runaway earns the enmity not only of the masters, but also of the slaves zealous of preserving the meager advantages of their delusional stability. This is no wonder, since the process of libertarian empowerment as explicated in Wittig’s materialist feminism leads from the unacknowledged immersion in the servitude of womanhood to the consciousness of women being objects of class oppression, who will eventually strive to become individual subjects forging their own destinies. In the emancipatory process, the presumptive factuality of womanhood is unmasked as an ‘imaginary formation,’ which reinterpret local features (in themselves as neutral as any others but marked by the social system) through the network of relationships in which they are perceived.” Although the category “woman” is merely a mythical or imaginary construct, those designated as such by their oppressors constitute a socially regulated class. In order to achieve liberation from this unreal, but nonetheless effective entanglement, the oppressed women must attain class-consciousness and be determined “to kill the myth of ‘woman’ including its most seductive aspects.” Even if it is a sine qua non for exposing the arbitrariness of the woman construct, the self-understanding as a class that is being oppressed is not identical with the subjectivity of the individuals in question. Since no individual is reducible to the conditions of her or his oppression, subjectivity as a dynamic force beyond class solidarity has to be acknowledged, according to Wittig, as the actual formative agent of history. For sure, both the class of subjected “women” and the class of subjecting “men” are vowed to disappear, since “there are no slaves without masters.” But once this occurs, subjectivities will have to cope with the deranging literal truth that there are neither men nor women. As Wittig had stressed before, lesbianism opens onto another dimension of the human” namely, one in which the sexual complexity of subjectivities is defined without reference to the myth of sexual difference.

Wittig’s materialist feminism is the result of one of the most creative receptions of Marxian
thought in the second half of the 20th century. Despite her acknowledgment of Marxism as “the last avatar of materialism, the science which has politically formed us,” Wittig raises against its traditional contenders two basic objections deriving from her own libertarian philosophy of oppressed and abject subjectivities. First and foremost, Wittig criticizes that Marxist class-consciousness purports to share a common awareness of exploitation and the struggle against it, but fails to convey the need to constitute individual subjects forging their own personal history. Fearing “bourgeois” divisiveness and hoping that conflictive issues (such as those incumbent on sexual difference) will disappear in the coming classless society, Marxism “has prevented all categories of oppressed peoples from constituting themselves historically as subjects […] of their struggle […]” Since Marxism left unexamined the supposedly “natural” relation between men and women, and hid the class conflict between them behind an allegedly natural division of labor, acknowledging the sexual exploitation of women by men even in the foreseeable Marxian utopia is one of the most far-reaching consequences of Wittig’s “science of oppression.”

Secondly, Wittig castigates all Marxist-inspired revolutions to the present for being incapable of dealing with the issue of Otherness. Since straight societies are based at every level on the necessity of referring to the different or other in order to exclude it all the more effectively, Wittig stresses that the categories of Difference invoked by many contemporary theoreticians were, for Marx, categories of social conflict, “which throughout the class struggle were supposed to destroy each other.” From a Marxian perspective, the process by which the position of the bourgeois One is taken over by the proletarian Other culminates with the self-abolition of this Other in order to render possible a true dialectical reconciliation. However, as Wittig underscores, the foreseen final stadium has never been attained by Marxist revolutions to date. Instead, the Other “has substituted itself for the One, keeping under it huge groups of oppressed peoples that would in turn become the Other of the ex-others, become by then the One.” Such an abrupt arrest of Marxian dialectics proved to be an additional and decisive factor retarding the insurgency of female subjects. Having ascertained that despite the revolutionary becoming One of some Others, women did not change their status as objects of oppression, but just the holders of their subjection, Wittig directed her critical questioning to the issue of a future “humanness once all categories of others will be transferred onto the side of the One, of Being, of the Subject.”

Since the “dialectical thought (or thought of difference)” that originated in Classical Greece evinces itself as an exclusionary logic of Otherness, Wittig’s attempt to “dialecticize dialectics” for the sake of empowering oppressed subjectivities implies a radical rebuttal of contemporary exaltations of alterity in all its forms: “Jewish, Black, Red, Yellow, Female, Homosexual, Crazy.” The imposition of the label of difference on someone cannot be transformed into an emancipatory “right” or “pride to be different,” for, according to Wittig, such a transformation would still continue to operate with the oppressive scheme of the One and the Other. Against a philosophy and politics aiming to re-appropriate alterity, Wittig contends: “the Other cannot essentially be different from the One, it is the Same, along the lines of what Voltaire called the Sameness[,] la Mêmeté.”

With the seldom used Voltairean neologism Wittig is referring to the locus of the fundamental commonality of the human, for, as she explains by quoting Terence a second time, “nothing human is alien’ to the One or to the Other.” Wittig’s inscription of the Voltairean concept of Mêmeté in her own discursivity evokes a comprehensiveness comparable to that of the Heraclitean as the (i.e. the universal), which enciphers the all-encompassing reconciliation of opposites. Thus, against the backdrop of the universal Mêmeté of humanness, Wittig structures a libertarian move going from the self-identification with the class struggle of women to the affirmation of individual subjectivities that have escaped their entrapment in the alterity
of womanhood. Even though the lesbian/guérillère appears throughout Wittig’s work to introduce the decisive struggle to transform mere thought differences into political oppositions, there is no silencing of the fact that the raison d'être of her libertarian program lies beyond the mere reassessment of lesbian identity. Not surprisingly, Wittig carefully underlines that “for the moment” lesbianism provides the only social form for a free existence beyond the categories of “man” and “woman,” and envisions pari passu a futurity that has left behind even the memory of the secular strife that lesbians had fostered. This privileged Time marks the inception of Subjectivities that have overcome not only the quandaries of sexual difference, but also even the struggle for its abolition. Significantly, the most precise depiction of sexual Subjectivities beyond alienation is offered by Wittig not in a literary piece, but in Paradigm, a philosophical essay in which she declares: “For us there are, it seems, not one or two sexes, but many (cf. Guattari/Deleuze), as many sexes as there are individuals.” Wittig’s lesbian utopia can only be one if it is for all, and this can only be warranted when subsumptions under categories of sexual difference finally yield to the incontrovertible evidence that the corporeality of each Subjectivity bears the mark of a radically individualized and therefore unclassifiable sexuality. On this account, Mêmété, being the abbreviation for the irreducible Subjectivity of the individual, evinces itself as the reconciliatory commonality that enables the deployment of radical sexual diversification within the framework of the human. Even if the theoretical and literary prolepses of this final outcome are indispensable for giving direction to the emancipatory struggle, they should never be mistaken for the future concrete realization of the aims pursued by the lesbian “science of oppression.” It is not by chance that “Wittig,” the protagonist of Across the Acheron, will eventually realize in her peregrination through hell that “Paradise is in the shadows of swords and peace at the end of a lance.”

Since gender constitutes “the linguistic index of the political opposition between the sexes and of the domination of women,” Wittig envisages its deconstruction parallel to the philosophical and political abolition of sex. Essentially, gender is an “enforcement of sex in language” that obviates the “literal” uniqueness of sexual bodies in order to transform them into entities that are capable of “symbolizing” only inadequately the clear-cut categories of sexual difference. Well aware that “personal pronouns engineer gender through language,” Wittig will promote personal pronouns to the rank of subject matter in three of her major narratives. While L’Opoponax revolves around the issue of “lon” (one) and Les Guérillères focuses on “elles” (the untranslatable feminine form of “they”), Le Corps lesbian can be read as a meditation on the “j/e” (the French for “I” written with a slash in between). Despite the obvious differences of the grammatical perspectives they imply, the three pronouns are, in an important respect, functional equivalents, for they all aim at debunking the presumptive universality of the masculine by making obsolete the prevalent categories of gender. Wittig’s perhaps most far-reaching elaborations on this issue relate to the French indefinite pronoun “on” whose neuter and neutral nature she underscores: “One, on, lends itself to the unique experience of all locutors who, when saying I, can re-appropriate the whole language and reorganize the world from their point of view.” Clearly, the aspiration to universality conveyed by the indeterminacy of the “on” contrasts with the unwarranted universalization of homo/homme/man made apparent in a sentence like: “Un homme sur deux est une femme” – “One man in two is a woman.” The very fact that the sentence could not retain its meaning after interchanging the nouns testifies to the fundamental asymmetry of the man/woman divide resulting in the degradation of the “female sex” to a modus deficiens of mankind. Against this backdrop, the gender neutrality of Wittig’s “on” certainly does not imply forcing a semantic uniformity of sexuality, but, on the contrary, offers a linguistic framework in which sexuality can be potentiated as to include a diversity of sexes co-extensive with the number of sexed individuals. If femaleness is the gender mark of “ec-centric” subjectivities imposed by the delusive ideology
of male centeredness, the neutrality of “on” undoes the mark of gender difference by exposing the arbitrariness of any categorical subsumptions under sexual categories of the given sexual diversity and reassessing the commonality of sexual uniqueness.

Although Wittig's use of the pronoun nous/we generally refers to the oppressed class of lesbians, there are passages in which the “nous” is designed to include “lesbians, women, and homosexual men.” Contrasting with the self-centeredness of the straight subject, these “minority subjects” are depicted as being like “Pascal’s circle, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere.” Given that for Wittig “Lesbians are not women” and that she seldom deals with the specific condition of homosexual men, her inclusive use of nous is indicative of a solidarity not based on sexual self-understanding or sexual orientation, but on the obliqueness of a minority perspective that guards from the “straight” delusion of an heterosexual appropriation of universal humanness. Challenging the history of millennia, the oblique mind testifies to the necessary fragmentation of the human in the irreducible sexual diversity of its individual manifestations. In correspondence with this contention, Wittig’s passionate self-assertion as a lesbian does not pretend to achieve a general lesbianization of the world, but rather intends to show how the full assumption of an “ec-centric” sexual existence can be the source of empowerment for minority Subjectivities deprived of the social validation of their uniqueness. Significantly, the women in Les Guérillères – undoubtedly Wittig’s most pugnacious book – tell the young men who have joined them in their struggle, “We have been fighting as much for you as for ourselves.” Thereafter, one of the Guérillères begins to sing, “Like unto ourselves / men who open their mouths to speak / a thousand thanks to those who have understood our language / and not having found it excessive / have joined with us to transform the world.” In a later scene reminiscent of Antonin Artaud’s rebellious army of men coming down from their crosses, where the blood-sucking morpion-dieu had nailed them since time immemorial, the Guérillères solemnly declare: “The vessels are upright, the vessels have acquired legs. The sacred vessels are on the move. […] henceforward the vessels empty of seed have shrunken loins.” Having liberated themselves from the constrictions of reproduction, these women are on their way to an assault that, while closing the book, actually constitutes the chronological beginning of the narrative. Like Artaud’s desecrating rebels, Wittig’s Guérillères are out to perform “a sacrilege, a violation of all the rules” that emanate from the thought of Difference. Since in the world of Les Guérillères dichotomic categorizations are overcome, divinities appear at the most as “paper goddesses” with a decorative function, and women themselves achieve a validation of their Subjectivity without reference to heterosexuality and motherhood. If Catherine Legrand in The Opoponax could have assumed the perspective of Les Guérillères, she would have been in a position to counter Robert Payen's self-flattering conjectures by making it clear that she is not defined by the absence of a “wee-wee-er,” but by the presence of a clitoris, “the only organ in the body to have pleasure as its function.” The lesbian affirmation of this “presence” contravenes the silencing or denigration of female genitals throughout cultural history and necessitates a radical re-negotiation of the relationship between the sexes, which are not two, but as diverse as the number of sexed individuals. Once the constraints of the sexual binomial and its resulting hetero- and homosexual combinations are left behind, the commonality granted by the homology between the penis and the clitoris liberates the “lesbian body” from the predicament of being marked by the vagina as the site of an absence that has been conceptualized at times as a “negative phallus.” Even though toward the end of her life Wittig stressed that she had never denied having a vagina, the sentence “Je nai pas de vagin” attributed to her among others by Leo Bersani, can be read as a radical refusal of the imagery of the “non-penis,” and thus as an abbreviation for Wittig’s revolt against the thought of Difference that reduced women to an ontology of absence. By debunking the ideology of feminine non-Being, Wittig gained access to the clitoral “kleís”: the
key capable of opening up the way to Mêmeté as the common human uniqueness beyond the arbitrariness of categorical divides.

Bibliography


CONSTRUCTING A NARRATIVE:
THE HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN POLAND

John Stanley

Introduction

No one has ever published a coherent narrative synthesizing the history of homosexuality in Poland. This gap in Poland’s historical record results from the scattered nature of the evidence, the generally negative attitude toward homosexuality, and narrative construction itself. However, the issues facing the historian constructing a synthesis of the Polish history of homosexuality are similar to those writing syntheses for the homosexual history of other lands. Although the painstaking research needed to ferret out the evidence of homosexual behaviour has its own difficulties, establishing the facts about homosexuality in a given milieu is only a preliminary to writing a history. The real problem for the historian of homosexuality in Poland is to weave the few available facts into a coherent narrative. Of course, the concept of homosexuality shifts over time, from a focus on specific types of behavior to the establishment of an identity or distinctive culture: the historian and the narrative must adapt to this shift.

By mapping out the nature of narrative and the special type of narrative known as “synthesis” and by then showing how a narrative of the history of homosexuality in Poland may be constructed, it is possible not only to establish the various discourses on homosexuality and their periodisation in Poland, but also to better understand the genre of gay and lesbian history.

“History” is not the facts that comprise it, but the narrative that interprets these facts. History by its nature is based on demonstrable evidence and the nature of this evidence changes dramatically over the centuries, ranging from the theological, to the philosophical, to the legal, to the medical and to the political. The available evidence reflects the discourse of contemporaries. For example, when homosexuality is always regarded as a sin, it becomes part of a theological discourse. When homosexuality appears in the law codes, it has entered a legal discourse.

In order to establish an overview of the past, it is necessary to establish a synopsis or representation of that past, a synthesis. Synthesis is a special kind of historical narrative that deals with many periods and shifting boundaries while maintaining a consistent thread of narrative unifying the historical work. This long view is perceived as giving author and readers greater perspective in reviewing the events of a particular period or epoch. This particular focus provides the organizational principle giving unity to a disparity created by evidence or life shifts. Following the evidence means the narrative synthesis risks becoming a patchwork, devoid of a consistent framework. Since syntheses rely on the ability to indicate a general, systematic narrative from a whole set of diverse facts, often from different periods, this step also creates unique problems for the historian of homosexuality. However, syntheses are valuable in allowing for the integration of material from a variety of different fields. The contemporary plethora of historical approaches and tools make synthesis hold even greater value. A synthesis by necessity must rely on informed interpretation. In addition, narratives by their nature demand a framework. “To do justice to both the intractabilities of fact and the mind’s lust for system and order” thus becomes a challenge for any historical narrative. The empirical narrative, which encompasses historical writing, pledges its allegiance to reality. It is empowered, but also constrained by its empiricism. Every history represents only a selection of infinite possibilities and the narrative inevitably becomes a mechanism for transmitting a message that may go beyond an immediate thesis. For example, most syntheses of Polish history, regardless of the period
covered, ignore homosexuality.

All narratives encompass certain constant elements: meaning, character, plot, and point of view. A successful historical account “must be structured so as to achieve a rich and fresh perspective on character, motive and their transformations; the historian must be self-conscious about what his or her narrative does.” In a historical narrative, meaning is provided by the thesis and the argument that bolsters it. A successful thesis in a historical narrative makes sense of disparate data, framing the facts and events presented to support the meaning ascribed in the narrative. Characters may be provided by a class or community; individuals may be used for representational or illustrative purposes. Plot in history writing is provided by the pattern of facts established by the historian within a chronology that serves as the “dynamic, sequential element”: the beginning, middle, and end. It is this linear nature of the historical narrative which gives the illusion of progress. The chronology covers whatever span of time is required by the subject; theme establishes the focus of the writing; it may observe the present as well. The subject of the historical narrative is treated solely in the past and the neatness of the focus excludes the irrelevant. For the history of homosexuality, the subject is particularly problematic. Is a writer searching for evidence of homosexual behavior, other kinds of activity, or a particular consciousness? The proper name “Homosexuality” does not designate a “thing,” anymore than “Renaissance” or “Cold War” do. Therefore, a history of homosexuality is not a history of a thing or a person, but rather an account of certain aspects of human life.

Finally, the point of view in a narrative establishes the relationship between the writer and the audience. The narrator of a history is, typically, not only omniscient but also invisible, and employs the third person to provide distance and to demonstrate professionalism while assuming the authority and presumed impartiality of the impersonal. In Gustav Flaubert’s view, the author should be in his work like God in the universe: everywhere present but nowhere apparent.

The modern historian is not only a recorder of events, he or she is also an investigator through research. Mastery of the evidence gives the writer the authority as impartial judge and repository of fact and gives the audience sufficient confidence in the writer’s competence to agree with the writer’s thesis and the arguments or commentary supporting it. Historical research provides the evidence and illustrations for the narrative’s argument justifying a specific interpretation. The narrator’s interpretation provides the conclusion for a historical narrative. However, our knowledge of the past and the ideas that we derive from that knowledge are channeled by concepts such as the “Renaissance” or “Homosexuality.” Nonetheless, such concepts are useful to historians and readers but in a specific way: while the evidence for them is grounded in the past, the point of view shaping these concepts is in the historian’s present. Historians could probably agree on specific sexual behaviors that are homosexual, but no agreement exists on what constitutes “homosexuality.” The individual historian must inevitably, define “homosexuality” and explain how it is used in the work: “when [historians] wish to see such an identity in the past, it will, in a certain sense, be there.”

A Synthesis of the History of Homosexuality in Poland

In Poland’s history of more than a thousand years, homosexuality has always been present. While little attention has been paid to the history of Poland’s gay and lesbian population, it is possible to stitch together a narrative linking the disparate elements that appear over the centuries. This narrative consists of a synthesis divided into periods based on the discourse used as evidence from the written record. The discourses detected in this survey are: theological, scientific, and political. While new discourses appear, the old ones do not disappear. A layering of discourses consequently occurs in this synthesis.
The Theological discourse

The reaction to Krakow's March for Tolerance in May 2004 and the efforts of Lech Kaczyński, Warsaw's current mayor, to ban the 2004 Gay Pride Parade in his city may lead observers to believe that homosexuality is something foreign to Polish culture. In fact, homosexuality appeared early in Polish history as seen in the biographies of three Polish kings.

Bolesław the Bold (1042-82) reigned from 1058 to 1079 and was accused of sodomy by the medieval historian Jan Długosz. Although Bolesław was only sixteen years old when he assumed power, he turned the young Polish state into a major power in eastern Europe by leading two successful military expeditions to Kyiv and forging a strong alliance with Hungary that served to check the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV and his Bohemian ally. Signifying Bolesław's success was his coronation as king of Poland in 1076.

Poland had officially accepted Christianity as the state religion in 966 and the young Roman Catholic Church in Poland of the eleventh century was still dependent on the state, not only for funding (through land donations and tithes collected by the treasury), but also for the appointment of all bishops. Bolesław was initially seen as a friend of the church. In order to strengthen Poland's position in Europe, Bolesław became an ally of Pope Gregory VII against the pretensions of Henry IV. Furthermore, Bolesław supported the establishment of Benedictine monasteries to carry out missionary activities among a population still only superficially Christian. While supporting the church, the king expected this institution and its bishops to support his rule and promote the consolidation of state power. However, a conflict with Bishop Stanisław of Cracow led to the bishop's murder and the king's exile in 1079. Although the sources for this conflict are limited, the Cracow bishop appears to have been part of a rebellion against the king.

Bolesław was considered an upright but ambitious and proud monarch. His generosity was legendary but he could also be ruthless. Gallus' Chronicle, the most important source, notes that Bolesław did not like married men because they cared more about their wives than obedience to the king! This chronicler attributes to Bolesław the belief that the debauchery of women should be prevented. Gallus considered the source of the dispute between king and bishop to be rooted in the bishop's condemnation of the king's cruelty, which cursed Bolesław with the threat of his kingdom's annihilation. The Great Poland Chronicle, written toward the end of the thirteenth century, based its facts on Kadłubek's Chronicle but, for the first time, adds the theme of Bolesław's sexual deviance: sodomy. The anonymous chronicle immediately notes that “he would rather trust other writers who thought this to be incorrect.”

The greatest of Poland's medieval chroniclers, Jan Długosz, chose to emphasize this deviant element, making it the cause of the dispute between king and bishop. Długosz notes that the king acquired the habit of sodomy during his stay in Kyiv, where this sexual practice was endemic, in the chronicler's view. According to Długosz's Annales, the bishop first privately chided the monarch and then publicly upbraided him for this behavior. Whatever the cause of the king's anger, the dispute was not between the king and the Roman Catholic Church or all of its bishops, but only with Stanisław. It appears that the Archbishop of Gniezno, the Primate of Poland, supported the king in this dispute. As a result of the bishop's presumed rebellion, Stanisław was publicly executed and his body dismembered in April 1079. This act led to an uprising of the nobility and Bolesław fled to Hungary, where he died.

Of course, by emphasizing Bolesław's sinful behavior, the later versions of the disputes supported the bishop's canonization and, eventually, his position as patron saint of Poland. The accusation of sodomy shifted the conflict away from a dispute between church and state to a tale of the courage of a faithful pastor pursuing his necessary duties. Although Gallus, writing just thirty years after these events, acknowledged that both men had “sinned,” only Bolesław's crime and Stanisław's martyrdom survive in Kadłubeck's twelfth century account and it is this
emphasis that was carried forward by subsequent re-tellings, including that of Długosz in the fifteenth century.

Długosz also condemned the twenty-year-old Władysław III (1434-1444), who led a crusade against the Turks and died at the Battle of Varna. Władysław III was simultaneously king of Poland (from 1434) and of Hungary (from 1440). The image left to us by contemporaries depicts a young, valorous king as a man of action; he was religious but proud, possessed knightly virtues and lived modestly. However, he was inexperienced, and despite his good will, not always effective. The king had already been involved in a war on the Turks, but in July 1443 he had reached a truce with the Sultan Murat II. Urged on by the Hungarian nobility and Pope Eugene IV, Władysław broke the truce on 4 August. In the midst of the battle outside Varna in November 1444, the king, leading his retinue, impetuously broke from the ranks and charged into the Turkish troops. The Turks initially were surprised and broke ranks, but soon they surrounded the king, killing him and his knights.

Basing his view on the eye-witness account of the papal tax collector in Poland, Długosz attributed the Christian defeat to the king’s lying with a man before the decisive battle. Like the earlier case of Bolesław the Bold, the great chronicler related that the king had been warned of his sin -- in this case by two knights -- and had promised to abandon his “ugly offences” (ohydne występkí) but had continued his “disgusting habits (obrzýdlych nalógw).” In fact, Władysław III remains the only crusader-king not canonized. Długosz was unusual in citing the king’s homosexual behavior as accounting for the loss of divine approval and, consequently, the loss of the battle. Most of his predecessors as well as those who came after Długosz cited the king’s breaking of a truce with the Turks as depriving Władysław of divine approval. Few later historians mentioned the king’s “sin,” let alone gave credence to it.

Both of these cited cases of royal homosexuality were written in the late fifteenth century by Jan Długosz (1415-1480), one of medieval Europe’s greatest chroniclers and the Canon at Cracow’s Cathedral. His examples of homosexuality are not usual among the chroniclers. In both cases, he could have used different evidence to illustrate his narrative to avoid the imputation of homosexuality. In the case of Władysław III, Długosz is the sole chronicler to repeat the evidence from the papal tax collector. Długosz’s writings thus are key to the theological discourse on Polish history.

Długosz was involved in public service his entire life, as the right-hand man of the most powerful Roman Catholic prelate in Poland, Zbigniew, Cardinal Oleśnicki, bishop of Cracow. Długosz also knew a number of foreign languages and had traveled widely, from Rome to Kyiv. (The reference to the Ruthenians’ predisposition to homosexuality in the discussion of Boleslaw the Bold is presumably based on Długosz’s own observations during his visit to Kyiv.) He was made Canon of Cracow Cathedral in 1436 and took Holy Orders in 1440. After the death of Oleśnicki, King Casimir -- no favorite of Długosz -- appointed him tutor to the royal children in 1467, rather than as bishop of Cracow. From this time on, the cleric was a feature of royal society and he accompanied his former charge, the young Władysław Jagiellończyk, to Prague in 1471. Although he did not accept the proffered position of archbishop of Prague, he was awarded by being named Canon of Gniezno Cathedral (in addition to that of Cracow). His chronicles were Długosz’s final and most important historical work. As Paul Smith has noted of the Chronicles, “Długosz […] is present in their pages.” For example, his focus on Władysław Warneńczyk’s homosexuality was probably caused by his dislike for Władyslaw’s brother, the future King Casimir Jagiellończyk and his wife, Elizabeth. Whatever his motives, Polish historians have reached a consensus that Długosz was reliable and always aimed for the truth, regardless of the political consequences. As a result, his work was not published until the nineteenth century!

Evidence of a discourse on homosexuality in medieval times is not limited to Długosz’s
writings. During the medieval period, penitential lists -- used by confessors to assign penalties for specific sins -- acknowledged homosexual behavior by ascribing specific types of punishment, such as prostrations, for the sin. None of the evidence cited necessarily points to actual homosexual behavior. For example, the medieval concept of “sodomy” encompassed more than homosexuality. Moreover, accusations of sodomy were useful tools in the battles between the Roman Church and the Polish State. Nonetheless, the charge itself demonstrates that male-male sexuality was known and regarded as heinous.

In Renaissance history, Henryk Walezy (Henri de Valois) (1551-1589) is usually singled out as a homosexual figure, although this assertion is open to debate. Nevertheless, the polemics demonstrate that the discussion was still within a theological discourse. A “black legend” surrounds the king, fed by allegations of perversion. The Huguenot writer Agrippa d'Aubigné described the king as “un putain fardée,” (a painted whore) noting that it was impossible to determine if he were “un roi femme ou bien un homme reine” (a woman-king or a male-queen). A Roman Catholic pamphlet echoed the Protestant’s accusation, denouncing the king as “un fantôme d’homme-femme” (a fantasy male-woman).

By the time Henri de Valois became Henryk Walezy, king of Poland, he was already known as someone who took great care about his appearance. For example, at the 1570 marriage of his brother, Charles IX, Henri wore earrings that were so big they were compared to “les anneaux des Maures d’Afrique” (earrings of African Moors) He was admired for “l’aisance de ses gestes, l’élégance avec laquelle il portait un supere habit de toile d’argent brodé de perles et fourré de loup-cervier.” (The waving of his hands, the elegance with which he wore clothing of gold brocade and pearls, lined with lynx).

As Prince Henri was unlikely to become king of France, his mother, Catherine de Medici, set French diplomats the task of finding her son a throne. With the extinction of the Jagiellonian dynasty, the Polish crown seemed a possibility. However, the Habsburgs also sought this position. The Poles were aware of Henri’s ignorance of their culture and language. His reputation for religious intolerance (after news spread of his role in the St. Bartholomew Massacre) was alarming, for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was an oasis of religious peace where Protestants and Roman Catholics had easy relations with one another. Moreover, they were leery of the French kings’ absolutist pretensions. On the other hand, a link to France was of diplomatic importance, and Henri’s reputation as a victorious warrior might deter war threats from Muscovy. As a result, the French diplomats were successful and, at the electoral Diet, 40,000 noblemen took 35 days to deliberate before deciding on the French prince on 11 May 1573. However, the Polish nobility (szlachta) placed a price on France’s success: Henri’s royal powers would be limited and he would have to consent to these constraints before his coronation. At a mass held in September at Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris, Henri swore to accept the conditions. However, the same day, the French king and Henri’s brother made Henri his heir, in the absence of a male child.

By this time, Henri had already begun to surround himself with trusted and attractive young men disapprovingly called his mignons. Henri himself termed the group “ma troupe” or “ma chère bande” (my dear band). Whatever their charms, these favorites were an important counter-balance to the powerful nobles at court. By elevating these men of the middle nobility, Henri was establishing his own basis for support and rewarding those most loyal to himself. He took these most loyal retainers with him to Poland, arriving after a long winter’s journey in Cracow in February 1574. The difficult, wintry trip to Poland molded this group into a trusted circle of royal favorites. Henri valued the loyalty of those who followed him to Poland.

The Polish coronation took place on 21 February 1574. Although “Henryk” reigned as king in Poland for barely five months, his court managed to shock the Sarmatian mentality of the Polish nobility with parties that lasted all night. The young king wore ear rings and used rouge
and perfume. Moreover, his hygienic standards seemed unnecessarily high! Perhaps most shocking, however were the king’s mignons, his favorite courtiers who formed the royal household. Given their power and closeness to the king, these favorites were accused of numerous sins, including “Italian customs,” the contemporary Polish euphemism for homosexuality.

Henri’s behavior certainly led observers to this conclusion. In letters, he addressed the members of his troupe in terms used for lovers and in conversation he used tender, even feminine, diminutives. These observations were used to construct an image of effeminacy, which led to rumors of homosexuality. Certainly, the king liked to appear in women’s clothing. For example, at the marriage of his sister Margot in Paris, he had appeared as an Amazon. On another occasion, he dressed as an ancient goddess at one of his mother’s cultural events. Some Poles aped this fashion: the thirty-five-year-old nobleman, Stanisław Żółkiewski appeared in a green dress as Diana at the wedding of the magnate Jan Zamojski with Gryzelda Batorówna.

Despite his partying, Henryk found the royal court on the Wawel in Cracow much duller than the French court. He also felt constrained by the pride and power of the Polish nobility. Knowing no Polish and only a little Latin, the new Polish king spent most of his time with his French friends. While many educated Polish nobles knew French and Italian, these tongues had no official status. Henryk therefore limited his contacts with his Polish subjects and wrote up to 40 letters a day to contacts in France, to whom he complained “la Pologne est un pays de Scythes sauvages où il n’y a rien à manger” (“Poland is a country of wild Scythians where there is nothing to eat”).

In his view, a monarch should not only reign but also govern, and he involved himself heavily in administration. Henryk soon learned to use the internal divisions of the nobility to strengthen royal powers and attended Senate meetings regularly. However, the foreign ways of the royal court alienated many nobles. The “volta” danced at court was regarded as obscene and Henryk was accused of laziness because he played card games and partied most of the night. Between the king and his noble subjects, misunderstanding grew. The Poles had numerous accusations: the king did not take his oath to uphold the Polish laws as he had promised in France, he favored a few Polish nobles while neglecting the rest, he spent most of his time with his mignons, and finally he ignored Anna Jagiellońska, the last survivor of the previous dynasty, whom many Poles had hoped he would marry. These points led the Polish elite to re-evaluate its choice of this Frenchman as king.

When Henryk learned of his older brother’s death in June 1574, it was easy to choose between the crowns of France and Poland, the Wawel and the Louvre. On the night of 18 June, he secretly fled Cracow, accompanied by his trusted French courtiers. The baffled Poles soon learned of the king’s departure and chased after him. Already outside Poland, the king received Count Tęczyński, sent by the Senate. Faced with the Polish professions of loyalty and regret at any misunderstanding, Henri lied: “je ne quite pas ce qu’il m’a acquis par élection. Quand j’aurai fait ce que j’espère, je vous reverrai car j’ai, Dieu merci, les épaules assez fortes pour soutenir l’une et l’autre couronnes.” (“I am not leaving what I’ve acquired through election. When I have done what I hope to do, I will return to you because I have, thank God, strong enough shoulders to bear both crowns.”) The king’s absence brought confusion, disorganization, and foreign threats to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Poles eventually declared the throne vacant and elected Stefan Batory in July 1575.

The Reformation and Counter-Reformation kept any focus on homosexuality to the theological realm. Both Protestant and reformed Roman Catholic condemned homosexual behavior. Religious leaders such as Jean Calvin, Martin Luther, and Ignatius Loyola, who played large roles in Poland’s history, condemned homosexual behavior. Prior to the eighteenth century, the discourse on homosexuality in Poland was clearly grounded in theological language and concepts. Homosexual behavior was sinful and “the wages of sin are death,” as clearly demon-
strated in the case of the young Władysław III.

The Secular discourse

Only in the late eighteenth century does an alternative discourse develop in Poland when the country was affected by the fluid attitude toward sexuality that was promoted by the Enlightenment's tolerance, rationalism, and secularism. The Enlightenment became the model for Poland's reform and it is only at this juncture that a non-theological discourse rivals the theological interpretation and another type of discourse on homosexual behavior can take place.

Stanisław August (1732-1798), Poland's last king who reigned from 1764 to 1795, made the Enlightenment a state doctrine. He was said to have slept with Sir Charles Hanbury Williams (1708-1759), the British ambassador in St Petersburg, where he was employed as the ambassador's secretary – but the future king was also a paramour of Catherine II of Russia. His name was also amorously linked to the British Major General Charles Lee (1731-1782), who served in the Polish Army between 1764 and 1766, the first years of the king's reign. The king finally married in 1783, but no children were born. Also as this time, Jerzy Marcin Lubomirski, a scion of one of the wealthiest magnate families, was known to his contemporaries as a "sexual pervert." A Warsaw newspaper reported the scandal when Lubomirski appeared in women's clothing at a Warsaw masked ball in 1782.

After the Third Partition of Poland in 1795, Poles were deprived of statehood and their state divided among Russia, Austria, and Prussia. However, there were periods of autonomy, one of which was the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1813) when Poland was under Napoleonic influence. For the history of homosexuality in Poland, the Duchy of Warsaw is of crucial importance, because this short-lived state saw the adoption of a modern legal system, the first in Eastern Europe, the Code Napoléon. Napoleon had given the Duchy a constitution which decreed the introduction of this code. In 1808, Napoleon's Civil Code was successfully introduced in the Duchy of Warsaw. The Duchy's government then attempted to implement the new Napoleonic criminal code. Influenced by revolutionary legislation, the 1810 Criminal Code of the French legal system was silent on the issue of homosexuality, which was a conscious attempt to ensure that there was no legal framework for the oppression of homosexuals. Although this code was ultimately not introduced to the Duchy as a result of parliamentary opposition, it was still influential in shaping Polish legal tradition. Like the Code Napoleon itself, this silence on homosexuality came to be considered as Poland's legal norm.

However, after 1815, the legal codes of the three occupying powers made homosexual acts illegal. For example, in 1835, Nicholas I of Russia decreed male homosexual acts illegal throughout the Russian Empire, a prohibition formalized in the Russian criminal code of 1903. Paragraph 516 decreed that those convicted of “pederasty” were to be sentenced to no less than three months in prison. The remaining partitioning powers, Austria and Prussia (later Germany), also treated homosexual behavior as criminal. The infamous Paragraph 175 of the German criminal code of 1871 and its equivalent paragraphs 129 and 130 of the Austrian criminal code of 1852 also made homosexuality a criminal matter. This treatment contrasted with contemporary law in France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal as well as some of the Swiss cantons where homosexuality was not criminalized. However, the criminalization of homosexuality was based on a scientific discourse of biological abnormality, displacing the earlier religious discourse of sin. The crime was seen as offending "Nature," not God. Nonetheless, given that the Polish national movement condemned the partitioning powers and the legal regimes imposed on Polish territory while simultaneously looking to Western Europe for support, it is little wonder that many thoughtful Poles questioned why the legal system outlawed homosexuality.
New, secular attitudes toward sexuality were tied to an advancing modernity that was perceived as corrupting traditional values and a threat the existing social structure. In Poland, the attack on modernity was coupled with the birth of modern anti-Semitism, for Jews were viewed as pushing a modernist agenda. In addition, Polish anti-Semites were capable of accusing the Jews not only of an abnormal sexuality themselves but also of promoting sodomy. For example, Independent Thought (Myśl niepodległa) noted that the Jews’ unethical moral code promoted prostitution and pornography, but also divorce, polygamy, premarital sex, incest, and sodomy.

Despite the laws of the partitioning powers, homosexual behavior continued, and the beginning of a specifically gay consciousness appeared in Poland during the nineteenth century. A founder of the Polish feminist movement, Narcyza Żmichowska (1819-1876) is among the few known lesbians in nineteenth-century Poland. She used her affair with the daughter of a rich magnate as the source for her novel The Pagan Woman (Pogańka) first published in 1846. Lesbianism was not mentioned in the Russian or German criminal codes, and consequently lesbian social circles were not documented in this legal context.

The medical discourse

By the mid-nineteenth century, a specific variety of the secular discourse became prominent. This medical discourse put the discussion of homosexuality on radically different footing. In this discourse, homosexual behavior was regarded as a medical condition, which meant that it was inappropriate to deal with it through the judicial system and illogical to treat it in theological terms. In fact, this discourse attempted to monopolize the discussion on homosexuality by setting it firmly within the medical domain.

Despite occupation, Poland remained open to foreign influences: the work of English and French researchers were cited in Polish medical literature. The work of Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, Ambroise Tardieu, Albert Eulenburg, Marc André Raffalovich, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Albert Moll, Iwan Bloch, Martin Charcot, Paul Chavigny, Valentin Magnan, Hermann Rohleder, Paul Näcke, Leopold Löwenfeld, Léon Thoinot, Havelock Ellis, and Gabriel Antoine Jogand-Pagés (under the pseudonym Léo Taxil) were cited by Polish researchers as was Magnus Hirschfeld and his periodical Jahrbücher für sexuelle Zwischenstufen.

Indeed, Polish doctors participated in this medical discourse. The forensic physician Leon Wachholz (1867-1942) and the psychologist Stanisław Szuman were medical experts who “pomonised” the medical discourse on homosexuality. Wachholz was a professor at Jagiellonian University whose expertise was recognized by the provincial court in Krakow. He also published a number of articles on homosexuality. However, he is best known for his two forensic manuals: The Handbook of Forensic Medicine, taking into account Austrian, German, and Russian law for the use of students, physicians, and lawyers (Podręcznik Meydcyny Sądowej z uwzględnieniem ustawodawstwa austryackiego, niemieckiego I rosyjskiego dla użytku uczniów, lekarzy i prawników) (Cracow, 1899), which went through several editions, and Forensic Medicine on the base of the laws in force on Polish territories (Medycyna Sądowa na podstawie ustaw obowiązujących na ziemiach polskich) (Cracow, 1919).

Wachholz’s work placed homosexuality firmly within the medical field and drew upon the evidence put forward by German and French doctors and psychologists. Wachholz accepted Krafft-Ebing’s thesis that homosexuality was genetic, present from birth. Although he referenced Moll’s belief that homosexual behaviour should not be a criminal offence because it was innate, Wachholz himself treated homosexuality as an “offence against nature” (nierząd przeciw natury), following the law that he was describing. However, he was comfortable pointing out that criminalisation left homosexual men open to blackmail from male prostitutes, showing that one crime led to another, and often to economic ruin and even suicide.
he pointed out the contradictions in the contemporary treatment of homosexuality under the law. Finally, he added that given the importance of the sex drive, homosexuals had a Damocles sword over their heads, repressed if they do not act on their sexuality but condemned legally if they do. By 1919, Wachholz had concluded that the French, Dutch, and Italian approach of de-criminalising homosexuality was the most appropriate approach. He noted that research on the mental state of homosexuals invariably demonstrated that they did not differ from others. Yet he accepted the absurd notion that one could tell active and passive homosexuals upon physical examination.

Wachholz estimated that 2% of the population was exclusively homosexual and 4% bisexual. Like Kraft-Ebbing, he created a taxonomy of sexuality, dividing the homosexual population into three groups, based on attraction. Homosexuals attracted to youth (ephemophilia) constituted 45% of the group, to adult males (androphilia) also 45%, to male children (praeophilia) only 5%, and to old men (gerontophilia) also 5%. Lesbians had approximately the same level of attraction: about half to young women (parthenophilia) and another half to mature women (gynaecophilia), but were seldom attracted to young girls (koreophilia) or to old women (grandophilia). Wacholz also felt comfortable reporting that 40% of homosexuals used the hand or mouth for pleasuring, 12% used frottage, and only 8% were involved in intercourse (anal for men, using dildos for women).

For his part, Szuman undertook original research and published it, describing three specific cases of homosexual men. His approach is unusual because his article is almost entirely devoted to first-person narratives by his subjects who described their lives and feelings. The reader can no help but sympathise with their plight and recognise the sincerity of their passions.

After independence was regained in 1918, reformers worked to remove the existing foreign laws outlawing homosexuality and restoring the Polish legal tradition. For example, Professor Anton Feliks Mikulski (1872-1925) wrote an influential treatment of homosexuality in 1920 that demonstrated the rise of the medical model of homosexuality in the new Polish state and the need to remove homosexual behaviour from a criminal context. Although Mikulski still regarded homosexuality as a “sexual perversion” (zboczenie płciowe), he acknowledged that this concept arose from theology, not science. Nevertheless, he was comfortable with the term because he believed that the purpose of the sex act was reproduction. Moreover, Mikulski agreed with Krafft-Ebing that it was important to distinguish between perversio and perversitas. His analysis led Mikulski to believe that while homosexuality was not normal, there was no reason to treat it as a criminal issue. He saw the goal of the legal reform movement to remove homosexuality from the penal code.

Independent Poland was now faced with administering three different criminal codes on its territory. Work began on the development of a new code as early as 1919. A special Codification Commission was established and a criminal division worked within it. The commission worked with psychologists and physicians to ensure that its recommended approach reflected the latest in medical thought. Their work attracted much attention. For example, the heterosexual pediatrician, journalist, and translator Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński (1874-1941), published newspaper essays supporting the rights of homosexuals to be left alone. Such advocacy for legal reform was successful: independent Poland’s newly minted criminal code was silent on homosexuality, thus keeping with what was considered Polish legal tradition.

The Polish Criminal Code of 1932 was an extraordinary accomplishment. At a time when the Nazis were about to take over Germany and embark on a savage repression of homosexuals and when Stalin was re-criminalising homosexuality in the Soviet Union, Poland enacted one of the most progressive codes anywhere in Europe. Nonetheless, Polish society had other methods for discriminating against homosexuals. Social attitudes had not changed, and the
theological position of the Roman Catholic Church still condemned homosexuality. Moreover, the police continued to use other laws such as gross indecency laws to harass homosexuals. It appears that most Poles regarded homosexuals with repulsion or, at best, pity. A few intellectuals would have advocated tolerance or, at best, acceptance.

Nevertheless, inter-war Poland had a thriving homosexual subculture as well as an intellectual and cultural elite with a prominent homosexual component, similar to other European capitals. For example, the Skamander, the most important group of lyrical poets in inter-war Poland, was dominated by homosexual men. Such figures as the composer Karol Szymanowski (1882-1937), the writer Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz (1894-1980), the poets Boleslaw LeSzman (1877-1937), Stanislaw Balański (1898-1984), Jan Lechoń (1899-1956), and Witold Gombrowicz (1904-1969), as well as the novelists Tadeusz Breza (1905-1970), and Józef Czechowicz (1903-1939), demonstrated the intellectual vitality of this elite subculture and the contributions that these gay men made to Polish culture and society.

An illustrative example of this cultural elite was Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz. Born into the Polish minority living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, Iwaszkiewicz studied law and music in Kyiv from 1912 and settled in Warsaw in 1918 where he belonged to Skamander. In 1922, Iwaszkiewicz married Anna Lilpop, the daughter of a rich Warsaw industrialist; the marriage resulted in two daughters. However, it did not result in a change to Iwaszkiewicz’s sexual preferences. Throughout his writing career, Iwaszkiewicz explored the link between creativity and eroticism. His early poetic fable, Escape from Baghdad (Ucieczka do Bagdadu) (1923) already had a distinct homosexual accent. Many of his works had homoerotic plots. In The Young Ladies from Wilko (Panny w Wilka) (1932), the protagonist Wiktor has an affair with his cousin Julia; this plot was later acknowledged to be based on an affair the author had with Józef Świerczyński, whom this fine novella transformed into a female! A friend and cousin of the composer Karol Szymanowski, Iwaszkiewicz wrote the libretto for his homoerotic opera King Roger (Król Roger), which premiered in Warsaw in 1926. In later works, such as the novels Red Shields (Czerwone tarcze, 1934), The Mill over the Utrata (Młyn nad Utratą, 1936) or the short stories The Teacher (Nauczyciel) and Siegfried (Zygfryd), he was more open about homosexuality.

During World War II, Iwaszkiewicz remained in German-occupied Poland, living on a country estate owned by his wife’s family. Following the expulsion of the Nazis, Poland was occupied by the Red Army and a Communist regime was imposed in 1948. Iwaszkiewicz was among those intellectuals who found it possible, even profitable, to co-operate with the Communists. Almost from the regime’s origins, Iwaszkiewicz began to co-operate with the new Communist government in 1949. For example, he was appointed chairman of the Polish Committee to Defend Peace and became a member of the Polish parliament. Iwaszkiewicz presided over the Union of Polish Writers three times; from 1955 he edited the important monthly literary periodical Twórczość (Creation). In 1970, he was awarded the International Lenin Prize.

While Iwaszkiewicz could change his politics, there were some things that did not change. Even in his most popular work, the family saga, Glory and Fame (Sława i Chwała) published between 1956 and 1962 and relating the fate of Poles between 1914 and 1945, homoeroticism is present. His autobiography Book of my memories (Książka moich wspomnień 1957) recalls his fascination for the homoerotic. He also translated the works of gay authors, such as Arthur Rimbaud and André Gide into Polish. Iwaszkiewicz’s life recalls the rich intellectual life of Polish gay life in the interwar period, as well as its continued existence in People’s Poland. The most important figure in cultural politics, Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz, is now joined by the homosexual novelists Jerzy Andrzejewski (1909-1983) and Julian Stryjkowski (1904-1996).

In People’s Poland, the Communists did not criminalise homosexual activity as Stalin had
in the Soviet Union, and it maintained age 15 as the age of consent for all sexual acts, homosexual or heterosexual. However, the medical model of homosexuality continued in a new guise. By the 1960s, sexology was acknowledged by the Communist regime as a legitimate field of study. Kazimierz Imieliński was a pioneer in this field and authored numerous publications. Eventually, this sexology approach resulted in the first, full-length monograph devoted to homosexuality. This trend also led to self-help books for readers with self-identified sexual issues; many of these books were translations from English.

Homosexuality was also treated within the field of criminology with less favourable results. Polish criminologists were familiar with Western studies on homosexuality, such as those by Alfred Kinsey, Gordon Westwood, and Stephen Coates. Homosexuals were regarded as a part of society that would not accept social norms, and therefore their actions were suspect, even though homosexual sex was legal. Moreover, they treated pedophilia as a variant of homosexual behavior.

The most prominent researcher was Jerzy Giza. He estimated that in Wrocław, one of Poland’s largest cities, there were 5,000 male homosexuals, of whom 800 to 1,000 were sexually active; they were “lacking ethical brakes,” and they set the tone for the homosexual subculture of the city, recalling the Damoclean sword of earlier literature. For the homosexual, sex was as necessary as narcotics for the drug addict. However, Giza also noted that homosexual men who participated in the homosexual subculture were least likely to become involved in criminal behaviour. Nonetheless, the “hermetically closed” nature of homosexual society meant that police operations were difficult in this milieu. Giza conducted his research almost exclusively in correctional institutions and he clearly demonstrated that homosexuality was widespread in Polish prisons: his survey showed that 37.7% of youth incarcerated for the first time and 42.7% of those incarcerated more than once had been involved in homosexual practices. Homosexual prostitution was of particular interest to him. From his research, he posited that male prostitutes were unlikely to be homosexuals themselves and were most likely to become prostitutes at age 17 and practice prostitution for around ten years.

Giza understood that while Western-style clubs did not exist in Poland, public meeting places were universally recognised by members of the sub-culture, regardless of the locale: steam baths, public washrooms, parks. During summers, the Tri-city region (Gdańsk, Gdynia, Sopot) was regarded as particularly active. While homosexuality was not regarded as a clinical disease, it was seen as a social problem because it led to crimes such as lewd behaviour and prostitution. In addition, assaults on homosexuals -- as well as homosexual assaults on others (likely in self-defence) -- were largely unreported. Among the crimes believed most frequently committed by homosexuals were sex with under-aged or legally incompetent partners, sale and distribution of pornography, or getting minors drunk. The types of crime committed against presumed homosexuals were murder, robbery, and sexual assault. Giza paid particular attention to the subject of youth and homosexuality. One survey noted that 80% of those surveyed had their first homosexual experience before age 16, which led him to suggest that the age of consent should be raised from 15 years to 18 or even 21 years. Criminological studies led to the attitude that it was important for the police to be familiar with the homosexual underworld for “prophylactic purposes and for greater discovery” of homosexual crime. However, at a time when few areas were available for discussions about homosexuality, criminology permitted research opportunities and information gathering for study.

The Political Discourse

While underlying public attitudes toward homosexuality did not change significantly because of Warsaw’s homosexual cultural elite, by the 1970s, cafés such as the “Alhambra” on al.
Jerozolimskie, “Na trakcie” on ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście, the bar at the Ambassador on ul. Ujazdowskie, the café Antyczna on ul. Nowy Świat (opposite the pissoir on Plac Trzech Krzyży), and the washrooms at Warsaw’s Central Station were popular cruising grounds. However, all media outlets and cultural organisations, were controlled by the Communist government and the police kept detailed records on anyone suspected of homosexuality. Section 213 of the Criminal Code – public indecency (nierząd publiczny) – was always available as a legal tool. Most importantly, the Roman Catholic Church maintained its hostile position, which made open homosexuality scandalous in all but a few circles.

Although the Communist government did not allow an independent gay movement, the ground for a political discourse was laid. Despite social disapproval, the network of cafés and private social circles provided opportunities for a gay subculture to grow. The first open discussion of Warsaw’s homosexual underground arose from a 1981 article in the important Warsaw weekly, Polityka, which advocated greater tolerance. Indeed, the periodical Relax permitted classified ads for encounters between gay men, beginning in Autumn 1983. The first article from the point of view of a gay male also appeared in Polityka in 1985: its author, Dariusz Prorok (writing under the pseudonym Krzysztof T. Darski), described in vivid detail the dominant society’s treatment of gay people.

Beginning in 1986, the underground gay newspaper Filo from Gdańsk was distributed in editions of less than 100, thereby escaping censorship regulations. In addition, the gay poet Grzegorz Musiał was officially published. (However, the uncensored version of Jerzy Andrzejewski’s last novel Miazga (Pulp) which dealt with homosexuality could only be published abroad.) Despite such openings, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the police continued to keep records on homosexuals; the Communist government used traditionally negative attitudes toward homosexuals as a way of blackmailing them. The police felt free to harass gays; citing the need to control venereal disease the police launched “Operation Hyacinth” in November 1985. During this crackdown, the police picked up hundreds of gay men at work, school and home, to interrogate them and blackmail them into collaborating. The earliest attempts at establishing a gay movement were, ironically, linked to these mass arrests and the appearance of the first (and last) issue of a Warsaw gay newspaper Efebos, in June 1987, one of the results of that attempt.

With the return of democracy in 1989, Warsaw’s gay community established its own organisation, “Lambda,” in October 1989. The provincial court of Warsaw officially registered this group in February 1990. The first gay campaign for tolerance, “Love, don’t kill” (Kochaj, nie zabijaj) took place that spring with the publication and distribution of safer sex pamphlets and the establishment of a confidential telephone line. Warsaw’s Pink Service began to publish the English-language Warsaw Gay News in September 1990 and Warsaw soon had three more gay monthlies: Men, OKAY, and Gayzeta -- Nie? Tak?. The first published gay novel in Polish appeared. Moreover, the city’s first gay demonstration took place in 1993 on Valentine’s Day, when Lambda Warsaw passed out brochures insisting on the equal value of love, homosexual or heterosexual. In 1994, Lambda Warsaw held a press conference to release its “Report on the discrimination for reasons of sexual orientation in Poland” (Raport o dyskryminacji ze względu na orientację w Polsce). For the first time in Polish history, discrimination against gays and lesbians was formally documented.

Warsaw is still clearly the centre of Polish gay life with bars, baths, and organisations. However, Cracow, Gdańsk, Poznań, and Wrocław also have a gay commercial infrastructure as well as gay organisations. The abolition of censorship led to a wave of gay periodicals, such as Inaczej (Different) (Poznań), but this quick efflorescence has now been reduced to the commercially successful and sex-positive Nowy Men (New Men). On 17 June 1995, the first official
celebration of Gay Pride took place in Warsaw at the student pub, “Giovanni.” During the 1995 election campaign, the successful Social Democratic candidate for president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, publicly appealed for support from gay and lesbian voters. In 1996, the Lesbian Information and Counselling Centre was established. While there is no distinct lesbian movement, women’s organisations have been supportive of homosexual causes.

As elsewhere, AIDS served to activate gays and lesbians. The primary vector for the transmission of HIV in Poland is shared needles, but HIV/AIDS has also touched the gay community. For example, in 1995, an exhibition on “I and AIDS” was organised in Warsaw and featured the work of the openly gay artist Andrzej Karaś. Canadian, Swedish, and German groups have actively aided the HIV awareness campaign in Poland.

Social prejudices remain. Although the 1997 constitution banned discrimination “on any grounds,” the Roman Catholic hierarchy has prevented any specific protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In addition, the constitution limits marriage to heterosexuals. Opinion polls consistently show that two-thirds of Poles “despise” homosexuals. To challenge such attitudes, the Campaign Against Homophobia has featured controversial posters that force viewers to ponder their own attitudes. Although the foundation for a gay and lesbian community has been laid and the legal framework is favourable to gay life, the Roman Catholic Church publicly encourages anti-gay attitudes so that the lives of individual gays and lesbian continue to be difficult. Nonetheless, the presence of a political discourse means that new arguments about rights and freedoms engage the public.

The presence of the new political discourse has not erased the first, theological discourse, however. Despite the impact of the Reformation and, in the nineteenth century, industrialisation and urbanisation, Poland remains overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. This church served as an important source of resistance to the Nazis and the Communists, gaining widespread respect for itself in the process. The church’s prestige was reinforced by the election of the first Polish Pope, John Paul II, in 1978. As in other countries, the Roman Catholic Church traditionally has had a large percentage of gay priests, because the priesthood is one of the few acceptable ways to avoid marriage in a traditional society. Nonetheless, it has been unremitting in its condemnation of homosexuality. Józef Cardinal Glemp, Archbishop of Warsaw and Primate of Poland, publicly condemned homosexuality and blamed it for the fall of the Roman Empire! Pope John Paul II also decried the adoption of children by gay couples and gay marriages. In 1994, a group of gay Christians, Grupa Lesbijek i Gejów Chrześcijan w Warszawie, was established to engage in dialogue with the church hierarchy and to integrate gays and lesbians into the life of the church. However, such attempts have been met with silence from the church. Today, most Polish gays and lesbians are still closeted despite the development of a gay and lesbian movement and the emerging presence of queer theorists and activists.

This brief narrative of the history of homosexuality in Poland reveals a layering of discourses. While the theological discourse of sin and damnation dominated until the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment’s appearance in Poland presented a secular discourse that scoffed at sin and removed homosexuality, witchcraft, and apostasy from the legal domain. However, after the partition and occupation of Poland by its three Eastern European neighbours, Poles treated homosexuality as a crime against “Nature.” In the late nineteenth century, Polish doctors accepted and helped to develop theories of homosexuality, presenting yet another layer of discourse – the medical. In the twentieth century, criminologists expanded on this medical discourse. Polish gays and lesbians have themselves recently established a political discourse when speaking of their liberation and struggle for rights.

Conclusion

Constructing a narrative of Poland’s history of homosexuality is inevitably an interpretative act. The meaning of such a narrative is two-fold. Demonstrating the continuous presence
of homosexual men and women in Polish society shows that contemporary gays and lesbians have a history that validates their existence. History becomes an avowal of the present and a resource for the ongoing struggle for recognition. “Historiography is the form by the help of which society transforms the past into a component of its own consciousness.” This narrative also shows the futility of criminal prosecution because homosexuality appears to triumph over all attempts to suppress or destroy it. Despite such positive messaging, all historical narratives are inherently unstable. In Ankersmit’s terms, there is a “lack of fixity” in historiography between accounts of the past and the past itself. New evidence, a new approach, a new context can force a new interpretation of the pattern of facts, establishing additional layers of interpretation that inform the actions writers may advocate and readers may devise. Objectivity is inevitably related to the point of view function in a narrative. While the historian’s task is to provide the most comprehensive account of the past according to Ankersmit, the best, the most adequate, or the most objective narratio out of a set of competing narrations on or around a historical topic is the narratio of which the scope beyond its descriptive content has been maximalised.... The requirement that the historian should maximalise the scope of his narratio could be interpreted as a plea for an “integral history,” i.e. a historiography that subsumes in one narratio all that has been found by the sub-disciplines of the historical past.

Furthermore, the enlarged scope and need for comparison permits for greater validity.

The rarity of historical evidence of homosexual behaviour forces most historians of homosexuality to pursue precisely this strategy. As a field, gay history exploits every bit of evidence (however fragmentary), every field of study, and every shift in discourse in order to pull together a narrative of homosexuality. Tracing the layers of discourse that result from this research activity shows the development of, and change, in social and political consciousness. Basing the periodisation of this history on the appearance of new types of discourse provides a structure for the synthesis.

The acquisition of knowledge implies the responsibility to act upon it. Consequently, such narratives typically describe a progress from the suppressed and persecuted, to openness and success: the “New Jerusalem” paradigm described, in a different context, by the Canadian literary theorist Northrop Frye. The point of view in nearly all narratives of gay history is that of the open gay or lesbian and this revealing of the homosexual past inevitably becomes a political act. The narrator of the past becomes witness and advocate, encouraging belief in present and future activism. The process of creating a narrative aids the leap from data to recommendations, from fact to values, from “is” to “ought.”

This short narrative and synthesis of the history of homosexuality in Poland serves to outline the shifts of discourse and attitude over the centuries in the hope of providing a guide to a deeper analysis of this history. However, it too gives roots, provides shade for the present, and points the way for a future.
Notes:
1. Among the earliest such syntheses is Jonathan Katz, Gay American History: Lesbians and Gay Men in the USA (New York, 1976). A synthesis of Canada’s queer history is available in Tom Warner, Never Going Back: A History of Queer Activism in Canada (Toronto, 2002). The recent www.glbtq.com: an Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Culture (2004) required writers to compose syntheses for specific countries. See Dan Healey's essay on Russia or my own on Poland. In contrast, the essay on the Balkans avoids such a narrative by focusing exclusively on current events.

2. I use the term “homosexual” although I recognise that the term is not neutral. The term “homosexual” appeared first in 1869; its first usage in English is dated to 1892. I have not been able to date the first usage of “homoseksualizm” or “homoseksualista” in Polish. Leon Wachholz used the term “samocolożtwo” in his important 1899 work Podręcznik Medycyny Sądowej z uwzględnieniem ustawodawstwa austryackiego, niemieckiego I rosyjskiego dla użytku uczniów, lekarzy i prawników (Cracow, 1899), pp. 482-88.


7. Scholes and Kellog, p. 81


9. Ankersmit, p. 2

10. Ibid., p. 207

11. See ibid., pp. 164-65, for further discussion of this argument.

12. For further discussion on point of view, see ibid., p. 25-7.

13. Ibid., p. 168

14. Ibid., p. 195

15. A first attempt at publicising basic facts about Polish gay history, but in a non-narrative format is Andrzej Selerowicz, Leksykon kochających inaczej: fakty, daty, nazwiska (Poznań, 1994).


18. The sources of this dispute are limited to the Chronicle of Gallus Anonymous, written within 30 years of the events, and the Polish Chronicle by Master Vincent, called Kadłubek, written a hundred years after Gallus's work. See Tadeusz Grudziński, Boleslaus the Bold and Bishop Stanislaus (Warsaw, 1985), pp. 89-119.

19. Grudziński believes this new element is based on an inaccurate interpretation of one unclear sentence in Kadłubek. Grudziński, p. 97

20. Saturnin Kwiatkowski, Ostatnie lata Władysława Warneńczyka (Lwów, 1883) [offprint from Przewodnik Naukowy I Literacki], p. 15


22. Kwiatkowski, pp. 55-9

23. Kwiatkowski, pp. 71-2


26. For example, one of the foremost accounts of the battle, that of Oskar Halecki, does not even raise the issue of homosexuality. See Oskar Halecki, The Crusade of Varna : a Discussion of Controversial Problems (New York, 1943. [Polish Institute series, 3]. His contemporary, Jan Dąbrowski, provides only the slightest mention of the king's proclivities in a footnote. See Dąbrowski, p. 196, note #3. The earlier account by Kwiatkowski simply notes that the king was made a scapegoat for the defeat. Kwiatkowski, p. 75


30. Solnon noted that "les bijoux étaient sa passion" (“jewelry was his passion”). Solnon, p. 275

31. Ibid., p. 92


33. For a discussion of the Polish delegation to visit in France, see Adam Przyboś and Roman Zelewski, eds., Diariusz poselstwa polskiego do Francji po Henryka Walezego w 1573 roku. (Wrocław, 1963) [Polska Akademia Nauk. Oddział w Krakowie. Materiały Komisji Nauk Historycznych, 8].


36. Solnon, pp. 154, 229, 259

37. Jouanna, pp. 157-8


39. Grzybowski relates that at the death in a duel of two of the mignons, Lévis Caylus Jacques, count of Quélus and of Louis de Maugiron, Henryk went wild, kissed them both on the lips after their
death, kept Quélus’ ear rings as a reminder, arranged a princely funeral, and built an imposing tomb. Grzybowski, p. 168 and Solnon, pp. 238-9. The duel was predicated by Callus calling Maugiron a “bougre,” or sodomite. Solnon protests that the term was used purely as an insult and not an accusation of a particular sexual practice. Solnon, p. 232-3


41. Solnon, p. 241. For example, Henri de Saint-Sulpice was known as “Colette” and the king called Gilles de Souvré ”ma Gode.” Jouanna, p. 161.

42. Solnon, p. 116

43. In 1577, at a fête celebrating femininity, Henryk appeared in a silver and pink gown, covered in jewels, symbolizing Hebe. Agrippe d’Aubigné noted that this party was one “where he allowed himself the great violence to custom…” Grzybowski, p. 170, citing Mme Gacon-Dufour, La cour de Catherine de Médicis, de Charles IX, de Henri III et de Henri IV, vol. I (Paris, 1807), p. 323.

44. Grzybowski, p. 164

45. H. Kutrzebianka, Opinie Francuzów o Polakach z czasów elekcji Henryka Walezego (Warsaw, 1937), p. 15-16

46. Solnon, p. 170. This entire episode served as the basis for a comic opera, Le Roi malgré lui by the French composer Emmanuel Chabrier.


48. Jan IJ. Van der Meer, Literary Activities and Attitudes in the Stanislavian Age in Poland (1764-1795). A Social System? (Amsterdam, 2002), p. 147

49. The impact of the Napoleonic legal system on Polish law is immense: The Civil Code remained in force until 1846, the Code of Civil Procedure until 1864, the court system until 1876, and the Commercial Code until 1934! The Napoleonic legal system became considered as the native legal tradition, the “Polish” law and its maintenance was seen as a sign of Polish autonomy from Russian control.

50. The Austrian legislation differed from the Russian and German laws by encompassing lesbian acts. Leon Wachholz, Podręcznik, p. 482 This equal treatment of homosexual behavior between men and between women appeared in Austrian legislation as early as the Caroline, the sixteenth-century criminal code of Charles V.


52. Myśl niepodległa, no. 265 (January 1914), p. 28, as cited by Dr Robert Blobaum in his unpublished paper, ”Deviance, Antisemitism and the Construction of Jewish Criminality in early Twentieth-century Poland,” delivered at the 2003 convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) in Toronto.

53. Further biographical details are available in Jan S. Olbrycht, ”W piątą rocznicę zgonu Leona Wachholza”Polski Tygodnik Lekarski, no. 48-49 (1947) and Jan S. Olbrycht, ”Leon Wachholz (1867-1942), Polski Tygodnik Lekarski, vol. 19 (1964), pp. 685-6.

54. Wachholz, ”Zur Kasuistik der sexuellen Verirrungen,” Friedrich’s Blätter für gerichtliche Medizin und Sanitätspolizei (1892); Wachholz, ”Krytyczne uwagi w sprawie uranicznego poczucia płciowego,” Krytyka lekarska (1900); Wachholz, ”Z kauzurek ciaŁ obcych w odbycie,” Przegląd lekarski (1907) and in Aerztliche Sachverständigen-Zeitung (1908)

55. Wachholz, Podręcznik, p. 485

56. For example, he pointed out that while anal intercourse was illegal between men, the law was silent on anal intercourse between a man and a woman. Wachholz, Podręcznik, p. 483

57. ”The stand of these laws is completely appropriate and conforms with the results of scientific research.” Wachholz, Medycyna Sądowa, p. 450

58. Ibid., pp. 450-1

59. Ibid., p. 452

60. Ibid., p. 447

61. Ibid., p. 449

62. Stanisław Szuman, ”Własna charakterystyka stanu swego 2-ch pacjentów dotkniętych homoseksualizm,” Nowiny Lekarskie (Poznań), R. 30, z. 4 (December 1918), pp. 77-81

63. Antoni Mikulski, Homoseksualizm ze stanowiska medycyny i prawa [Odczyty kliniczne, Serja XXII, zeszyty 11, 12, nos. 263, 264 (Warsaw, 1920), p. 3. Mikulski saw the Polish doctor as key to providing the evidence to resolving this legal issue.

64. Mikulski, p. 29

65. See Adam Lityński, Wydział karny komisji kodyfikacyjnej II Rzeczypospolitej : dzieje prac nad częścią
ógólną kodeksu karnego (Katowice, 1991).

66. For further details on the development of the code, see Juliusz Bardach, Bogusław Leśnodorski, Michał Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego (Warsaw, 1994), p. 553.


69. For further details on the development of the code, see Juliusz Bardach, Bogusław Leśnodorski, Michał Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego (Warsaw, 1994), p. 553.


72. Krzysztof Boczkowski, Homoseksualizm (Warsaw, 1992)

73. For example, see Ujawnij się prawda lesbijek i gejów: (Warsaw, 1995).


76. Giza, “Wielkomiejskie środowisko homoseksualne,...,” pp. 730-31. Pedophilia was regarded as sex between an adult and a male of 13 years of age or younger. p. 739.

77. Ibid., p. 731

78. Ibid., p. 740

79. Ibid., p. 730.


82. Giza, “Wielkomiejskie środowisko homoseksualne,...,” p. 733

83. Ibid., pp. 739-40

84. Ibid., p. 744

85. For further details on this period, see John Stanley, “Poland, a recollection,” The Body Politic, (December 1984), pp. 27 -29.


88. Grzegorz Musiał, Kosmopolites (Gdańsk, 1980) and his Czeska biżuteria (Gdańsk, 1983)

89. Antoni Romanowicz (pseud.), Nie znany świat (Warsaw, 1992)


92. Mikulski recognised this phenomenon as early as 1920. See Mikulski, pp. 5-6

Sikora, “Queering the Heterosexist Fantasy of the Nation,” in Anna Branach-Kallas and Katarzyna Więckowska, eds., The Nation of the Other: Constructions of Nation in Contemporary Cultural and Literary Discourses (Toruń, 2004).

94. Михаил А. Барг, Эпохи и идеи : Становление историзма (Moscow, 1987), p. 24
95. Ankersmit, p. 236
96. Ibid., pp. 238-39
97. “...we only possess a number of narratios on or around a historical topic and by comparing them mutually we may hope to find out which of them is most objective.” Ibid., p. 237
98. Jonathan Katz dedicates the first national narrative of homosexuality, “For my people, with love, in struggle...”
I wanted to write this paper as a lawyer and a researcher. However, I am also an ordinary citizen of Poland and a heterosexual woman, to complete this sexual self-identification, I generally disapprove of this kind of labeling because it blurs the really important qualities of a person. However, these labels define our place in society, influence our conduct, and determine our perception of the world. My way from ignorance to understanding, and finally to supporting the rights of sexual minorities has been determined by my own life experiences, my beliefs and attitudes. Therefore, I will look at the changing legal and social situation of LGBT persons in Poland from my perspective, which obviously may be different from that of a homosexual person (or a homophobic heterosexual).

When I was still a law student, I did not know much about LGBT movements, and I did not know much about homosexuality itself. When I came across an article concerning homosexuality in the European legal system, translated and published by Lambda Warsaw, I found it very interesting. For the first time I saw the problems a homosexual person may encounter in life, and the difference the law can make. I wanted to learn more, especially about the situation in Poland. It struck me, however, that I could not find any other relevant publication in Polish. The problem seemed to be a real taboo, not just in law, but also in the media and in culture generally. I decided then to write my master's thesis on the issue of sexual minorities in law, but at that time I could only focus on the European law because not a single legal provision in Polish law that mentioned or related to sexual orientation.

The mysterious words “sexual orientation” have first appeared in the labor law. Chapter IIa of the Polish Labor Code entitled "Equal treatment of women and men" (introduced on 1 January 2002) has been modified by another amendment, which came into force on 1 January 2004. The chapter is now entitled “Equal treatment in employment” and it forbids discrimination based on sex, age, disability, race, religion, political opinion, trade union membership, ethnic origin, belief, or sexual orientation.

Of course, the new regulations are the consequence of joining the European Union and the requirement to adjust Polish law to the EU acquis communautaire. There is no doubt that the authorities would not have been so eager to introduce these amendments without this gentle “enforcement” by EU requirements. As the amendment of 2004 constitutes, in fact, the implementation of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, “Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation,” Chapter IIa of the Labor Code repeats the Directive's articles with little difference.

In accordance with the directive, the code, Article 18(3)a, §3 and §4, defines and prohibits direct discrimination, which occurs whenever someone is treated less favorably than someone else would be treated in a comparable situation, on grounds specified in this chapter. The code also prohibits indirect discrimination when an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice results when a person (of one of the protected classes) is treated unfavorably compared to other persons. Indirect discrimination is outlawed unless it can be objectively justified, but the employer has the burden of proof and must demonstrate there is an objective and justifiable reason for a discriminatory decision.

As the prohibition applies to employment, training, promotion, pay, and dismissal, it is...
mainly the employer who is to avoid discriminatory behaviour in such situations. In addi-
tion, the Code prohibits situations in which any employee or supervisor encourages another
to act in a discriminatory way, as well as harassment (§5), which is defined as behavior that
has the purpose or effect of humiliating or violating the dignity of another protected person.
This type of harassment (distinct from sexual harassment) is also a new term in Polish labor
law. Co-workers as well as employers are prohibited from engaging in harassment and from
encouraging discrimination.

The EU directive allows government the option of excluding specific cases where dif-
fferences in treatment can be justified by special circumstances. The Polish Labor Code also
provides for such exceptions in Article 18(3)b; for example, it allows establishing age or pro-
fessional experience criteria to be eligible for employment or vocational training, or as condi-
tions for dismissal, remuneration and promotion. It is also possible to set special conditions
of employment for older or disabled workers and persons who have responsibilities caring for
children in order to ensure their protection.

However, one exemption might be misused with regard to sexual orientation. According
to the EU directive (Article 4):

Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of
treatment which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article
1 shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupa-
tional activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic
constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective
is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. (my italics)

In other words, a characteristic that is grounds for discrimination may also be an essential
characteristic for performing the job. The article in the Polish Labour Code is phrased slightly
different: “refusal of employment” based on one of the grounds for discrimination will not
constitute discrimination, if it is justified by the nature or conditions of employment as well
as occupational requirements. Moreover, it does not emphasize that the reason for treating
people differently should be “legitimate” and the requirement “proportionate” (i.e., it must not
go any further than strictly necessary). I wonder if this difference allows for a different, possi-
bly adverse, interpretation. It seems that the directive permits an employer to hire an employee
with a particular characteristic, while the Labor Code rather allows not employing someone
because of the specific feature.

Some people may be tempted to invoke this regulation to discriminate against LGBT per-
sons, mainly in cases of occupations requiring exceptional “moral predisposition.” Right wing
politicians have often stated their intention to use option, even during the debate in the Senate
(the upper house of the Polish Parliament) when the amendments to the Labor Code were
discussed. One of the senators suggested, and the representative of the government agreed,
that “a person with homosexual proclivity” or “a person who has been penalized for various
behaviors of this kind” (sic!) could be rejected for a job in a school or orphanage because of
the requirement that the applicant uphold “fundamental moral principles.” Similar statements
suggested that homosexuality is the same as pedophilia, an intolerable ignorance that should
not be encouraged by representatives of the State. Sadly, they seem to share and influence the
opinion of common citizens. Moreover, the first case invoking the legal charge of infamy, chal-
lenging statements in the press that encouraged negative stereotypes against homosexuals, was
recently dismissed by the court, and similar cases have not yet reached the courts.

In Polish law, “good character” is a common occupational requirement that is imprecisely
defined. For example, there is the requirement of an “immaculate character” for judges, advokates,
solicitors, public service while other occupations require possession of “moral qualities,”
such as the position of Commissioner for Human Rights Protection, or as cited above, the
Teacher's Charter carries “the obligation to uphold moral principles.”

Such interpretations of morality clauses may prevent people from applying for certain jobs, from pursuing occupations or forces them to conceal their sexual orientation. This undoubtedly undermines the spirit of the directive, as well as citizens’ constitutional rights – the right to legal protection of private life, of honor and good reputation and to make decisions about personal life, as provided in Article 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, or the freedom to choose and to pursue an occupation and to choose a place of work (Article 65). It also appears contrary to the Polish Labor Code, which should be interpreted according to the directive it implements – the purpose of these acts is to eliminate stereotypes and their consequences, such as discrimination. Claiming that someone is immoral and depraved simply because she or he is homosexual takes us back to times when homosexuality was believed to be an illness.

Another step taken to strengthen the fight against discrimination was the establishment of a Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men in November 2001; by a Government Ordinance of June 2002, the mandate of the Plenipotentiary was expanded to cover issues of discrimination generally, including discrimination against sexual minorities. The measures initiated with the extended mandate were mostly required by the EU Racial and Gender Equality Directives, 2000/43 and 2002/73: educating the public on issues related to discrimination; reviewing the contents and effects of existing and proposed national legislation in light of relevant international standards; advising public authorities at all levels on issues related to discrimination. The Plenipotentiary holds conferences, some relating to LGBT issues, for example, a conference on Equality and Tolerance in School Curricula and Textbooks held 8 October 2002, and a conference relating to the draft of the same-sex partnerships act in November 2003. The Plenipotentiary also supports events and conferences organised by LGBT Non-Governmental Organizations and is involved in the EU Anti-Discriminatory Policies projects.

Since the first Polish Criminal Code of 1939 decriminalized homosexuality, the Labor Code is one of the first Polish legal acts to contain an explicit reference to sexual orientation. The first mention amended the Act on Employment and Counteracting Unemployment went into effect 6 February 2003. This amendment was replaced in June 2004 by the new Act on Promotion of Employment and on Institutions of the Labor Market, which introduced a ban on the formulation of job offers in manner that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation or other protected statuses.

However, it is the Labor Code that provides the genuine and practical protection of an individual against discrimination (the possibility to find redress in court). Even before the 2004 amendment, the general prohibition on discrimination in employment constituted one of the fundamental principles of the Labor Law, which is expressed in Articles 112 and 113 of the Labor Code. Nevertheless, the catalogue of the possible grounds of discrimination did not include sexual orientation. Moreover, Article 32 of the Constitution provides for prohibition of discrimination in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever, as well as the principles of equality, before the law and equal treatment by public authorities. In theory, these clauses should embrace discrimination on ground of sexual orientation. It is not irrelevant, though, that at the time of drafting the Constitution, the proposal to add sexual orientation as one of the ground for discrimination was rejected. (On the other hand, there are articles in the Constitution providing for particular protection of certain groups, such as war veterans, religious organizations, national minorities, etc.) This shows the reluctance of the legislature to interpret the principle of equality as encompassing homosexuals and transsexuals.

Thus a broad anti-discrimination clause is not enough to protect people effectively. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Alvaro Gil-Robles, when visiting
Poland in November 2002, also indicated that “despite the wide anti-discrimination clause in the Constitution, Poland has very little specific anti-discrimination legislation.” He also underlined that Poland has not yet signed Protocol Number 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights relating to the general prohibition of discrimination, though it is being considered.”

Therefore, the Labor Code amendment can be viewed as a milestone for improving the legal situation of LGBT persons in law and perhaps in public life, although it may be too early to assess the tangible effects of this legislation.

Nevertheless, we might have to wait a long time to see those effects. Although implementation of the Directive was proper, there is no guarantee that authorities will properly enforce the law. The Polish Labor Code provides for a very complex protection of an employee's rights, yet in practice, the rights of employees are frequently infringed. In addition, high unemployment forces people to tolerate violations of their rights so that they may maintain their jobs. Therefore, they seldom use the protective systems provided, including the courts.

When someone decides to file a discrimination suit, typically usually only upon termination of employment, he or she is often discouraged by the long trials that may take years, costs of professional advice and unpredictable results. The situation is even worse in cases concerning discrimination against women in the labor market. It is worth mentioning that since the 2002 amendment, calling for the equal treatment of men and women in employment, very few women have filed cases on the basis of this legislation. I presume homosexuals and transsexuals will not dramatically alter this trend, since doing so would require coming out and facing public condemnation.

These legal changes did not provoke public debates on homosexuality – in fact, most articles on labor law commenting the amendment seemed to ignore the words “sexual orientation” and everything it might mean. Perhaps, due to the reasons I have discussed, most authors perceive these changes as cosmetic, rather than leading to real changes in the legal situation of the covered groups.

However, the subject of homosexuality did provoke a public storm in November 2003, when professor Maria Szyszowska, a senator from the governing Democratic Left Alliance, proposed a bill allowing same sex partners to register. The proposal, supported by 36 senators, provided that a registered partnership would receive the rights and obligations similar to those given in civil marriage, particularly in economic matters: right of inheritance after partner's death, the right to use partner's health insurance, and the right to joint taxation of income. Legal registration of partners did not confer the right to adopt children; however, the proposal provided that partners had the right to raise and care for a biological child of one of the partners together.

From a legal point of view, the proposal was not perfect. Its main weakness, I think, was that it contained too many references to the Family and Care Code rather than standing as a coherent and self-contained act. Another problem was the provision relating to care for a partner's children. Opponents called it a “disguised adoption” plan, because it imposed rights and obligations connected only to parental rights. Although the bill itself did not intend to equate registered partnership with marriage, these points supported the main argument of its opponents: that marriage is a legal relationship between a (biological) man and a (biological) woman, according to the constitutional definition of marriage, for the purpose of procreation. Thus gay and lesbian couples do not have the right to be recognized as a family.

The draft bill did not receive enthusiastic backing from Senator Szyszowska’s party, most of her colleagues considered the proposal a waste of time, with no chance of passage in the Polish Parliament.

The draft has passed the Senate and awaits to be reviewed by Sejm. It has been consider-
ably changed compared to the original version. Following the first reading, it was passed to the Senate Committees, the Legislation and the Rule of Law Committee, and the Social Policy and Health Committee, which worked on it until August 2004 and adopted a few amendments. After a plenary debate during the second reading in the Senate, in autumn 2004, many provisions in the original proposal were revised or deleted. For example, to be eligible for joint income taxation, a couple would have to show a notarized partnership contract because, in the opinion of a senator from the Self-Defense party, people might abuse the law by pretending to be homosexual and registering to gain material benefits. In addition, references to feelings and mutual care were deleted because, according to a senator from the League of Polish Families, the only motive for registered partnership is sexual deviation. Finally, partners would not be able to share the same surname and the act of registration could not be ceremonial because, in the opinion of some senators, homosexuals should not endanger the status of the heterosexual family.

However, then the bill was returned to the Senate Committees, many of the earlier provisions were restored, as well as new, more precise regulations added. Nevertheless, the Committees would not approve an article relating on custody of a partner’s child. After the third and last reading in the Senate in early December 2004, the bill was approved and passed to the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament. (When the Senate passes a law, it is subsequently sent to the Sejm, as a legislative initiative).

The current version of the bill bestows upon a partner the status of a “close person/relative,” which is a status recognized in procedural laws (civil or criminal). After a couple registers in the registry office, which is to be without “ceremonial character,” an exchange of vows or the taking of another’s surname, the partners are entitled to visit each other in hospital and decide on a treatment in an emergency, pick up each other’s correspondence. They have the right to inherit from each other and to demand alimony in cases of poverty. Poland joint property laws (a carryover from the Napoleonic code) will be available to couple after the conclusion of a notarized contract, but without possibility of joint taxation. Adoption is not allowed; a partner without parental rights cannot represent a child, although the draft does not forbid a couple from raising a partners’ child together. A person living in a registered partnership will not be able to marry a person of the opposite sex until the registration is revoked. The final version of the bill also deleted the obligation of mutual care and support, as well as any references to a common household or to emotional relations between partners. This silence shows the reluctance to recognize registered partnerships, even subtly, as a form of family life.

Even though the law has disappointed some LGBT activists, I think it is an accomplishment that in such a hostile and unhealthy climate, it was not rejected in the first reading and was passed to the Sejm. It is another very important step toward a better existence for sexual minorities, and is a step that may improve society’s tolerance of LGBT persons. Nevertheless, the draft is now in hands of the Deputies in Sejm and the outcome is difficult to predict.

The issue of same-sex partnerships has activated both sides of the dispute, LGBT groups have organized information campaigns, while right-wing organizations conduct humiliating crusades and to encourage anti-gay violence.

The “Days of Culture for Tolerance,” organized in May 2004 in Krakow by LGBT organizations and supported by the Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Women and Men, included cultural events, interdisciplinary seminars at the university, meetings, discussions and films. The most important activity was the March for Tolerance, a peaceful demonstration for LGBT people, their friends and supporters, as well as disabled persons and anyone who wanted to express their support for tolerance. Opponents of the March, several conservative and religious organizations, sounded a media alarm that it would be a parade of “naked deviants” who would profane the royal town.
When the march began, bystanders saw only ordinary people, young and old, men and women, homosexual and heterosexual, even parents with children. There were no naked deviants to be found! We were surprised how many citizens joined in the march, over one thousand. But after first euphoric hours, and despite the police protection, eggs, bottles, and stones began to fly, and the march ended when hooligans, led by local right-wing politicians, fought with the police. And when the police lost control over them, they chased anyone in view, no matter whom: gays, tourists, even police officers.

When I decided to write about homosexuals and transsexuals from the legal point of view, I knew I needed to learn more about the medical and psychological aspects of sexuality. But would an ordinary citizen make that effort? Would I have made that effort if I were not interested in human rights? What does an ordinary citizen know of queer theory, or gay and lesbian art and literature? What does “normal” society think about campaigns and events organized by LGBT organizations? What do people know about sexual minorities? They know nothing more that what they can see on TV or read in a colorful magazine, nothing that would encourage them to search for their own opinion. Nothing, really is available in Poland for mainstream, heterosexual people.

The incident in Krakow brought about a public debate on tolerance, aggression, homosexuality, and same-sex families. Suddenly, gays and lesbians are shown on TV, popular magazines write about homosexuality, unthinkable a few years ago. Although the debates often lack objectivity and substantive arguments, I suppose their very existence shows some progress. Although the violence of several people disrupted a peaceful educational event, many people sympathized with gays and lesbians, and indicated that they accepted the right of LGBT people to live normal lives alongside heterosexuals. For the first time, people had the chance to learn something more about homosexuals than what was whispered or portrayed in awkward stereotypes.

The LGBT organizations have changed recently, too. Four years ago, they were interested in my work, but did not know if it can be of any use. Today they have become more active in the public sphere and are open to outside people.

When I tried to contact Polish LGBT organizations over three years ago, I did not find much encouragement; at that time, they were focused on support activities for gays and lesbians. However, I got in touch with the Gender Studies Students’ Association “Nic Tak Samo” (“Nothing The Same”), which was established at Wroclaw University in February 2001. Its main purpose is to establish and encourage the development of the study of gender, gay and lesbian studies and queer theory in Poland. They have already organized several international interdisciplinary conferences dealing with gender and queer studies, which are a great and unique opportunity in this country because of the possibility of exchanging views, knowledge, and experience. It is also rare to be surrounded by people who are concerned about human rights, tolerance, pluralism and freedom. It seems that those who write about sexual minorities in Poland must care about issues other than their academic careers.

The Lambda Warsaw Association is the oldest Polish LGBT organization and was created over ten years ago; its activities are mostly based in the Warsaw area. They run an Information and Support Center, provide information and support to homosexual individuals and their relatives, run support groups that help participants accept their sexuality, they provide also legal, medical and psychological counseling. The association also monitors discrimination, prepares survey research regarding to discrimination based on sexual orientation. They are doing a great job, but for someone not familiar with the LGBT movement, they are rather invisible.

The Campaign Against Homophobia was founded in 2001 and is a non-government organization operating throughout Poland. Their main objectives are to publicize the discussion on homophobia, to increase social representation for all sexual minorities, to foster tolerant
attitudes, to promote awareness of sexual and gender identification, and to create and introduce anti-homophbic discourse into the public circulation. Together with ILGCN Polska (International Gay and Lesbian Association for Culture in Poland, created in 2000), they organize various public actions, including lobbying, education, petitions, and publish educational materials. More importantly, many of their actions are intended for the media. Each year, there are more local divisions of CAH established in cities throughout Poland. In this way, their activities have begun to embrace almost the whole country.

Besides the “Days of Culture for Tolerance,” another example of their projects was the campaign, “Let them see us” which opened in April and May 2003. This was thirty photographs of people of the same gender holding hands displayed in public spaces. However, the Warsaw, Krakow, and Gdansk city councils pulled down the billboards after a brief public display, persuaded to do so by conservative groups and politicians. In many cases, pressure was exerted on the advertising agencies responsible for the billboards and art galleries willing to exhibit them, for example, by cancelling contracts.

Notes:
1. The book was based primarily on publications by Kees Waaldijk, Andrew Clapham and J.H.H. Weiler.
3. Official Journal L 303, 02/12/2000 P. 0016 - 0022
5. Ed. note: “Indirect discrimination” is roughly equivalent to “disparate impact” under U.S. law.
6. Article 18(3)b, § 1.
7. On the other hand, the section that allows churches or similar organizations to employ people who share their religion or beliefs in cases where there is “a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement,” is phrased almost identically as in the directive.
8. The Campaign Against Homophobia sued a journalist who wrote in a newspaper that homosexuals endanger the institution of family, and “someone suffering of this disease should be forbidden by law from becoming a teacher and raising children.” Prosecution refused to take up proceeding, because of “lack of social interest,” and the private charge was dismissed by court in Warsaw in November 2004; CAH plans to appeal.
9. The abovementioned amendment to the Labor Code introduced a new article 221 which has finally specified what kind of data an employer may demand from a person applying for a job. It does not allow questions about sexual orientation; the closed data includes forename, last name, parents’ names, date of birth, education, professional experience, place of residence.
10. Ed. note: See the paper by John Stanley in this volume.
13. Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, on his visit to Poland, 18–22 November 2002, for the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly.
14. Professor Szyszkowska prepared the project and sent it to her parliamentary club for internal opinion procedures in July 2003. Earlier, in February 2002, a Deputy of the Democratic Left Alliance, Joanna Sobowska, proposed an act on legally recognized domestic partnership (konkubinat) for hetero- and homosexual couples. The proposal was never accepted as an initiative.
15. Available only for same-sex couples.
16. Inter alia, legal experts giving opinion on the project.
17. By, inter alia, legal experts giving opinion on the project.
18. Unfortunately, the personal consequences of the proposal for its author were shocking: Many newspapers ceased to cooperate with her, some people returned her books; she received threatening letters and for a few months, was under special police protection.
19. Recently, in light of the extremely low support of public opinion, it seems the party tends to use the proposal in the forthcoming election campaign to demonstrate its return to leftist ideals and to regain voters. This strategy may, unfortunately, become just another argument against the proposal. Most parties do not have an official stance on LGBT rights; the League of Polish Families and the Law and Justice are the most obvious antagonists. The parties that openly support LGBT rights and the proposed bill, beside the Labor Union (whose present leader, Izabella Jaruga-Nowacka was formerly the first Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Men and Women) are the Greens 2004 and the Anticlerical Progress Party, Racja. However, Racja is quite a radical party with little chance for a mandate in the next Parliament, and the Greens are still a young party that lacks funds and access to the media, so their influence on voters has been limited so far.
20. Over 300 workers of registry offices wrote protest letters to the Parliament against the bill on same-sex partnerships; however, the Polish Association of Registry Office Workers considered this bill an abuse of a post because the registry officials should not become involved in political disputes.
21. Sitting of 18 November 2004
22. The possibility of sharing the same surname had earlier been restored by the Senate Committees.
23. However, if it has any chances to be adopted in Sejm, it should be done before the end of this tenure, because, according to the political prognosis, the new Parliament may be very conservative.
24. The situation repeated itself in Poznan in November 2004; in June, the president of Warsaw (Lech Kaczynski from Law and Justice) banned the "Parade of Equality." The official reasons were to avoid riots and to respect public morality. He upheld his decision against the opinions of all human rights organizations and two quashing decisions of the Wojewoda (governor), claiming that such an assembly would constitute public demonstration of sexual issues and would offend the religious feelings of other people.
25. I mention here only a few organizations that I find the most active.
27. Writing a doctoral thesis on sexual minorities in Poland sometimes feels like writing on unicorns. I suppose many people in Polish academic circles do not take me seriously, and some advise me to change my subject. I think this only proves that although queer theory in Poland already exists in areas like sociology or psychology; when it comes to other branches of science, like law, there is still empty space. Personally, I know of only a few other young lawyers who write on LGBT rights.
31. Campaign Against Homophobia’s website said Karoline Bregula’s photos were intentionally similar, "even monotonous, so the viewer who sees all 30 images would get bored with them and consider that he or she meets hundreds of such people in the streets every day; that gays and lesbians are no sensation."
THE “SEXUAL REVOLUTION” IN BULGARIAN SOCIALISM*

Karin Taylor

Introduction

The sexual policies of the Bulgarian socialist government centred on promoting the family and combined two goals: to maintain a familiar patriarchal social order in the private sphere and to ensure reproduction. In the 1960s and 1970s, magazines and medical literature endorsed conventions of romantic courtship and outlined the future tasks and responsibilities of a young couple in love: as future spouses and parents. Discourse on sexual practices, however, was extremely subdued, even silent. Was there no sex in Bulgarian socialism? This article contrasts the mute official stance on sexuality with the “behavioural revolution” of young people in the 1960s and 70s. During this time, ideology and the everyday practices of the population moved apart significantly, especially in cities where young people assumed values that diverged from those of the “war generation” represented in the Party leadership.

In socialism, all spheres of life were politicised, including sexuality. This politicisation meant that personal life was open to state intervention. Bulgarian authorities sought to regulate sexual culture not only through pro-family campaigns, but also through restrictions on where, and in what form, men and women could spend time, or live, together. Heterosexual marriage was endorsed as the only legitimate and morally approved context for sexual relations. But as recent research on socialism has shown, far from representing an unchanging monolithic position, sexual policies in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were modified over time and adapted somewhat to the practices of the population (Rotkirch 2000; Kon 1995; David: 1999). In addition, some scientists have described Communist party attitudes as “sexophobic” and were conditioned by a number of ideologies intricately linked with one another. For the case of Cuba, Laura Gotkowitz and Richard Turits established three competing ideologies of the family and sexuality: the conservative but egalitarian view of the Communist Party, the traditional and machista culture, and the legacy of Marx and Engels that saw the traditional family superseded by a giant revolutionary collective (1988). According to the authors, the Party stance became dominant in the 1970s, during which its conservative views on sexuality receded (ibid.: 14).

For Bulgaria, existing attitudes toward sexuality and commonly held values and beliefs concerning sexual behaviour and gender roles, influenced and fused with socialist thinking to create an ambivalent and sometimes conflicting discursive and social environment in which young people in the 1960s and 70s grew up. In a study on sexual education and youth in the countries of Eastern Europe published in 1980, Wolf Oschlies emphasised Bulgaria as the most dramatic case of discrepancy between experienced sexuality, strong social taboos and contradictory Party policies, resulting in a widespread lack of elementary biological sexual knowledge among young people.

At the same time, the generations whose formative years were between the early 1960s and late 1970s altered their sexual behaviour despite official moralising. In an analysis of sexual cultures in the Soviet Union in late socialism, Anna Rotkirch termed the increased attention

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people gave to personal values and their intimate lives as “personalisation” (Rotkirch 2000: 161ff). This process saw a transformation of sexual behaviour and a greater variation of sexual practices. Similarly, in Bulgaria, the age of first sexual intercourse gradually decreased and attitudes toward traditional moral codes, such as the value of virginity, altered as a new pleasure ethos caught hold among youth (Mitev 1980; 1987; Dinkova 1985; Spasovska 1995). Rotkirch showed that, for the Soviet Union, sexual practices changed long before the official discourse did. Likewise, Bulgaria saw a sexual revolution, but in different phases and with greatly delayed public articulation, compared to trends in Western Europe. This essay looks at persistent positions and changes in Party attitudes toward love and sexuality as communicated in the media addressed to youth; it subsequently investigates memories of first experiences of romance and perceptions of sexual intimacy by young Bulgarians during the middle two decades of the socialist era. 

**Socialist Morality**

By the 1960s, socialist theorists in Bulgaria had firmly thrown overboard any notions of an end to marriage and the family. Bulgarian socialists had never seriously considered the introduction of libertine sexual relations or the dissolution of marriage that had been envisaged by thinkers in the early Soviet Union (Brunnbauer, Taylor 2004). In the few texts that conceptualised the possible end of a legal marriage bond, monogamy was vigorously endorsed in the sense of a permanent relationship entered by a man and woman free from material and social pressures (Mitev 1969: 257ff.). The 1973 book, *Sex, Marriage, Family* with contributions by leading social scientists and medical doctors characterised by equality between the sexes and emotional harmony (Pophristov et al. 1973: 341–42). The authors viewed the union as a couple's private affair. Paradoxically, the text continued to point out that sexual relations would be subject to “social regulation” and monitored by “the sanctions of public opinion” (ibid.: 343). Despite political pledges to emancipate sexual relations from backward and hypocritical limitations, theorists obviously struggled with the notion of the protection of privacy and ideas, and to what extent the state—in this case understood as the social collective—should interfere in the private lives of its citizens. Indications of promiscuity among the young population were resolutely attacked by the professionals concerned with youth and sexual behaviour, including medical experts or sociologists. People who practised free love with changing partners were condemned as “psychologically unstable and ultimately vulnerable” (Dinkova 1978: 109).

The Bulgarian Communist Party’s puritanical stance on sexuality stemmed in part from its fixation on the “higher goal” of transforming society and human nature itself. Sexuality—irrational, individualistic, capricious and spontaneous—was a massive obstacle to the creation of the rational, and disciplined, collectivist new socialist personality (Kon 1995: 2). In the 1950s, attempts were made to suppress sexuality by banishing it from the arena of political and public activity. The poet Andrej Germanov recollected a warning issued to workers on a youth brigade: “In the brigade camp, morality was highly valued. In the beginning, the energetic Commander Grosdanov explained to us that love was out of bounds in the life of the brigade. Only pure friendship was permitted” (cited in Popova, forthcoming). The concept of the “purity” and “honesty” of emotion between young men and women—reminiscent of romantic imaginings of “true” friendship—was transformed into an emblem for the selfless union of young people in the service of the socialist project. If sexuality could not be eliminated altogether, then the sexual drive had to be contained or sublimated for the benefit of society. When friendship turned into love, marriage was the imminent next step for a young couple, ensuring the incorporation of the sexual relationship into the socialist collective in a restrained and controllable fashion (see the article “Can there be friendship between girls and boys?” in
Because sexual attraction constituted a vital prerequisite for marriage, authorities were unable to ignore or limit it without undermining an important goal of family policy: demographic growth. From the late 1950s, theorists turned their attention to the topic of love and romance, seeking to channel sexuality into the desired direction of procreation, accomplished in a “decent” manner in what Igor Kon described for the Soviet Union as an “awkward taming” of sexuality (Kon 1995: 267). Columns giving advice on matters of the heart were increasingly published in the women’s and youth press. These publications were inevitably oriented towards marriage. In 1964, the youth magazine *Mladež* devoted its entire November issue to the topic, from a political discussion called “Lenin on love and marriage,” to practical details, such as furnishing the newly-weds’ home. Yet the issue eschewed the matter of sexual relations entirely.

In the course of the 1960s, a number of medical experts began to write on sexuality and publications addressed to the “young family” offered some information on physiological aspects of sex, albeit very imprecisely (Slavčev et al. 1967; Pophrísov et al. 1973; Slavčev, Báčvarov 1975).

Subsequently, sociological data appeared in the 1970s on an issue that could no longer be ignored: the growing practice of pre-marital sex that confirmed the worst fears of conservative theorists (Mitev 1980: 41–50; Oschlies 1980: 20–26).

**Table 1**

Attitudes toward pre-marital sexual relations in 1977–78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think it is right for young people to have sexual relations before marriage?</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Parents</th>
<th>Grandparents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, if they love each other.</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, if they have decided to marry.</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, once they feel like a man, a woman.</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t approve of sexual relations before marriage.</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mitev 1980: 41

Despite a certain scientific approach to sexuality, information on sexual activity continued to be presented to the public within the discursive framework of communist morality and supported a sentimental ideal of love with a dash of political mission. In an article published in *Ženata dnes* in 1970, prominent sex expert Dr. Todor Bostandčiev tentatively introduced readers to erogenous zones, but ended the article just as it had begun with a lengthy discussion of the kind of idealised disembodied love relationship that frequently inhabited scientific texts: “The healthiest association creating the possibility to repeatedly refresh feelings and emotional unity is (based on) common goals and aspirations in life, a common path, identical dreams and ideals for which the couple fights” (Bostandčiev in *Ženata dnes* 1970, 8). Such rhetoric was sometimes used by scientists as a smokescreen that officially enabled unfavourable ideas to be presented to the public; the result was still not informative for readers.

The paramount task of medical discourse seemed to be to protect young people from sex rather than to encourage informed sexual practice. Advocates of responsible sexual behaviour suggested, for example, that male masturbation helped to disperse sexual tension before marriage as long as the technique was not “abused” (Kassabova-Dintcheva 2003). However, re-
fraining from any type of sexual activity was definitely preferred. Doctors recommended physical work, sport, and artistic activities as the best vents for surplus sexual energies (Bostandčiev in Ženata dnes 1970, 6).

The gradual move away from repression to a domestication of sexuality led to the beginnings of a limited public debate on the issue boosted by an alarm over the growth in divorce rates in the 1970s. In an open letter to the Komsomol youth organisation in 1978, Party leader Todor Živkov criticised that young people were not being adequately prepared for married life: “The questions of sex and knowledge and sex education of young generations continue to be almost incriminated by the public. Ignorance in this field often subjects the physical and moral health of youths to unnecessary risks. Obviously it is necessary to create a comprehensive system of sex and married life education of the growing generations” (Živkov 1978: 50–51). Leading doctors, most notably Bostandčiev, deplored the low level of sexual culture in Bulgaria and repeatedly called for a national programme of sex education for youth. But as Oschlies pointed out, an effective education programme did not materialise as schools, parents, and the youth organisation shoved responsibility between each other for over a decade (Oschlies 1980: 32).

A web of social taboos surrounding sexuality wound itself tightly around socialist ideology and influenced the work of the mass organisations charged with providing sex education. This web joined with the socialist suspicion of the irrational power of sexuality, formed a society-wide conspiracy of silence that was only broken when sexual practices directly violated sexual mores. Because the intimate life of citizens was thought to be a mirror for the authenticity of individual morality, the socialist mass organisations promoted a culture of vigilance that monitored sexual behaviour and kept a watchful eye on issues ranging from proper dress to extra-marital affairs. A central corrective institution in this regard was the neighbourhood or work-place comrade court (drugarski săd). Patterned on the Soviet model of grassroots social control, the extra-judicial court served to regulate the moral misdemeanours of individuals. Complaints and denunciations linked to sexual activity–living together outside marriage or marital infidelity being favourites–could lead to a summons before the court where the accused party would be publicly reprimanded for misconduct and advised on how to amend his or her ways.

The “Permissive” West

The new leisure ethos and the sexual revolution that transformed sex relations in the West during and after the 1960s did not go unheeded by the governments of Eastern Europe. While on the one hand, the fact that young Bulgarians were persistently enchanted by these trends worried the Party; on the other, the apparent collapse of morals in the capitalist world offered a useful scenario against which to contrast upright socialist society. From the 1960s, official rhetoric shifted from attacking the decadent attitudes of the bourgeois milieu within the country, to expressing alarm and gratification at the moral corruption allegedly taking hold on the other side of the iron curtain. The use of popular judgements on sexual transgression and impropriety to denigrate alleged opponents of the system was not new, nor of course, specific to socialism. Yet, moral indignation was heavily employed as a warning in the youth press. Articles pointed a reprimanding finger at “permissive” Western society, taking up the tone of moral panic called by some contemporary critics in the West. The youth magazine Mladež, for example, discussed the slide of young Westerners into promiscuity, prostitution, drug use and social misery (see “A Trip Around Hippie-land” 1969, 1: 68–73; “The Paradoxes of Permissive Society” 1971, 5: 58–62). Although the texts dealt with the very real dark side of hippie culture, they projected social problems onto the whole of Western society, suggesting inherent and unstoppable, social and cultural decay. In an article entitled “Yet Again: Sexual Revolution,” sociologist Filip Panajotov commented: “Some of the characteristic features of the so-called
“sexual revolution” include not only the concomitant sexual perversions, but also attempts to legalise them and present them as completely natural and normal” (Mladež 1970, 11: 43–47). The demands of the young generation in the West for more sexual liberty and their rejection of existing moral double standards were seen as an attack on domestic ideology in general and as utterly devoid of political content. Panajatov concluded his article with the statement: “The so-called “sexual revolution” in the West testifies to the moral collapse of a waning world and has nothing in common with the real revolution in the sphere of sexual relations that Lenin spoke of” (ibid.).

The socialist vision of social revolution foresaw the full equality of the sexes in all spheres of society. As pointed out by numerous scholars however, equality in socialism tended to be understood in a mechanistic sense that neglected differences between the sexes and subjugated feminist agendas to a class revolution and national reproduction targets. In Bulgaria, the feminist perspective articulated in the course of the sexual revolution in the West remained far outside the scope of public debate.

In opposition to the image of the West in the grip of moral ruin, socialist theorists constructed a virtuous and “healthy” society in which relations between young men and women were based on “high morals and not naked sex” (Mladež 1970, 1: 53–55). Authors recommended an aesthetic approach to sexuality, abandoning the body and sensual experience for the contemplation of discrete and uplifting artistic interpretations of erotic and spiritual love (Vassilev 1981: 161). Illustrations of tender young lovers—predominantly with touching faces and clasped hands—decorated such texts until the mid-1970s, while articles on Western youth tended to feature press photos of forlorn-looking adolescents and drug addicts. In the article, “Love, Sex, Morality,” Soviet psychologist Artur Petrovski concluded that the Soviet media contributed to form high moral standards among youth and that individual virtue and conceptions of love were adequately formed by reading literary classics such as Tolstoy, Maupassant, Gorki and Hemmingway! (Mladež 1970, 1: 55).

Femininity Reborn

At the centre of official concern with sexuality lay the issue of female sexual behaviour. Although Bulgarian socialist legislation made significant inroads on patriarchal attitudes toward women in public life, concepts of female sexuality remained very much contained within patriarchal ideology (Daskalova 1999: 100–101). After the early phase of sexual repression in the socialist media, during which proletarian women were featured as desexualised workers and mothers in contrast to self-indulgent bourgeois housewives, femininity made a comeback in the course of the 1960s. Once again, it became possible to discuss women in terms of attributes such as beauty and refinement. Leading youth sociologist Minčo Semov introduced a study on “The Contemporary Bulgarian Girl” with the following words: “The girl with her grace and charm beautifies the street, the factory, the village, the university. On her the attention of youths, parents, relatives and acquaintances is focused. The girl delights everyone: from passers-by to the people thrilled for her future” (Semov 1969: 7). Texts reiterated an image of girls and young women as seen by the gaze of the older man, i.e. as infantilised objects of sexual desire. Women were never presented in terms of individually and actively experienced sexuality. In addition, for theorists and scientists into the 1980s, the raison d’être of women remained motherhood. Semov, whose work aimed to show positive changes in the lives of the young generation living in the new socialist society, went down the much-trodden road of confirming woman’s true destiny: “From being a member of the parental family she will soon become the basic unit of her own family. From being the parents’ child she soon will become the mother of children” (Semov 1969: 7).

The fear that the emancipation of women would lead to indiscriminate sexual behaviour
and compromise true femininity was frequently expressed in sociological, psychological and pedagogical texts: “The emancipation of women is also a historical, progressive tendency. But if it goes so far as to blunt and degrade femininity it can also leave negative results in contemporary culture” (Vassilev 1981: 162). In comparison, signs of a lack of restraint in the sexual activity of boys met with a degree of disapproval but did not necessitate interpretations of their behaviour that were basically assumed as natural, albeit even leaning toward the irresponsible (Copanov 1970: 65ff.; Dinkova 1978: 137ff.).

One of the main concerns of theorists and scientists alike was the issue of female sexual relations before marriage. Most texts declined to directly tackle the question of virginity – the traditional mark of a girl’s honour – since socialist norms were meant to transcend the backward relics of both bourgeois and village culture. However, the general moratorium on the issue offered no alternative guidelines on how young women may begin their sexual lives. The author of an advisory manual for parents entitled “First Love” was one of few that openly translated female virginity into a socialist virtue, and only in connection to motherhood: “Female honour, not only in the widest ethical sense but also in the sense of preserved virginity, must be one of the basic socialist virtues of the contemporary girl (Copanov 1970: 63). Furthermore: “Female virginity is a necessary virtue for every girl because she is a future mother [...] Girls who do not preserve their maidenly honour, giving themselves to various exploits, cannot be a mother in the true sense of the word” (ibid.: 63–64). Other publications that reacted to evidence of an increase in female pre-marital sex criticised young women’s “sportive” and “light-minded” attitude toward sex by emphasising the likely negative consequences: unwanted pregnancy and/or moral humiliation and degradation. A 1972 series published in Ženata dnes by sociologist Maria Dinkova, “Labyrinths of light-mindedness and irresponsibility,” presented “real stories” of the sad fate of pregnant girls abandoned by their “Romeo”; these stories suggested that young people who were rash in their sexual lives and shirked responsibility would not make conscientious and reliable citizens (Ženata dnes 1972, 3, 4, 5, 7).

Women were ultimately addressed as collective possessions of the nation who must guard their purity as “our daughters, our sisters, tomorrow’s wives and mothers” (Ženata dnes 1968, 6: 19). In an article aimed at sexually active girls in the late 1960s, Bostandčiev called on young women to safeguard, if not their chastity, then at least a sense of social duty: “Don’t forget: you must always be able to look openly and without embarrassment into the eyes of your children” (ibid.). Over a decade later, however, doctors such as Bostandčiev had cast off much of the moral overtones of the 1960s – still kept alive by theorists – and supported an increasingly clinical and non-judgemental approach: “To talk of pre-marital virginity today and pointedly only to girls is an anachronism” (Bostandčiev 1981: 63).

The strong warning tone of most of the official discourse on sexuality reflected concern about the loss of control over female sexuality and marriage choices, both by parents and the state. The domesticated understanding of sexual relations disseminated in the course of the 1960s allowed society to revive and maintain accustomed relations between the sexes and in the family; at worst, it at least keep up a pretence of undivided social order and morality. Pedagogical texts endorsed a gender-specific upbringing oriented on popular representations of femininity and masculinity: “A man must be a man, and a woman – a woman” (Slavčev et al. 1967: 263). With the re-establishment of a domestic variation of femininity as central to female identity, two sets of expected behavioural traits entered the field. Like the Soviet woman, the Bulgarian socialist woman was supposed to be a blend of the rational and the romantic, with a growing preference for the “romantic” trait that presumed esoteric knowledge about the essence of femininity, i.e. about looks and fashion, as well as meticulous care for the home and family (compare Attwood 1999: 166). Women were taught to exhibit one set of personality traits and behaviour patterns during their working hours, and another when they came back
to their husbands and children (ibid.: 170). An article on the “New Face of the Bulgarian Girl” in 1977 summed up the roles and responsibilities of young women in socialist society – to be a “mother, loving wife, worker” (Ženata dnes 1977, 3: 5). This bi-functional identity pandered to male desire. The magazine Ženata dnes clearly communicated the two models of feminine behaviour by presenting vignettes of working and politically active women in its first pages, and turning to household tips, fashion and cosmetic advice in the last pages, which is a structure still characteristic for many contemporary women’s magazines in Bulgaria and elsewhere. Isolated articles questioned the actual nature of equality in the socialist system, such as “Is this emancipation?” (1965, 11), or the 1975 series, “We talk about problems in contemporary family life” (3, 4, 5).

For the most part, the women’s and youth press assumed common experiences and goals of womanhood, thus promoting conservative codes of feminine beauty and domestic bliss. Boys and men were presented as romantic objects, which displaced sexuality with codes of romantic courtship. Many expectations of proper conduct between the sexes strongly resembled the same bourgeois codes of female subordination and trivialisation that had officially been branded defunct. Although the youth magazine Mladež, for example, dealt with the “cavalier” as a well-meaning but outmoded model – “The contemporary girl will not accept being patronised. She prefers friendship” – this point should not mean the end of good manners towards female comrades who required “respect, attention and tenderness” (Mladež 1965, 5–6: 67). The article finished with advice for young men on the rules of socialist social etiquette: from how to gallantly accompany a woman to a restaurant and politely request a dance, to what kind of gift to present a girlfriend. Lipstick or eau de cologne were recommended.

Birth Control

The Bulgarian media, and even popular medical texts, kept extraordinarily silent on the matter of contraception. Communicating information on how to prevent pregnancy was an ambivalent issue for several reasons. Firstly, demographic policies in the 1960s were oriented toward boosting reproduction, with a target of three children per family (Ilieva 1989: 22, 29). Secondly, because marriage was considered the only correct setting for sexual relations, doctors recommended adolescents to refrain from sex rather than practise what the medical profession at the time described as “pre-mature” sex (Bostandžiev 1985: 100). Public information on contraceptives, then, was seen to potentially encourage sexual activity among youth and was better played down. Thirdly, popular taboos surrounding sexuality made any information on sexual practices a tricky topic, resulting in very vague and obscure communication on what was generally described as “intimate relations.”

Until the late 1960s, contraception found almost no mention in the Bulgarian print media, and rare discussions of sexual activity before marriage centred on the topics of hygiene, physiological aspects of sexual maturity, and how to avoid venereal disease, through sexual abstinence (Ženata dnes 1968, 3: 16; 10: 22). Around the same time, a publication addressed to future spouses, the “Book for the Young Family,” listed the main methods of contraception while eschewing details on how to use them (Slavčev et al. 1967: 271–273).

In 1968, the government introduced heavy restrictions on abortion as part of a national effort to increase fertility and curb the alarmingly high rate of terminated pregnancies. The ban brought the issue of abortion into the media for the first time. In the youth media, doctors of the time warned of the negative consequences of the operation: “Medical science is categorical: there is no such thing as a non-dangerous abortion!” (Mladež 1968: 78–79). In fact, the repressive measures did not succeed in reducing the number of abortions because the medical profession resisted the ban by broadly interpreting medical indications (Vassilev 1999: 77). In addition, many operations were carried out illegally (ibid.: 81). However, as pointed out by
Kassabova-Dintcheva, crude abortion methods threatened women’s reproductive health and necessitated a certain popularisation of family planning methods (2003). From the 1960s, the pill and IUDs were available on medical prescription and were cheap to buy. However, modern contraceptives were not produced in Bulgaria, and although they were imported from other socialist countries, supply was erratic and unreliable (Vassilev 1999: 81). 

Coitus interruptus remained the most widely used method of birth control. For newlyweds, popular publications on the themes of “love and marriage” began to offer information on family planning. Nevertheless, these chapters were kept terse in comparison to the cheerful sections on starting a family (Pophristov 1973: 187–196; Slavčev et al.: 1975: 142–147). Information was not illustrated.

The year 1970 marked something of a turning point, when articles on the issues of sexuality and contraception entered the women’s press. Bostandžiev published a series, “Sexology: a belated talk” in Ženata dnes that obliquely discussed emotional and physiological aspects of sexual life and mentioned the existence of contraceptives. Women were referred to gynaecological clinics for further information. Information in magazines was clearly framed by the government’s pro-natalist campaign. An article on the problems of unwanted pregnancy offered a basic description of contemporary methods of birth control ending in the maternity pathos common to socialist discussions of women and sexuality: “The contemporary woman who has the freedom to work and to participate in cultural and public life must also have the freedom to sensibly control her sexual life, in order to fulfil her great biological purpose of mother and sustainer of the human race” (Ženata dnes 1972, 10: 16). Rare references to contraception in the youth magazine Mladež similarly did not go beyond a short list of methods and underlined the social, i.e. reproductive, function of sexual relations (Mladež 1975, 3: 18–21). The message to young people seemed to be that the discussion and use of contraceptive methods was something that should be kept between married couples and that aided citizens to better fulfil a vital social duty: to found a family. Moreover, contraceptives may be used to plan a family but not to benefit free sexual relations or make sex life more enjoyable by disconnecting it from pregnancy.

Memories

For people whose formative years were in the 1960s and 70s, love, romance and sexuality was increasingly influenced by peer groups rather than relatives. Young people established new practices in their intimate lives protected by forms of solidarity they maintained among themselves. Like in Western Europe, changes in sexual values were embedded in other aspects of social and cultural change, such as growing urbanity, more time spent in education away from home, or the new models of identification offered by the rock music culture that bridged the iron curtain. From this complex of factors, new understandings of what Rotkirch termed “everyday morality” evolved, i.e. self-assessments of daily habits and practices that differed from official ideology and sometimes even from personally endorsed values (2000: 12–13).

The memories of youth and first romance I collected between 2001 and 2003 concentrate on urban student life. They show that individual norms of sexual conduct began to move in similar directions to patterns in the West during the 1960s. Pre-marital relations became an established standard of youth behaviour in the course of the 1970s.

During the 1960s, first romantic contacts were often made during evening or weekend strolls (dviženie) in the centre of town. In smaller towns, this form of socialising was a public event and subject to social control. Young people felt very much under the watchful eye of adults. An informant from the Black Sea city of Varna, born in 1952, said kissing in public or embracing had been impossible in her youth: “Back then, we saw to it that no one could see you... we didn’t laugh openly in front of older people... older people always became indignant.” Adolescents felt less discomfort about their first romantic experiences in the presence of

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friends and classmates. Teenagers sought out particular sheltered spots for intimacy. A woman from Blagoevgrad recalled that young people in the mid-1960s were not shy among themselves when they met at a well-known meeting place in a wooded park: “There, feelings were expressed, and there were many courting couples, and we were not embarrassed among ourselves because as with every first love everything was very frank and open. Among ourselves, we as school pupils knew who was going with whom.”

On Brigade

Memories of first love were frequently linked with the excursions, work brigades and holiday camps organised by the Komsomol youth organisation. Recalling the early 1960s, informants remembered a strict regime, with Komsomol leaders charged to supervise the moral tone among young teenagers. An informant remembered being loudly reprimanded (and her parents summoned to the school headmaster) after an excursion because she, a girlfriend, and two boys had left the group to spend some time on the beach. In a similar incident, a young teenage girl from Sofia who had been seen holding hands with her first love at a Pioneer camp was upbraided at the evening roll-call together along with her girlfriend who had also been observed with a boy:

And in front of all the lined-up children, peacefully ordered, she [the Pioneer leader] drove us out in front of the row to scold us for being too young to be concerned with love and that it was not moral. It was traumatic for us, because we didn’t see what terribly immoral thing we had done, that we had flirted, some sort of first child-like thrills.

Revealing intimacy in public was a common sanction employed by the socialist mass organisations with the aim of correcting individual behaviour.

Although love was officially banned from public life and collective actions, the work brigades in which the majority of young people participated – usually agricultural work in the countryside – actually constituted one of the main sites of adolescent intimate relations. Hiding in the maize fields to steal a kiss or enjoying romantic gatherings around an evening campfire were popular memories. According to a woman informant, girls would watch the boys at work to see whether they were the type to lend a helping hand that qualified them for a love affair. Another woman remembered how the boys would fill the girls’ quota of gathered vegetables, letting the girls rest and admire them in the shade. School holiday trips also engendered important experiences in the process of growing up and negotiating intimacy, because the accompanying teachers increasingly left young people up to themselves. A woman from Sofia born in 1955 recalled:

At the end of the school year, for three days our class – we were already around 15 or 16 years old –went to the [Black] sea, and there in the hotels you already drank alcohol, smoked cigarettes, and some had sex. (...) And so we went out to restaurants, we felt grown up.

By the 1970s, teachers and youth organisation leaders often turned a blind eye to the flirting and romantic episodes that developed on brigade and youth camps despite rules that divided the sexes. A former teacher who accompanied school pupils on their annual stint of labour described the brigades as a kind of sexual initiation and a form of legitimising sexual relations among youth. At the same time, restricted information about sex meant that relations were often entered without knowledge of what was really happening and was especially risky for young women. A male informant remembered losing his virginity in the early 1970s: one night he crept through the window of the girls’ dormitory and into the bed of the girl he admired. He did not see her again after the camp was over and did not find out if the night had
had any consequences for her.

On the other hand, several informants met and fell in love with their future spouses on youth brigades and holiday camps, and married them some time later. Young people generally felt freer to explore their sexuality away from home and enjoyed a degree of independence despite the official rhetoric that prohibited intimacy. On brigades, they were able to escape the sharp eye of parents who many felt to be more authoritative than the gaze of teachers and monitors (compare Ivanova 2003: 61).

**University Life**

Because many young people left their families to study in larger cities, students in the 1960s were freer than ever before to control their own sex lives. A sexual culture developed among students who overturned former values. A woman informant from Sofia born in 1948 said: “When I was a school girl, the general opinion was that you had to protect yourself from sex, it was felt to be shameful.” However, she said her personal attitude changed when she was a student, around 20 years of age: “We were all students... attitudes changed into the opposite: it was shameful not to have sex.” At the same time, she and her girlfriends shared the opinion that sexual relations should take place with a steady boyfriend: “The question of virginity or not was a concern... we had a romantic idea... that love should be part of it.”

Young women in particular had ambivalent feelings about pre-marital sexual relations, and attitudes also varied significantly between young people from the capital and those from smaller towns where codes of sexual morality were much more strictly upheld. Informants said that women sometimes refused sex with a steady boyfriend or fiancé if the prospect of marriage appeared uncertain. Pregnancy outside marriage was a persistent social taboo and frequently led to rushed student weddings. “Today a lot of women marry obviously pregnant... at that time it would have been a disgrace, marriage had to be organised fast,” an informant said.

Sexual contacts took place despite a web of regulations designed to monitor youth and discourage relations between unmarried couples. Procedures hinged on the spatial and temporal division of the sexes. In student hostels, evening curfews kept young men and women apart overnight. An informant described visiting rules in a hostel in the early 1970s:

There was a section for girls and a section for boys and for him [a boyfriend] to visit me, he had to go by the porter downstairs to get a pass and at 9 p.m. he had to leave. The hostel director – a woman, a simple villager – said, “If I find a girl and a boy in one room after 9 o'clock, whatever they are doing there, they must marry immediately or be expelled.”

For students in private lodgings, visiting was less of a problem, although living space was usually shared with others. Making hourly arrangements for the use of a room was an everyday experience and they could expect the co-operation of friends because almost all students were dependent on such pacts.

Co-habitation was ruled out by authorities. Married young couples were given preference in the system of allocation for the limited number of state apartments, which barred alternative housing arrangements. At the same time, the militia was directed to control lodgings where men and women were believed to be living together. A woman informant remembered that for some time, student friends were bothered by militia raids. The culprits were usually given a deadline by which they should “solve the problem,” i.e. by one of them moving out. The informant herself was once the victim of a raid at 6 a.m. after neighbours complained of noise in her flat. She was found alone with her sister and the militia apologised for the disturbance and retreated in embarrassment.

Another practice for encouraging marriage was based on records kept by the janitor of
each building or housing block. The janitor was obliged to note who lived in the building and in which relationship to other residents. In the case of immoral arrangements, the janitor was instructed to point out the resident's failing. A male informant who shared a flat with his future wife recalled: "I lived with this woman without being married and one day he [the janitor] came and asked me the question, 'Are you not going to marry? You can't live like that.' And I said that I had such an intention, but I had not yet exactly decided at that point."

Privacy was not perceived as a right, either by authorities, parents, or young people themselves. An informant commented in this connection: "If something is routine, you don't think about it." Due to the chronic shortage of housing, private space was hard to come by even in the home where families often shared extremely cramped quarters. An informant said that lack of privacy caused young lovers to "make the private public" by meeting in the public sphere of city squares or parks. The park bench became a characteristic setting for intimacy that was shielded by a non-spoken agreement among young people not to interfere. However, the fact that young people had very limited space for intimate relations was noted by officials, and even caused doctors some concern (Bostandžiev in Ženata dnes 9, 1970). In the 1970s, authorities gave way to the persistent but temporary inhabitation by opposite sexes in one flat by instituting the so-called "militia marriage." This arrangement made it possible for young people to register their relationship with the police and live together for some time without persecution. At that point, parental pressure to marry tended to take over.

**Parties and Holidays**

Like anywhere else, parties were favourite playgrounds for youth and students to approach the opposite sex. Informants said that were parties usually held when the parents of a student were away over the weekend. Of course, the tone of parties varied quite considerably. An informant from Sofia born in 1952 described her milieu as permissive, a mix of diplomats’ children, journalists and artists, and said they were drawn to hippie-type "feelings, attitudes and ideology." They saw themselves as open to an alternative lifestyle that included free love, although actual practice was bound by the conditions of life in socialist society: "Of course we could not organise communes, hippie communes, but we had a lot of fun during our parties... getting drunk." She assessed working class culture as markedly more conservative, adding that after some time her clique abandoned their revelling and integrated into mainstream culture.

Leisure organized by young people themselves opened up spaces of sexual freedom that were much more difficult for authorities to control than guided collective activities. Young people developed a practical sense for dealing with the regulations meant to inhibit relations and extended to personal recreation and holiday-making. Until 1989, for example, unmarried couples were not permitted to share a hotel room. An informant described a popular strategy for dealing with the ban: "We took two rooms, in one room, the girls, in the other the boys, we paid for the two rooms and of course we slept in one, or the two girls went [together] with the two boys, and so on."

Excursions into the mountains or to the sea-side with friends represented sexual journeys into a sphere that contrasted with the norms and spatial narrowness of everyday life. The Black Sea coast in particular figured as a catalyst of desire. Here, tourism took hold from the early 1960s and grew into a flourishing industry that attracted guests from across the socialist bloc, as well as from the West. Bulgaria’s first discos opened in these seaside resorts. Although they were initially reserved for foreigners, they were gradually made accessible to Bulgarians, too. For Bulgarian teenagers, seaside holidays opened up the opportunity to meet foreigners of their age from Western Europe, despite the attempts of authorities to fence off Western tourists by housing them in separate hotels. The bodies of Western girls, styled differently to locals, was a primary object of the male gaze and combined the promise of sexual adventure with fanta-
sies of life beyond the iron curtain. An informant recalled two summers spent camping in the “Golden Sands” resort in the 1960s:

There you could see West German girls, Austrians, Scandinavians... I had a girlfriend, because I knew a little German (...), Brigitta, from Frankfurt I think... who came for one, two years and stayed in a hotel called ‘The Golden Anchor’ which was only for West Germans... and she brought me magazines, gave me presents, it was a very nice friendship. She wore a short ‘Wrangler’ skirt with mules and I was terribly proud of her. Apart from being a Western European girl, she looked very attractive, she was a very beautiful girl [...] She was terribly aesthetically dressed and that made a big impression.”

A number of informants remembered summer holidays spent at the youth resort of Primorsko that was visited every summer by thousands of students from the socialist countries and beyond. A woman who spent some weeks there at an international camp around 1969–70 recalled how imitating the behaviour of foreign tourists released a sense of freedom:

It was a closed resort, only for young people, there was no control or at least we didn't feel it... and [at first] we passed them [the foreigners] by because they allowed themselves everything... [They were] free, had fun, enjoyed themselves and we liked that a lot and slowly we also got infected and let ourselves go and we began to enjoy ourselves like they did. Because there you didn't feel controlled from everywhere... It was very pleasant there... to mix with young people from across the world... from English to... although for them to come to a youth camp like that they perhaps had to be from some youth organisation, but that didn't play much of a role.

Over a decade later, the generation that grew up in the 1970s had significantly less inhibitions about demonstrating a hedonistic lifestyle directly articulated through sexuality. When nudism became fashionable in the early 1980s, Bulgarians avoided being pestered by militia moral guardians by reading foreign-language books or magazines on the beach, posing as foreign tourists. A man who had worked as a tourist guide recalled his encounters with foreign girls:

Naturally at that time I had contacts with all sorts of people, especially in Primorsko, from the whole range of socialist countries – German girls, Poles, Czechs... There, it was one big party, a lot of fun and very ‘comradely’ communism... there were no prohibitions, no taboos... sexual revolution, there was no AIDS and such stuff.

This glowing assessment presented a male perspective that was modified by the comments of the woman informant. Although she presented a narrative of transformation in attitudes toward sex, she pointed out the downside of free love in socialism: “The sexual revolution... we, the young girls, had quite a lot of problems, quite a lot of abortions, quite a lot of early marriages.” After the party was over, the female body felt the impact of state sexual policies and social norms.

Sexual Ignorance

The fact that sex education in state institutions equalled moral education meant that children and adolescents had very little knowledge of sexual reproduction or erotic culture. The general silence on sex had less to do with hostility toward the body, especially for the young generation, than with social taboos rooted in patriarchal moral and ethical principles. Between the sexes and between the generations, sex was unspeakable. Reluctance to articulate sexuality was deeply ingrained in family relations, even between mothers and daughters.

Several informants said that they had received no information about sex from their moth-
ers besides the warning that women should not have sex before marriage. A woman born in a small town close to Sofia in 1951 said:

We greatly lacked sexual education at that time, and actually whoever knew something told the others... I heard almost nothing from my mother... you heard something from a girlfriend, or you saw something in the cinema. We always joked that our information about life came from the cinema and if you read something – some kind of medical literature. Or if someone's mother was more open and told him something.

As a student, the informant said she and her friends had no sex life until late into their studies:

It's not that there was no one we liked, but we were still brought up in a more patriarchal way, not so much that you ought not to do it, to have a sex life, but that you will get pregnant and you can't have an abortion and must marry.

However, such warnings eventually lost their effectiveness. This informant married hurriedly three of four months into pregnancy.

Another informant, born in Sofia in 1948, said that sex had been unmentionable for her mother who did not even tell her about menstruation: “When I got it, I didn't know what it was, I was quite shocked. Then she explained it. I also heard a little something from the older girls in the neighbourhood.” Inhibitions on the part of the parent generation meant that information on sexual practices and methods of birth control was rarely passed on within the family and were picked up on the street, if at all. As a student in the late 1960s, she practised sex but did not recall using contraceptives until she was married. She learned about the calendar method from girlfriends. She mentioned that her friends shared the opinion that birth control should not be used before the first child for health reasons, which suggests an internalisation of the official stance propagated by part of the medical profession (Vassilev 1999: 82). A common rumour was that the pill caused women to gain weight or to feel permanently pregnant.

Another woman born in 1949 said young women of her generation felt ashamed about approaching doctors on the issue of birth control as long as they were not married.

This informant’s two closest girlfriends became pregnant in their early twenties. Both arranged to have abortions performed illegally. This practice was common. Abortion restrictions required unmarried women to present their case before a special commission, which made their sex life public (Vassilev 1999: 76). Through a network of contacts, the girls found doctors to perform the abortion privately, but for a high price: “Money was important. A recommendation was important. But we were students and couldn't talk to our parents about it. We had to get the money together.” According to the informant, an illegal abortion at that time cost roughly the equivalent of a two-month salary. The women collected the fee among their friends. “Generally people thought that the boyfriend should put up the money. In one case, we were very annoyed because the boyfriend said that he couldn't get it together. Another friend eventually helped out.” These abortions were performed in doctor’s practices, but many women resorted to traditional methods of terminating pregnancy, by either administering abortive substances themselves or making use of the services of older women.

Young women who began their sex lives in the 1970s were more self-confident about sexual practice, although attitudes and access to contraceptives varied quite significantly because use was determined by availability rather than suitability. An informant born in Sofia in 1955 said that though her mother had remained resolutely silent on the issue of sex, she and her girlfriends were informed about modern contraceptives and used the pill they obtained from doctors. However, contraceptives imported from the Soviet Union were notoriously unreliable and did not always impede pregnancy. Abortion remained an extremely widespread method
of birth control and legal restrictions meant that women had to go through the humiliating process of begging acquaintances for help. The informant said, “It was a huge psychological trauma for women, like in the whole world [...] You went to doctors you knew, you cried, they took you to hospital, allegedly for something else, you aborted and that was it.”

The authoritarian nature of social values and concepts of female honour ingrained in both socialist ideology and society proposed a single, approved solution for pregnant unmarried women: marriage. An informant said that her sister and most of her classmates married around the age of 20 due to parental pressure to sanction pregnancy. Women abandoned by their lovers faced prejudice and condemnation. Thus, the trend towards liberated sexual relations benefited young men, but was highly ambivalent for women and supported exploitative relations.

Conclusions

Because the socialist government considered reproduction a social responsibility, sexual relations were elevated to a state concern. However, official communication to the public was silent on the issue of sexual practice throughout the 1960s, with a hesitant surfacing of sexuality in the media after the imposition of restrictions on abortion. The sexual activity of the young generation was less repressed being an all-out denial of sexuality than constrained by efforts to regulate it and keep it quiet. Although love was allowed, a degree of sexual expression in the course of the 1970s sex was only officially approved within the setting of marriage. Information to youth via state institutions and state controlled media remained extremely limited, obscure, and unsystematic.

The changes in the sexual behaviour of youth in Bulgaria, especially in the urban centres, contradicted both the mores of traditional culture as well as concepts of socialist morality. Despite the efforts by some sectors of the medical profession to provide young people with elementary sexual education, sexual advice to the young generation given by the state and the family continued to ignore the body and was based on moral admonishment and warning. Although assessments of the value of virginity altered, legitimising pre-marital sexual relations, pregnancy outside marriage remained a social taboo. Official discussions of free love centred on the issue of female sexual conduct and the moral quality of women, related to future motherhood which became the moral signifier of the collective.

The sexual revolution in socialist Bulgaria cannot be described as a revolution in terms of the advancement of political content or an open challenge to, and uprooting of, social norms. Rather, it was an extended period of crucial change in the sexual behaviour of youth that had no public voice. Instead, the young generation developed a hedonistic ethos outside official norms, influenced by the rock music culture that impacted on Bulgaria from the early 1960s, and partially protected by the solidarity maintained among young people themselves. Behaviour shifted in phases spread over the two decades: people who grew up in the 1960s were very much influenced by existing values, and individual attitudes differed greatly during a period when tradition still held a strong grip across the rural-urban divide. The generation that grew up in the 1970s, on the other hand, was more independent and self-confident in their sexuality, although women remained compromised by patriarchal attitudes.

The so-called sexual revolution took place without the communication on sexual practices and the public articulation that accompanied the revolution in the West. In Rotkirch’s comparison of Finland and Soviet Russia, she pointed out that public discussion in Finland in the 1960s led to state and school programmes of sex education that consciously transformed traditional attitudes regarding sexuality, while in Russia “sexual practices preceded changes in public ideology” by one to two decades (Rotkirch 2000: 175–176). In Bulgaria, the young
generations similarly developed sexual cultures despite, but also largely unaided by, socialist institutions. In socialism, a feminist platform did not exist to represent the interests of women outside, or against, official discourse. Sexuality and changing sexual values only became publicly articulated after 1989 when the issue exploded into the public sphere.

IBLIOGRAPHY


Notes:
a  Kon 1995; Riordan 1996.
b  On love and intimacy in youth culture against the background of repressive socialist policies in the 1950s, see: “Herz, Sichel und Hammer. Liebe und Politik in der sozialistischen Jugendkultur der 1950er Jahren in Bulgarien” (Popova, forthcoming).
c  The magazine Ženata dnes had irregular pagination so that quotes are given here with the number of the issue but without a page number unless a number was printed.
d  Bulgarian socialist social policies were closely patterned on Soviet policy; therefore, basic phases of change can be seen to correlate in both countries.
e  For a detailed discussion of normative medical discourse on sexuality, see “Der Diskurs über die Reproduktion im sozialistischen Bulgarien – Eingriff und Realitätsverleugnung” (Kassabova-Dintcheva 2003).
f  The first co-ordinated programme of sex education was added to the school curriculum in 1985, beginning in the fifth grade (Vassilev 1999: 87).
g  The primary mass organisation charged with the socialisation of the population and the creation of a socialist way of life was the Fatherland Front (Otečestven front). Others included the trade unions, local Party committees, and the youth organisation.
h  Rumen Daskalov termed the correctional procedures initiated by the collective in Bulgarian socialism, such as the comrade court, as “quasi-judicial” (1998: 15). They dealt with the social conduct of citizens in cases that were not subject to the penal code. The courts were not only concerned with sexual failings, but also with resolving issues ranging from lapsed work ethic and petty theft, to heavy drinking and marital disputes. In the latter case, attitudes toward the involved parties were gender specific. When dealing with male infidelity, for example, women were expected to show tolerance toward repentant husbands (see Kassabova-Dintcheva, forthcoming). On the collective surveillance of sexual life in revolutionary Russia, see Oleg Kharkhordin (1995) “The Soviet Individual: Genealogy of a Dissimulating Animal,” in: Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson (eds.), Global Modernities. London: Sage, 209–226.
i  On Bulgaria see Daskalova 1999 and Demiel 1998.
j  Rotkirch reported in her study of sexual cultures in the Soviet Union that a number of informants had mentioned that they had searched for authentic expressions of human feeling in classical Russian and French novels, and that their conceptions of love were deeply defined by the fictional relationships described there (Rotkirch 2000: 163–64).
l  Such articles on cultivated personal conduct and tactful communication between the sexes were popular in Ženata dnes in the 1970s (see the series “Us... and the others” published in 1973).
m  This articles focuses on youth and changing sexual behaviour before marriage, rather than on extra-marital sexual relations.
n  The informants were born between 1948 and 1955 and all have a higher education.
p  In fact, everyday male speech was – and is – extremely sexualised: language is full of sexual allusions and verbal abuse related to the sex act. However, informants said that speaking about actual sexual relations in the 1960s and 70s necessitated the use of euphemisms.
q  Sexual minorities were not represented at all and remained silent under socialism.
THE LGBT MOVEMENT IN BULGARIA

Monika Pisankaneva

The gay and lesbian movement in Bulgaria has not achieved the political success of its predecessors in the West despite the existence of international funding and support to start a national LGBT movement at the end of the 1990s. The very limited support that activists received in their own communities, hints that there are some limitations in adopting the western model of a sexual rights movement to the Bulgarian context. This paper aims to explore these limitations from the standpoint of a researcher who was part of the movement and has first-hand experience with some of the developments that took place.

Characteristics of the LGBT movement in Bulgaria

Though not massive in scale, there was early movement for gay and lesbian rights that began before 1992, referred to by later activists as “the LGBT movement.” It was organized by a group of activists, Gemini, who tried to capitalize on the current political situation to achieve changes in the lives of gays and lesbians in Bulgaria. They were few in number and they voiced concerns that the majority of gays and lesbians did not share. Several features characterize this phase of the Bulgarian LGBT movement. First, it was small in scale. It did not have many supporters from within the LGBT community. The explanation for this lack of support draws upon the social and political context in which the movement originated and developed.

Second, it was greatly influenced, and more or less directed by, the international LGBT movement, rather than from the needs of local people. Because there were not many politically inclined gays and lesbians in the country, GLBT activists found their source of motivation in the international movement, and consulted primarily foreign activists about the course of their activism. This is especially apparent in the first decade – between 1992 and 2002 – when there was only one legally registered Non Governmental Organization (NGO) representing gays and lesbians. Few people in Bulgaria knew about its existence or work, but it was quite well known in the European network of LGBT NGOs.

Third, the Bulgarian LGBT movement merely followed up on political decisions, rather than initiating them. The Republic of Bulgaria started its accession negotiations to join the European Union in 1999, and since fulfilling the acquis communautaire (the obligations deriving from EU membership) has become the primary instrument influencing the legal and economic development of the country. The government hurried to meet the EU’s legal criteria and rewrote laws discriminating against gays and lesbians without any grassroots pressure. Gemini, the only existing gay organization, was too weak to exercise pressure on government. Gemini members simply pursued the lobbying initiatives organized by the International Lesbian and Gay Association of Europe and by the Intergroup on Gay and Lesbian Rights in the European Parliament, and thus the effect of its work in Bulgaria was quite limited.

Origin of the movement and its social context

In 1992, a small group of homosexual men came together to create the first gay organization, named after the astrological sign of the founder, Gemini. The start of the movement was triggered by the outburst of new social movements (NSMs) for democratization and human rights that swept over Bulgarian society in the first half of the 1990s that were essentially anti-socialist. Socialism had repressed the pluralism of identities to the extent that there were no publicly recognizable typologies of the homosexual subject. These identities emerged in the
second half of the 1990s when the topic of love between men was, for the first time, openly mentioned in pop songs and poetry. The actor and singer Marius Kurkinski, was the first gay man to come out to the general public and became the embodiment of homosexual love – a tender, intelligent and melancholic young man. Around 1995, the first gay bars started in Sofia; most of them were underground and not accessible to everyone. The commercial gay scene was disinterested in supporting political activism. The very few pop stars who were openly gay, particularly Marius Kurkinski who was most frequently interviewed about his homosexuality in those days, expressed a viewpoint that Bulgarian society does not discriminate against homosexuals and did not need an equal rights movement or distinctive gay culture (Atanassov/Kurkinski, 2000). In this milieu, the need for increasing the legal and social rights of gays and lesbians was foreign to the Bulgarian mind, and promoted only by activists who had lived abroad and maintained contact with the movement in countries such as the Netherlands, which were well-known for their liberal attitudes towards gays and lesbians.

The social context in which the gay and lesbian equal rights movement emerged was quite unfavorable for increasing the visibility of gays and lesbians. Previously indoctrinated by the communist regime, intolerance of differences in society was deeply ingrained in the minds of the Bulgarian people, and it would take years of free media and freedom of association to overcome such intolerance. In addition, after the collapse of socialism, Bulgarian society resurrected patriarchal ideology in an attempt to defeat the long-detested socialist moral standards that promoted formal equality between men and women. Patriarchal values embedded in Orthodox Christianity (the dominant religion in the country) were actively reinforced by the mass media; this reinforcement led to a widely accepted double-standard on social mores and ethics. One was forced needed to pay lip-service to an outdated morality in order to be seen as a good citizen, but one could enjoy sexual and social freedoms only in publicly inconspicuous ways. In this context, homosexual identity and behavior were considered acceptable as long as people did not discuss it in public. Here the restrictions were mainly on labelling, discussing and popularizing of the homosexual identity, and not on having homosexual acts or relationships specifically. It was considered acceptable, even chic and trendy for people from the artistic elite to visit gay night clubs and engage in same-sex flirtations, or to live with a same-sex partner, as long as they never discuss their private life in public. The public/private dichotomy was widely accepted as a needed division between day life/night life codes of behavior. This double ethical standard was more or less approved by the majority of people living in cities. The situation in small rural towns and villages was quite different. Alternatives to traditional lifestyles have always been an urban phenomenon, and people who felt a need to enjoy greater anonymity and personal freedoms migrated to the urban centers.

In the social context described above, “coming out” became the test of the gay and lesbian movement. The leaders of the movement were very few and did not enjoy large-scale support inside the communities that they represented. This situation did not change much after receipt of a sizable financial support and tactical advice from abroad. Commonsense guided most gays and lesbians to observe the widely accepted social norms that still permitted them to enjoy sexual freedom in private. Activists in the movement were generally very young and inexperienced, and could not win support from people with careers, families and high social status. This state of affairs prevailed until 2003 when the movement finally began to diversify.

The first ten years of the movement: 1992-2002

The earliest activities of Gemini were largely associated with HIV/AIDS prevention among gay men and other health care activities implemented in partnership with the Bulgarian Red Cross and the National Council on HIV/AIDS Prevention. The importance of linkages with the international LGBT movement was recognized from the very beginning and Gemini be-
came a member of ILGA soon after its creation. It only had gay male members until 1998. In 1998, due to the enthusiasm of one lesbian activist who had studied in the Netherlands, Gemini created a lesbian “section” and other lesbians gradually became an integral part of the organization.

Also in 1998, Gemini initiated contacts with the COC (Dutch Society for Integration of Homosexuality) with a request for partnership in an organizational development program to be funded through the MATRA program of the Dutch government.1 Gemini members had learned of Holland’s special program to support social change for gays and lesbians in emerging democracies; they were also familiar with a similar program in Romania that had contributed to the strengthening of the Romanian gay and lesbian organization ACCEPT. It took more than two years until the long-desired project was approved and funded by MATRA and a Dutch private donor organization, NOVIB. In the meantime, the activities of Gemini included sporadic media appearances of its leaders that aimed to increase the public visibility of gays and lesbians. Lack of a long-term strategy, added a nuance of randomness to the organizational activities in those years.

Great hopes were associated with Gemini’s access to international funding, as part of MATRA’s Balkan Triangle Project. The receipt of the funds in the beginning of 2001 undoubtedly increased interest in the organization and recruiting of new people for its work. Around the end of 2001, Gemini had about 200 registered “members,” which means that 200 people had at least expressed interest to take part in the organizational activities.

Unfortunately, as often happens in the early stages of organizational development, access to sizable funding and opportunities for international travel and training, which the project created, led to internal power games that forced out some of the civic-minded leaders and brought to the forefront people pursuing personal, rather than collective, interests. There were annual changes of the Board during the project’s three years of operation. The first change was demanded by the partner organization, COC, when at the end of Year 1, Gemini could not provide financial documents for expenditures in the amount of 5000 Deutsche marks. The sitting Board Chair was held accountable for the missing funds and a new Board was elected, but the situation with the organizational governance did not improve tremendously. Most of the former Gemini leaders who took part in the development of the project were no longer in Bulgaria, while others lost interest after being driven away by the new people in power.

Lack of experienced leadership and lack of widespread support from the community persisted until the end of the project. The organization continued to demonstrate lack of transparency in decision-making and lack of interest in following its members’ demands. As a result, instead of providing services to at least 1,200 members in Year 3, as was planned when the project was developed, Gemini ended the project with less than 10 members attending its annual general assembly. This was tremendous collapse revealed the artificiality of the organized movement and exposed the fact that in three years of work, Gemini has ceased being an organization serving the LGBT community, and had become merely a project serving the interests of a small number of people.

Despite Gemini’s weak performance and ineffective work, the legal and social environment for LGBT integration was constantly improving after 1999. The fuel for this integration was the EU accession process, which motivated abolition of discriminatory provisions in the law. The state and free media gradually became more objective when discussing social phenomena such as homosexuality and freer and less prejudiced younger generations came of voting age. The discriminatory provision in the Bulgarian Penal Code (article 157, paragraph 4) that defined homosexuality as a perversion and criminalized its display in public was abolished in June 2002. The age of consent (currently fourteen) was equalized for hetero- and homosexual people. Furthermore, since 2004, a new anti-discriminatory law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. At the same time, the quick transformation of laws, motivated by external factors rather than grassroots pressure from citizens, led to a decline in the civic participation of gays and lesbians. Legal changes outpaced changes in social attitudes and the homosexual minority did not feel a need participate in changing the legal climate.

The new wave in the Bulgarian LGBT movement after 2002

Around 2002, some diversification of the LGBT community started to take shape. Informal groups of lesbians and gay men united around common interests, such as nudism, sports, clubbing, etc. and established regular social activities. In the beginning of 2004, two new organizations that openly identified as LGBT were formalized – the Bilitis Lesbian and Bisexual Women Resource Center and the Queer Bulgaria Foundation. These two new organizations undertook consistent efforts to increase the visibility of the LGBT people in Bulgaria. The activities of Queer Bulgaria also aimed to articulate clearly the meaning of the terms “lesbian”, “bisexual”, “transgender” and “intersex” to the Bulgarian public, and to challenge existing stereotypes. Queer Bulgaria represents the section of the “white collar workers” in the LGBT community: some are well-educated and financially independent young adults, who are looking for a way to translate the western experience into the Bulgarian context, and to stimulate a well-planned LGBT movement. Bilitis and its sibling organizations (For Her Lesbian Club and BGL SporTeam, a lesbian sport club) take a more intuitive or organic approach to building a community of lesbians, bisexual and transgendered women by working on the grassroots level. Most of their activities are based on self-support; international funding is not a determining factor in their work. Both Queer Bulgaria and Bilitis have managed to attract some private donations from LGBT-friendly people to support their activities. They are trying not to become exclusively dependent on international donor resources and are trying to follow their own agendas, which are developed on the basis of qualitative assessment of the needs of their target audience.

The formalization of new LGBT organizations in recent years took place as a conscious reaction regarding the failure of Gemini to unite a sufficient number of LGBT people around a common goal, and the ineffective use of donor funds. This change demonstrated that some representatives of the LGBT community were not indifferent to how existing development opportunities were used.

The failure of Gemini to retain its members after the end of the Balkan Triangle Project demonstrated how superfluous the movement had been up to this time. It was characterized by total dependence on international funding and support. It did not meet the needs of the local LGBT people because only a couple of members stayed in the organization when the international resources dwindled. Gemini was saved thanks to the willingness of the Dutch donors to continue funding the movement in Bulgaria. In the presence of several new, formal and informal LGBT organizations, Gemini should now have more chances to function effectively because it will have to work in a competitive environment. The new organizations still feel too insecure to rely on Gemini as a potential partner in joint initiatives because of the difficult legacy that the new Board inherited. At the same time, the need for a wider platform to achieve common goals is already being felt, and there are good prospects for forming a coalition, if all organizations prove able to follow mutually agreed-upon principles of communication.

The Discrimination Discourse

The international LGBT movement developed around the issue of discrimination and equal rights. LGBT identities failed to politicize in Eastern Europe at same particular historical moment that they became political in the West. The communist regimes in Eastern Europe suppressed the diversification of sexual identities at the time when the sexual revolution
flourished in the West. Thirty years later, when the former communist countries in Eastern Europe began to transform into democracies, some form of sexual revolution took place in all of them; however, they did not have the political dimension experienced in Western societies in the 1960s and 1970s.

In Bulgaria, in particular, the politicization of identities around sexual practices did not happen because inequalities resulting from different sexual orientation were considered minor and unimportant by the general public and by gay and lesbian people themselves reflected far greater social disparities around poverty and ethnicity. In the initial transition years of economic stagnation and mass poverty, the commonsense attitude of LGBT people was to not bring their specific needs to the public agenda until far more alarming social and economic problems affecting the majority of the population had been solved. Issues affecting LGBT people were only recently (after 1999) brought to the public attention with regards to the EU accession process and the need to adjust Bulgarian law to the European standards.

Though legal and political discrimination is now prohibited under law, social attitudes towards LGBT people remains ambiguous. The visibility of homosexual desires is effectively banned by the prevailing notion that this matter is private, and need not be discussed in public. Sexual freedom is allowed as long as it privately pursued, and homosexual relationships are regarded as some of the many sexual frivolities that a person who is otherwise “heterosexual” and respectable may have in his or her private life.

There are a variety of reasons why homosexual people in Bulgaria refuse to “come out.” Some of these reasons are associated with tradition, culture and social stigmatization of those who are “different.” However, the social environment is changing, and in the last seven to eight years there is no open discrimination and harassment of LGBT people. The rare cases of gay bashing appear might be called “gay panic” attacks as they are usually associated with blind dates arranged privately by the victim and his attacker. The more open and objective representation of gay, lesbian and transgender people in the mass media in the last few years has slowly expanded the boundaries of the social norms of respectability. The recently concluded first round of the TV show “Big Brother” reinforced the widely prevailing social attitude of acceptance of sex between women. Two young women had sex in the Big Brother house, and the mother of one of the women said to the public that she would be OK if her daughter was a lesbian. This example of changing social attitudes toward homosexuality shows how it is gradually becoming accepted as part of the mainstream culture.

LGBT activists have not yet developed a strategy for capitalizing on media opportunities for mainstreaming sexual identity differences. The majority of media appearances of LGBT activists focus on issues of equal rights and freedoms, while the general audience is more interested in the personal dimensions of homosexuality, bisexuality and transsexuality. In January 2005, a private national TV started to broadcast the U.S. series “Will and Grace” in which one of the title characters is gay. The effect of these newly inaugurated mass media products cannot yet be estimated as far as social attitudes to LGBT people are concerned; however, looking at the history of LGBT emancipation in the West, it can be assumed that they will produce a positive liberating effect.

Recent developments in pop-art and culture prove that Bulgarian society tolerates sexual orientation differences as long as they are not politicized. In the last few years, there has been abundant artistic imagery transgressing the heterosexual boundaries, but it is presented as a matter of personal taste, not as a collective identity. For example, the pop-folk singer Azis openly uses gay sex symbols in his videos, which contributes to his incredible popularity. At the same time, the very same artist who blurs the norms in his artistic products prefers not to discuss his own sexual orientation and says that it is a private matter that does not concern anyone. This situation may result in a negative attitude toward legitimizing a collective gay
identity among young people who are engaged in sexual experimentation.

The sexual orientation discrimination discourse failed to win many supporters in the LGBT communities in Bulgaria, because the popular gay/queer personalities who serve as role models presently do not take part in it. At the same time mass media products, imported from the West, help to mainstream sexual orientation and play a positive role in building tolerance to the differences in society. This context gave rise to a lot less radical LGBT movement compared to the one that flourished in the 1970s in the West.

Virtual communities

One essential characteristic of the LGBT communities in Bulgaria that predetermines resistance to political mobilization is their “virtual” or online existence. Instead of socializing in the pubs and other public spaces, most LGBT people in Bulgaria prefer to socialize in virtual chat rooms and forums on the web. Dating sites and other commercial LGBT sites (especially gay) are extremely popular. For example, the first gay site that started in 1997, www.gay.bg, today has about 15,000 registered users, 30% of whom are foreigners. The most popular lesbian site, www.bg-lesbian.com, has about 1,500 registered users. The site has operated since 2001.

But where are these people? Only about a hundred of them can be met in the gay clubs in Sofia. The Internet became the ideal medium for LGBT people who prefer to lead a semi-open life. Many LGBT people go by their nick-names, or screen names, even when they meet somebody face-to-face on a date arranged through e-mail. In the Bulgarian social environment, the Internet does not encourage openness and coming out. It functions as a convenient closet where anyone can do anything without disclosing one’s identity.

The virtual LGBT community is extremely fractured. Attempts to bring together people who hang out in different chat rooms and web forums have not led to success. The virtual forums are in fact the only place where debates on current political issues affecting the LGBT people can be found. Organizations do their best to maintain interactive web sites because this is the only way to receive feedback from the “community” about the effect of their day-to-day work. Messages transferred by Internet are a lot plainer and delivered in the language of the “average” Bulgarian citizen because they are not subject to external editing or state censorship.

Attempts to bring virtual personalities together and inspire some feeling of belonging to a real life community were recently made by an informal leader in the lesbian community – the webmaster of the www.bg-lesbian.com site. Her efforts brought some limited success – some women joined to form a lesbian sports club and started regular trainings. A similar history was the gay nude club that maintains an active web site. Increasing the variety of activities that the informal clubs offer may gradually lead to increasing the number of members. However, the informal lesbian and gay clubs do not consider themselves part of the organized LGBT movement, because they are oriented to the interest of the individual members and not to some larger public causes.

LGBT commercial culture

The development of the consumer culture in Bulgaria encourages the diversification of identities as consumers with different desires and tastes. Consumerism gradually paves the way to the inclusion of lesbians, gay men, transgendered people and bisexuals into the social mainstream as clients of services and buyers of products.

The LGBT commercial subculture, especially the clubs, have so far been closed to the movement and not a lot of interest exists to financially support political causes. The first gay bars emerged in Sofia in the middle of the 1990s. They were initially open only to people with membership cards, but with the growth of social freedom in mainstream culture and with the
decrease of exclusively gay clientele, they became much more inclusive. With the elimination of the restricted access in the gay clubs the interest in them decreased. There could be several reasons for the decrease of gay and lesbian clientele in gay clubs; for example, the lack of diversity in the bars and absence of special fetish clubs that meet various sexual tastes might be one of them. Today there are no exclusively gay places in Sofia or in any other big city in Bulgaria; however the number of LGBT-friendly places is growing. With the help of Queer Bulgaria, some thematic parties recently attracted a big variety of LGBT clients in one of the gay-friendly clubs in Sofia. The need of diversifying the club scene in order to meet all kinds of tastes and sexual pleasures is still clearly felt in LGBT communities.

The gay press is still underdeveloped in Bulgaria compared to western countries. Short-lived gay magazines do not fill the niche for such publications. Gay tourism is only now emerging, and it still in its very early stages. At the same time, the LGBT-friendly commercial culture is growing; it is specially designed to fit young people’s more diverse tastes and embraces tourism and sports in addition to the club scene.

Commercial sexual services make up the biggest part of gay culture in Bulgaria, but are illegal and not sufficiently researched yet. Many young gay people who migrate to Sofia from the country to start more open lives, that are independent of their parents, are sex workers until they find a job and can cover living expenses on their own. Though sex workers make up a sizable part of the small gay community in Sofia (and other big cities), their needs have never been the focus of the LGBT movement. This fact shows how non-inclusive the movement has been of various marginalized subgroups of the LGBT communities.

When we speak of the commercial sex culture, transgendered people, specifically male-to-female transgendered, come into sight. They are the most visible part of the LGBT communities in Bulgaria, and they have managed to reserve a space of their own in Bulgarian nightlife. They are tolerated much more than gay men because they are regarded as women who want to serve heterosexual men, and most of them identify in this way. Their existence does not pose a threat to the male-centered consumer culture, but rather create more diversity in the commercial sex culture. Some of the transvestites have won a place of their own in the fashion industry as models. They work in elite clubs and are respected for their aesthetic tastes and extravagance. They are an indispensable part of the commercial sexual culture that characterizes the big cities in Bulgaria. (Brooks, 2000)

Many people within the LGBT communities believe that the tolerance of sexual variety that which is characteristic of the nightlife in some Bulgarian urban areas may be hindered if sexual identities become more politicized. This serves to increase the incongruity between the commercial gay scene and the organized LGBT movement. The two follow different agendas, are not mutually exclusive by necessity. The first agenda serves pleasures and interests, while the second promotes rights and freedoms. The activists from the LGBT organizations have made some attempts to get the support of the gay club scene for the movement, but their success has so far been very limited.

Conclusion

The replication of certain organizational development models that are part of mainstream culture in Western Europe today is an inescapable trend in the development of the LGBT movement in Bulgaria because of the specific historical period and EU accession orientation in which the movement is developing. Local specifics may add a note of variation to the identity labels and mainstreaming techniques that are applied, but the core set of values characteristic of sexual identity politics remains the same.
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Notes:
1 MATRA is a program funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which aims to support social transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. “Matra” is an acronym of two Dutch words, *maatschappelijke transformatie*, meaning *social transformation*. See http://www.netherlands-embassy.ru/matra.html
MELTING THE IRON CURTAIN:
THE BEGINNINGS
OF THE LGBT MOVEMENT IN SLOVENIA

Bogdan Lešnik

Background

In Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, “unnatural fornication between persons of male sex” was a criminal act (with the penalty of 1-5 years in prison) until the new federal constitution of 1974 relegated authority over sexual matters to the eight national units (six republics and two autonomous provinces) that composed Yugoslavia at the time. In 1977, the new Slovenian penal code dropped the offence, and the age of consent was set uniformly to 14 years of age. Three other units legalized homosexual sex above the age of 18, while in the remaining four it remained a crime. Sexual morality appears to be one of the issues that divided the federation.¹

Limiting penalization to “male sex” was as common in Eastern as it was in Western Europe. In Slovenia, however, the law had not been applied since the early decades of the communist regime when it had been occasionally used to besmirch Catholic priests.²

Slovenians had a long history of being part of multi-national states, which all penalized homosexuality: before WWII of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, before WWI of the Austro-Hungarian empire (with the brief break under Napoleon’s occupation around 1800), and so on. Apart from certain “special rights” granted to the city of Ljubljana since the 14th century, it was only in the short period after the year 600 when the then pagan people had settled down in the region and until it pledged loyalty to the Bavarians around 750 (which resulted in its rather forcible Christianization) that they might have had some autonomy within the so-called “tribal union” of the Slavic peoples that had moved in together. When the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 granted its units many state functions as well as the right to secede, it was the closest to a national state that the Slovenians had ever come.

However, the 70s was a politically delicate decade in Yugoslavia. Marshall Tito was not only still firmly in power but had recently condemned the “liberal and nationalist deviations” in national leaderships, which had brought down a whole set of younger politicians called “the liberal group” in 1972. But they were also “nationalist:” they tended to neglect allegiance to Belgrade, worked on their own, and had plans that were never approved. This was more dangerous to Tito’s party which, after splitting with Moscow in 1948, developed concepts such as decentralization, pluralism, and self-management. Thus, even though the successors of “the liberal group” were more faithful to the federacy, Slovenia continued to diverge, fostering its reputation as the most “advanced” or “progressive” Yugoslav republic in both economy and social liberties, and therefore the best example of what distinguished Yugoslavia as a whole from the rest of Eastern Europe.

The argument to abolish the law was eminently liberal: “the intimate life of adults... is a personal matter and there is no need that the state should assume it has a right to interfere.” Furthermore, the prohibition of homosexuality “reminds one of the feudal age in which the state treated its subjects as unreasonable children and ruthlessly regulated all their personal and intimate issues.”³

Earlier, a report on homosexuality, published in a 1969 textbook on “social pathology,” found that homosexuality did not to represent a “social peril” but concluded that it should retain a “negative label” lest it spread “unnecessarily” in a “much wider population of people who are not firm about their sexual orientation, and who would perhaps sooner indulge in
homosexuality (or, more appropriately, pseudo-homosexuality), had society not hindered that with some sternness.” In other words, there was no need to criminalize homosexual acts, but to prevent undue indulgence, homosexuality should continue to signify degradation in the public discourse. The authors were convinced that “the few percents of real homosexuals” could bear with the consequences (Kobal, Bavcon 1969).

The subsequent textbook of psychiatry listed homosexuality under “unusual sexual behavior,” acknowledged its new legal status, and claimed that there was just as great variety of homosexuals as there was of heterosexuals. Nevertheless, a common element was found later on: a fascination with the organ. “Of the greatest importance is the penis; a big penis has a magical power for them as the most important symbol of manhood.” Conversely, lesbians “glorify the meaning of big breasts, which play a rather magical role in their life” (Lokar 1978). What is curious about this crude version of Freud’s narcissistic theory of homosexuality is that it attributes to homosexual men and women the two obsessions that can frequently be found – in heterosexual men.

It seems that what was at stake in the legislative change was not homosexuality itself. The principal issues were the elevation of the “right of privacy” and an inclination to sexual liberty that prevailed in the discussions on “sexual aberrations.” Transsexuals benefited, too: psychiatric authorities, being the decisive agency in all such cases, referred applicants, male and female, for sex change operations on medical security very liberally at least since the early 1980s.4

The general orientation of this discourse was Freudian and, naturally, Marxist. Freud had insisted that homosexuals should not be “separated off from the rest of mankind,” not only because he could not find anything radically different in “homosexuals” but also because he could find homosexual “tendencies” in everybody. Furthermore, if “homosexuality” was a symptom, so was heterosexuality, because the studies of homosexuality suggested that “heterosexuality,” too, was a construct. For Marx, the actual problem was alienation, whose “symptoms” were as diverse as, for example, marital systems, the social position of women, and sexual dissatisfaction. All this would radically change with the end of class society, the ultimate cause of alienation (and deviation).

This position was helpful because it opposed criminalization and social condemnation. But neither communists nor psychoanalysts had high regard for what we call “coming out” (in public). From the Marxist point of view, the act was meaningless in itself, possibly a “distraction from real problems.” Freud, for his part, regretted the persecution of homosexuals, but at the same time allowed for the view that because homosexuality is socially unacceptable, its public announcement must necessarily bear a sign of “pathology” (of the kind that involves personality).5

Although we must assume that the legislators did not expect their decision to be publicly contested, it tells us little about the actual reception of homosexuality amongst the people of Slovenia. Furthermore, it tells us little about its leadership’s own action.

That there was silent censorship is evident from the case of a 1971 feature film that abounded with (hetero)sexual scenes. When it was released again in the 1990s, the public could also see a scene of gay seduction, which had been cut out. With the exception of a lesbian scene, which remained untouched in a 1979 film by the same director, this (apart from rare crypto-queer scenes) was the only attempt to show “homosexuality” in Slovenian state-funded feature film until a lesbian fantasy satire in 2002. Sponsored by a local cultural authority, a film was produced privately in 1974 (after a 1938 novel, a love story from a boys’ boarding school), but it was withdrawn from distribution in 1977, after two public screenings in all.6

Under state-run production and distribution of films, there was seldom need for explicit censorship. A dissident film-maker simply didn’t get any production to direct. Books and journals were less immediately controlled, so formal ban was a regular measure. In the era of self-
Images of same-sex love and sexuality are thus more frequent in literature than on film. Many are frank accounts of pleasant or unpleasant personal experiences, and some are highly involved and poetic. But the concept of "homosexuality," in the rare instances when it comes up, never rises above crude stereotypes (cf. Mozetič 1990).

Though it ceased to be illegal, homosexuality largely remained a "mute sin," in the words of a blessed bishop from the nineteenth century (Slomšek 1851). However, it was the label that bore the stigma, and it did not necessarily link up with sexual acts. Many people who grew up in Slovenia after World War II did not feel that their sexual life was impaired by the lack of a public "scene." Some would say that they had sex with friends and lovers rather than with "homosexuals." It was the absence of such distinctions that provided them with opportunities. They simply relied on their sexual excitement. These people might doubt that the new identity brought them any kind of "liberation."

The flaw in the arrangement was of course that it did not really avoid identification. "Homosexuality" continued to signify degradation, so that most people who indulged in homosexual acts, though they might have got away with them, knew very well where they actually, if secretly, stood.

The initiative

The LGBT movement emerged as one of the "new social movements" (NSMs) of the 1980s. We cannot address their full history here. Suffice it to say that in the beginning of the decade, a wave of initiatives that would not have been thought possible under socialism swept over the country. The groups that fostered them could on occasion draw many people together, though their own shifting, never formal membership hardly ever reached a four digit number. But this is difficult to estimate, since there were no clear boundaries within NSMs or between NSMs and their supporters in the wider public. (See, for example, Žerdin 1997.)

NSMs had many similarities with concurrent processes elsewhere. As in other socialist countries, they were instrumental in the formation of political opposition. But while elsewhere NSMs were conservative by default, since they opposed governments that were decidedly "leftist" (communist), the NSMs in Slovenia nourished leftist ideas. They didn't criticize the regime for the objectives it professed (freedom, social justice, equality, even distribution, etc.) but for not taking them seriously; and they didn't see themselves within the government/opposition dichotomy but as the alternative to bureaucratic malpractice and incompetence.

An important circumstance in this respect was that NSMs both influenced and found support in the political organization of "socialist youth," which had until then served for selection and preparation of communist party officials. It was the party's "organ of reproduction." The youth organization was the first to openly start preparations for the imminent change and created a political movement (liberal democracy), which would lead the governing coalition since 1992 till 2004.

The meaning of the "alternative" was broad, but its main field was "alternative culture." This challenged as well as played upon the mythical status of "culture" as the foundation of the nation. "Culture" was understood in an anthropologically informed sense, not as the specific sector of privileged activities and productions as it was conceived within the system, but as consisting in everyday practices, including sexual ones. Accordingly, "art" was re-conceptualized as a form of social intervention.

Student Cultural Centre in Ljubljana, or ŠKUC, for short, followed this conceptual line as far as it went. Due to an inherited division, it was organized into "sections" for fine arts,
music, film, video, publishing, etc. In addition to these, “social sections” were founded in the mid-1980s – the homosexual one in 1984, followed by the peace and the feminist one, respectively, in 1985. A “social fund” was established for their purposes, to which the other sections contributed from their income.

The sequence of their foundation requires a comment, however, because there were significant differences in the “prehistory” of each social section. The women’s movement had started long before World War II and was now part of the state apparatus; the new initiative merely brought it back on a more grassroots level. The peace movement, too, had been in existence before some of its members took a seat in ŠKUC. It was often identified with NSMs as a whole, whose genealogy included the punk movement of the late 1970s and the student movement of 1968. Besides, the regime itself was professedly, though not unconditionally, “pacifist.” In contrast, there had been no homosexual movement or organization prior to the section. 9

ŠKUC closely collaborated with another student association named “Forum” – the union was called ŠKUC-Forum – whose members were no less involved in NSMs. Their crucial contribution was something in the order of the “theory and practice of clubbing.” They were involved in theater and musical production, ran an alternative disco, and very articulately defended their work. They developed a concept of “subculture,” vaguely based in sociological theory but used to mean rather “the cultural underworld,” which they found to be their proper field.

Partying, and having fun in general, became a “political practice.” Indeed, “everything was political,” but not only in the usual sense that every issue, personal and private included, bears political significance and consequences. Politics was seen as the cause, not an effect. It not only already determined our lives and actions but also dictated our pleasures. To understand the latter, one only had to study “state art” 10 which was done extensively. The rock group Lai-bach was born from this perspective (1980), and they later co-founded “Neue Slowenische Kunst” (1984), an artistic movement that reinvented “state art” after the fall of communism – by founding a state of its own (the “NSK state” of 1992).

“Theory” became a widely enjoyed practice in NSMs’ intellectual circles, particularly film theory, developed by a circle of Marxist-Lacanian philosophers since the late 70s.11 Their analyses (often psychoanalyses) of spectacular representations and reinventions of ideology had the effect of a powerful political critique. They introduced and developed many ideas that reverberated profoundly through NSMs. By defending their position within the Marxist frame of reference, they opened a battleground within the governing structure. Some would become members of, or closely associated with, liberal democrats.

A thematic project like many others, the Magnus festival was devised with the simple aim of presenting examples of “homosexual culture.” It took its name from Magnus Hirschfeld, both as a tribute to the pioneering German activist and for its playful connotations. The festival opened on April 23, 1984, and lasted three days, taking place on a range of locations in Ljubljana.12 Its programs included public discussions (with the participation of Guy Hocquenghem, whose book Homosexual Desire was something of a required reading13), an exhibition of current and historic queer press, a selection of films, and fringe events.

An issue of the bulletin that ŠKUC-Forum had recently started to publish was dedicated to the festival, in print of the most inexpensive kind, presenting the issue in its sexual, political, and aesthetic aspects.14 NSMs learned to make use of cheap and accessible means of reproduction, such as photocopying, cyclostyle, and (later) video, bypassing censorship and converting the medium into a straight-forward political message, a manifesto of autonomy. This continued with “Gayzine” in 1985 and “Lesbozine” in 1988.

Unlike the rest of the festival, its film program freely mixed films that included LGBT themes with films from an LGBT perspective,15 reflecting, coincidentally, that the organizing
group was not a group of homosexuals, nor indeed a homogenous group. They were students of different disciplines, producers and artists, women and men, with a range of interests from art to the mass media, and from marginal to popular culture.

Later that year (13 December 1984), about 30 men founded a “gay section” of ŠKUC, naming it “Magnus: Section for the Culture of Homosexuality.” They defined its position as that of a cultural organization with a political program. Its manifesto was published in 1986; it called for the abolition of anti-homosexual laws in all of Yugoslavia, for the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and for treating homosexuality as a “life style” in public education. Lastly, it demanded from the federal government to protest against anti-homosexual oppression abroad, mentioning Romania and Iran.

NSMs were notorious for their “strict treatment” of the state and for their refusal to engage in “realpolitik.” Clearly such demands had little prospect to be granted. This was a utopian agenda, with some references to Russian constructivism, but it made the movement very visible. The basic mobilization was however carried out in Magnus’ “cultural” work, especially by organizing events.

The essential part of the “culture,” of course, was clubbing. The discotheque run by Forum was declared “gay” for the festival, and its attendance went far beyond expectation (as did that of the whole festival). The gay disco reopened unofficially (without the necessary permits) a couple of months after the festival in a house owned by the university division of the youth organization. It became a weekly event that would continue, with a break between 1986 and 1989, on the same premises to the present.

One groundbreaking event that took place in the discotheque was a women-only night (April 3, 1985), organized by the recently founded feminist section “Lilit.” The house was overcrowded, and there was a favorable response by both women and men, though the mockery that often came from the circle of supporters indicates a degree of ambivalence. Not a lesbian project as such, it provided general support and encouragement of women that the lesbians (who had until then operated within both Magnus and Lilit) needed to eventually organize on their own.

The movement
The Magnus festivals of 1985 and 1986 followed in the same direction as the first one. The organizing group diversified and took up various issues, notably AIDS. In 1986, the discotheque was closed when the house in which it operated underwent renovation. The break took three years, during which clubs opened sporadically in various locations, but never for more than a few months. Other NSMs’ projects had similar problems. This was the period marked in the history of Slovenian NSMs as “the struggle for space” (cf. Bibič, 2003).

The Slovenian authorities’ first response is best described as a non-response. In those days, even tough no persecution took place, this amounted to exclusion. A controversial issue that did not have a political backup was as good as untouchable. Even the support of the youth organization, which had a strong position in the system, did not carry much weight beyond its own structure.

When the Slovenian media covered the festivals, they focused on the program rather than on the issue of homosexuality. There was some dismissive publicity about the issue in the Belgrade press on the occasion of the first Magnus festival. The interviews of organizers made for Belgrade TV in 1984 were not broadcast until 1987, when Sarajevo TV showed them as evidence of Slovenian deviancy. By then, a civil war had already started in Yugoslavia, though its means were not yet weapons but poisonous propaganda.

In March 1987, based on a notice about the annual Magnus festival in the bulletin that accompanied the Berlin film festival, the news exploded in the Serbian and Bosnian media that
Ljubljana was organizing a “worldwide congress of homosexuals.” Most outrageously, the event was planned on a sacred holiday, Tito’s (official) birthday, which was also celebrated as “Youth Day” (May 25). The tabloid press (a rapidly growing novelty) took pleasure in calling names; the political functionary identified as responsible was personally attacked as “the advocate of faggots” (Kuhar 2001: 93).

The Slovenian media resumed the news and national authorities reacted for the first time. Two political bodies immediately held meetings and declared that the “homosexual congress” (which had meanwhile been mysteriously reduced to “European”) should be banned. They used a handy new tool, fear of AIDS, and argued that the event would infect the country. As a representative said: “Surely they would not just talk with each other.” Medical authorities at once and categorically denied any such danger, but without any effect.

Tito had died in 1980, yet his figure continued to dominate in the state, certainly in its ceremonies and rituals. Any iconoclastic act was countervailed as “an attack on Yugoslavia.” By the time the Magnus festival became an issue in 1987, there had already been two scandals involving the annual “Tito’s relay,” a traditional ceremony that culminated in massive festivities every May 25. Its organization in 1987 was the responsibility of the Slovenian youth association. But then a civil engineer from Sarajevo discovered that the poster selected for the occasion (made by a division of NSK) was a copy of a Nazi poster. Next, a mockery of “sawing the relay baton” was publicly staged in Ljubljana. And now this!

Organizes of the Magnus festival never intended to compete with the ceremonies or demote or mock them. Quite the opposite. The holiday was the background, not an obstacle to be removed. It was commonplace that the Youth Day’s message, be free and love one another, was an empty ideological phrase in support of a dead ritual; the alternative was to take it literally and make it the appropriate frame for the festival. The organizers merely claimed the right to include the festival amongst other festivities.

In reaction to the attempted suppression, ŠKUC-Forum held an extraordinary general assembly (16 April 1987), which turned into an NSMs’ rally. Its minutes contain many names of the later political elite. Two statements were issued. One demanded the decriminalization of conscientious objection to serving in the military, and it was informally implemented even before the departure of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the change of power in 1990. But the one directly related to the reason for the meeting – to ban discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in the constitution – has never been followed through.

The festival was postponed, though it is not clear whether this was due to political pressure (which had never issued a formal ban) or because the organizers had logistical problems in meeting deadlines. In any case, the holiday was marked appropriately: “AIDS Mobilization Day” was organized instead in the ŠKUC Gallery. It included an exhibition of relevant material and the distribution of free condoms.

However, it was women speaking out who particularly distinguished 1987. In October, the “LL” group (for “Lesbian Lilit”) was founded within Lilit, after Lilit had become a member of the International Lesbian and Gay Organization (ILGA). In November, members of LL attended “the first informal meeting of Eastern European gay and lesbian activists” in Budapest. And in December, when the festival finally took place (after another postponement), Lilit organized “the first meeting of the feminists of Yugoslavia” in Ljubljana.

Massive and frequent political rallies in Serbia “against corrupt national governments,” as the slogan ran, but actually in support of a greater Serbia, reached their peak in 1988. The protesters never forgot to deplore the injustice of the Slovenian authorities that banned their rally in Ljubljana but permitted “a congress of faggots.” LGBT activists responded routinely, condemning such populist “repressive campaigns” but also criticizing the Slovenian authorities for their readiness to ban “the congress,” which had no justification even if such an event
were actually planned. Magnus and Lilit were at that time members of the Committee for Human Rights that had been recently founded in Ljubljana in response to the arrest (by federal military authorities) of four men for being in possession of a military secret (a scenario of Yugoslav armed forces in case Slovenia attempted secession from the federation). This complication became a dominant political theme in Slovenia, one that effectively united the people toward secession (Zerdin 1997).

In 1988 the Magnus festival was reorganized into a lesbian and gay film festival and has been held every December since. The “gay disco” reopened a year later, hosted by the youth organization, and quickly developed a cult status. The quotation marks are however in order, because the place continued to be used for diverse purposes. A conference on “homosexuality and politics” took place there, for example.

The youth organization, at its national congress in the autumn of 1989, adopted the Magnus’ initiative to include sexual orientation into the antidiscrimination clauses of both Slovenian and Yugoslav constitutions. Actions against AIDS gained new force with the collaboration of Magnus and two national medical authorities (Micro-Biological Institute and Institute for the Protection of Health).

This was “the beginning of the most successful period of gay and lesbian culture” (Velikonja 2004: 21). New funding became available, in particular from the city of Ljubljana and the ministry of culture. In 1990, the ‘zines were replaced by the more glossy magazine Revolver (which lasted until 1997, 24 issues in all). LGBT topic were covered in the mainstream media; for example, a popular weekly Teleks started publishing Gay Pages, and a regular program began on the national radio. Finally, members of Magnus and Lilit founded “Roza klub” (Pink club) to pursue purely political objectives: “to abolish and prevent discrimination and to implement the principle of equality.”

But 1990 also saw the end of NSMs as a political entity. Having appeared as a list on the election ballot that year and winning, after a disastrous campaign, a negligible half percent of votes, all groups except the LGBT ones dissolved. New initiatives came up in their place, such as self-help groups, battered women shelters, and crisis hot lines. Squatters in former barracks of the Yugoslav army in the middle of Ljubljana (along Metelkova street) in 1993 spurred the formation of new groups and boosted new projects. LGBT activists have been in the squatter vanguard from the start. The ambiguous concept of “culture” has been retained in the name given to the complex: “Autonomous Cultural Centre Metelkova City.”

Achievements in the legal sphere have been scarce: sexual orientation has been included in the antidiscrimination clause of the penal code as well as of the employment act, and the collection of data on “sexual behavior” has been prohibited by the act of protection of personal data (all in the 1990s). When the new state constitution was written in 1991, sexual orientation was not included in its antidiscrimination clause.

The call for same-sex marriage first appeared in 1989, but no legislative motion was made before 1995, when “the minimalist version” was proposed for consideration, named so because it required the least interventions in the existing law: only the three articles in the act of marital union implying that marriage was a union of different sexes would have to be slightly rephrased, and then the same rules would apply to everybody.

The “minimalist version” was abandoned in 1997 when Magnus and LL, having been invited into a work-group composed of representatives of state institutions (including psychiatry), supported a separate institute for same-sex unions and accepted the draft for a “registered partnership” act written by a teacher of law. Participation in this bust in effect dispossessed the movement of the initiative and handed it over to politicians. Almost immediately afterwards the draft was dismissed, and a private law firm was entrusted to write a more suitable one under the admittedly better name of “same-sex partnership union” act. It was proposed to
the parliament by social democrats in 2004, a month before the general elections. Conservative opposition won, and the new government promptly withdrew the draft from the parliament’s agenda, announcing it would propose an act which would unequivocally distinguish same-sex union from marriage, which they did in June 2005, exactly as declared. The issue has spurred the most primitive kind of discriminatory and sexist rhetoric in recent parliamentary debates.26

**Conclusions**

The new Yugoslav constitution in 1974 decentralized, amongst other things, the regulation of sexuality, and the Slovenian leadership introduced some cautious deregulation. Their decriminalization of homosexuality not only counted on social tolerance to support the act but also relied on social intolerance to counterbalance its possible “negative effects.” Repressive action on the part of the state was unnecessary because, with a little encouragement, “the society” was perfectly capable of doing the job. This theory would prove to be more accurate than they could have known.

As late as 1998, I had a dispute with two Marxist-Lacanian philosophers (who had both been involved in NSMs) when I observed that they had never disclosed, in their authoritative writings about Michel Foucault, the scholar’s homosexuality (Lešnik 1998). Their reply was that this was “private” and unimportant for Foucault’s theory. I disagreed with the latter, too, but that is another story;27 my point was that they had omitted this detail when surveying Foucault’s life, not his theory, while showing no such restraint with biographical data of a heterosexual character in other cases. One could thus only conclude that homosexuality was still somehow degrading – it might even degrade theory. Its positioning in the private seemed only to rationalize this assumption, redress it as a more technical pair of opposites, in which “private,” however, remained essentially equivalent to “mute.”28

The general public would express its views eventually, and in great variety, revealing the predictable result of this policy: misconceptions fortified with fantasies. On the other hand, public support was by no means absent, especially on the outer margins of NSMs, but also from unrelated positions. The complexity of the issue, to which the subtler forms of exclusion contribute a great deal, makes it impossible and unfruitful to estimate the prevailing public opinion about homosexuality. One can only say with certainty that it is split; there is a potential for any position.

Socially established LGBT people felt that bringing their sexual lives out of seemingly protected privacy into the spotlight of public attention would expose them, make them visible and therefore vulnerable. Many believed that their sexuality was a deviation of which one ought to be ashamed. This would not lead them to support the movement but to oppose it, or at least make them ambivalent.

The movement sprang from between these worlds, as it were. As LL would later emerge from the groundwork of Lilit, so too the whole LGBT movement emerged from the groundwork of NSMs. The initiative was first developed by a close circle of fellow activists who agreed on the general principles of inclusion and antidiscrimination, and who could identify with an oppressed minority at least on the issue of oppression. With this support, the initiative would then spread out to the public that was less than receptive. The movement did not start in private, grow in numbers, and then reach out to the public with reasonable requests; it started in public with a handful of people on the unquestionable premise of equal rights, inviting people to come out and seize them.

The situation from which the initiative evolved could justly be called “queer,” if such a word existed in the Slovenian language. On the edge of Eastern Europe, accustomed to travel abroad both to the East and to the West, equipped with technology that could be smuggled in or
bought on the extensive black market (which would become openly tolerated in the last years of the communist rule), and with a good view on contemporary trends, “crossing borders” became a natural living condition for many urban Slovenians of all generations. This is what the Magnus initiative represented in the sexual field.

There were NSMs that did not link up with ŠKUC-Forum, for example the ecologists, but the ecological initiative was never absent from the concept of “culture.” By the same token, rather than isolating LGBT issues from other NSMs issues, Magnus in effect “queerified” NSMs; the initiative was legitimate within their frame, it was put side by side with other initiatives, and activists from other movements espoused it no less.

Apart from a major leap in the late 1990s with a youth group project, the movement has grown slowly but steadily. More than a dozen groups have emerged, calling themselves gay and/or lesbian or LGBT.29 But the circumstances have changed, especially sexual morality. Sexual liberty was forgotten, giving way to discourse on sexual violence and abuse. The age of consent has been raised discreetly (to 15, for all). This surely manifests a problem with sexuality rather than with sexual orientation, but with the rise of “fundamental” religious values, grafted with extreme nationalisms, the degrading concept of homosexuality has also re-emerged, this time in a louder voice. Religious leaders have joined the far right in caustic public statements. A Catholic church-based group advertising the renunciation of homosexuality started in 2004, after an attempt to frame itself within the GLBT movement.

“Crossing borders” in sexual terms (but not only in those) has fallen out of favor. Without this element, the original initiative cannot be properly understood. The term “sexual orientation” was used somewhat loosely to signify options, not to mark off people. “Gay,” “lesbian,” etc., were considered as nothing more than formulations of sexual desire. It was only gradually that the movement has taken up “identity politics” and shifted from crossing borders to defending territories. Arguably, this shift coincides with the onset of the fight for positions within the movement, but it might also be argued that “defending territories” and “fighting for positions” are inherent in any social action anyhow. Evidently, what must also be taken into account is that the movement has lived with that mother of changes, the change of regime. There are many faces to this change, but one of them is certainly this: it has been a transition from a world in which it could be dangerous to speak out loud to the one in which it is difficult to make oneself heard. The most recent debates in the parliament furthermore suggest that the process of “liberalization” is not irreversible, especially since the “liberalism” upon which it started was itself of a contradictory, self-defeating kind.
Notes:
1 In the first group were Croatia, Montenegro, and the autonomous province of Voivodina. Serbia (together with the autonomous province of Kosovo, which had been made its integral part by then) decriminalized homosexuality in 1994, Macedonia in 1997, and Bosnia a year later.

2 (Personal communication from a former state security serviceman.) In the Soviet Union, by comparison, prosecution for sodomy (which was the actual crime there) and its use for besmirching persisted until the mid-80s. The penalty could be years of imprisonment in what is (still) officially called “labor and correction camp.” The law was revoked in 1993. Homosexuality (in men and women) was considered a severe personality disorder requiring compulsory hospitalization. (Cf. Klejn 2001.)

3 A spokesman for the change, quoted in Velikonja 2004: 7. This publication is the best source of the movement’s chronology.

4 Personal observation from an institution of mental health.

5 This is only a brief presentation of their “mainstream” points of view, beside which there was of course a wide range of positions on both sides.

6 This film, Stanko Jost’s “Dečki” (“Boys,” 1974), was shot in the Super-8 format. The other films mentioned above are Boštjan Hladnik’s “Maškerada” (“Masquerade,” 1971) and “Ubij me nežno” (“Kill me Gently,” 1979), and Maja Weiss’ “Čuvaj meje” (“Frontier Guardian,” 2002).

7 One of the few films that have been banned in Yugoslavia combined both. “W. R. or the Mystery of Organism” (1971) by Dušan Makavejev (a reputable Belgrade director) is a narrative on the connectedness between sex and politics inspired by Wilhelm Reich, and instantaneously became a cult classic. Foreign films were treated in the same way: Visconti’s “Death in Venice” had no problem, nor had Pasolini’s films – except, of course, “Salo.”

8 This term came to wide use in 1985–1986, along with “alternative movements,” and often overlapped in use with the term “civil society,” since they were at the time the rare vocal groups that were not organized by, or within, statutory structures.

9 Beside individual men and women who were locally known or suspected of unorthodox sexual orientation, there was a circle of Catholic artists in Ljubljana, whose central figure, Ivan Mrak, wrote plays with homoerotic imagery and allusions. “They looked rather strange,” a witness has recalled (personal communication). “I could never identify with them, even though I was into theatre myself. I did sometimes imitate their ‘deep,’ allegoric style, because it attracted some boys, but being a child of the sixties, I was turned off by their somber apparel, which gave me the impression of a nineteenth century Freemason lodge. They looked as if they possessed a secret of timeless importance but utterly abstract. My own interest in sex was much more concrete.”

10 Art that is prescribed, commissioned, sanctioned, and used by the state, such as the works of “socialist realism” in the Soviet Union since 1930s and in many other communist countries after 1945.

11 See literally any issue of the film journal Ekran and the philosophical journal Problemi in the 1980s. However, there is a lot more to say about their impact in other fields and disciplines.

12 These included the usual “alternative” places as well as prominent houses of culture, which put their parts of the program on their respective budgets.

13 G. Hocquenghem (1972), Désir homosexuel. Paris: Éditions universitaires. The author had been expelled from the French communist party, together with his action group, for trying to place the homosexual issue on its agenda.


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Alongside Rosa von Praunheim, for example, one finds such unlikely titles as William Friedkin's “Cruising.”

This is an example of how concepts were coined, usually crossing the very boundaries they were designed to guard.

The name was taken from the Hebrew myth of the first woman (before Eve) who refused her sexual duties in the divine order.

For example, even though endless jokes about clitoral and vaginal orgasms in the weekly Mladina that supported NSMs were primarily intended to sneer at political correctness, they had a telling tendency towards triviality.

It started with a leaflet in 1985, which was the first such publication in a communist country. Through the youth organization's facilities it was distributed in every primary and secondary school in Slovenia.

When NSMs were mentioned by officials, the usual list was: “The peace movement, the feminist movement, the ecological movement, and so on.”

Personal communication.

Ironically but not unexpectedly, the “defenders of Yugoslavia” themselves brought the federation to an end.

No charges were pressed in either case.

In a recent book on NSMs published by liberal democrats (in pre-election time), which focuses on the period 1986–1988, the extraordinary assembly is never brought in connection with the “congress affair,” and the initiative about sexual orientation isn’t even mentioned (Balažić 2004: 146–147).

The argument was that sexual orientation was implied in “any other personal circumstances” that concluded the list. But this argument did not enter the preamble of the clause either.

A good story should end with a denouement, but let ours end with a mystery: the new (conservative) prime minister was the same person who spoke for the decriminalization of conscientious objection at the ŠKUC assembly in 1987.

The legitimate (Foucauldian) distinction between a “writing body” and the author as a discourse-generated position only implies that one cannot be simply reduced to the other, not that there isn’t any relation between them.

Both authors claimed they kept to Foucault’s own view. It is true that he had never explicitly come out in public, or admitted he had AIDS from which he died in 1984. But it would be an illusion to think that by doing so he avoided involvement in what he named “confession games,” because the choice between “to confess” and “not to confess” is undoubtedly one of them, as may be seen precisely in the case of coming out.

They include Magnus (gay, 1984), LL (lesbian, 1986), Roza klub (gay & lesbian, 1990), Kasandra (lesbian, 1993–2000) Legebira (LGBT youth, 1998), “DiH” – Society for the Integration of Homosexuality (LGBT, 2003), Lingsium (LGBT youth, 2004), four or five subsidiaries of these, and a couple of commercial enterprises. The “informal association of homosexual couples Yoldashimm” made its only public appearance in 1993 when its members addressed the Constitutional Court with the initiative to assess the constitutionality of the act of marital union and family relations that excluded same-sex couples, but they subsequently withdrew the initiative before the case was heard.
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY: “KAOS GL” AS A SEXUAL IDENTITY ORGANIZATION

Mustafa Kemal Coskun and Tuba Ozkan

Introduction

According to classic sociological theory, social movements emerge as a reaction to structural and economical problems, and modernism. These movements have been interpreted as struggles gain access to social welfare, political power or social opportunities. For instance, from a Marxist point of thinking, social movements are believed to focus on the working class. Movements of the working class are seen as instrumentally based actions concerned with matters of economic redistribution. Whereas old movements are movements led by a particular class and articulate the interests of the working class, the new social movements (NSM) may involve people from many economic classes and are interested in achieving a collective good that would enhance the quality of life (Kitschelt, 1981; Melucci, 1980; Offe, 1985).

Besides trade union and nationalist activism, a plethora of NSMs such as feminism, environmentalism, human rights activism, cultural, ethnic and sexual preference movements have emerged, one after the other. It has been suggested that the social movements that developed in the second half of twentieth century have no economic base and thus they cannot be explained by the socio-economic structure of modern society. Contrarily, it has been said that agents of these movements have not aimed for political power, but direct activity at only cultural domains like identity or citizenship rights. According to Larana, Johnston and Gusfield (1994), the domain of movements related to peace, the environment, sexual identity, anti-nuclear and gender issues – movements that have different features and that have been called NSMs – have been explained like those movements connected to ideology, organization and rationality concepts. The realities of the NSMs showed that traditional concepts and explanations are not capable of describing current social movements. According to Larana, et al, these movements cannot be viewed as ideological movements or as rational points-of-interest groups. Here, we argue submitted that NSMs are related to identity/difference politics and are concerned with a revolutionary transformation of the system.

As a matter of fact, NSMs are the result of the transition from “industrial society” to “post-industrial society, or from “organized capitalism” to “disorganized capitalism.” These movements differ from the “old” working class movements, by their focus on issues such as culture, identity, autonomy and quality of life. Because of these aims, NSMs compete with worker movements (Dalton, et. al., 1990). These movements represent a new form of social protest and reflect specific properties of advanced industrial societies (Walsh, 1988; Adam, 1993; Rose, 1997; Pichardo, 1997; Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987; Pakulski, 1993). NSMs are also seen as a reaction to the deficiencies of Marxism (Epstein, 1990; Plotke, 1990). The movements analyzed by NSM researchers are the “urban social struggles, the environmental or ecology movements, women’s and gay liberation, the peace movement, and cultural revolt linked primarily to student and youth activism” (Boggs, 1986: 39-40).

This paper aims to constitute a theoretical framework to analyze a sexual preference organization, “KAOS GL” (KAOS Gays and Lesbians community) in Turkey. The lesbian and gay movement was chosen because it is considered to the quintessential identity movement (Melucci, 1980; Duyvendak, 1995). Data were obtained from interviews with participants in KAOS GL.
New Social Movement Theories

The theoretical and empirical literature on current social movements is quite thorough. Scholars engaged in the study of social movements have attributed certain characteristics to these movements. New social movement theories, according to Buechler, can be classified according to “cultural” and “political” versions.

The cultural version of new social movement theories are represented by scholars such as Habermas (1984), Laclau and Mouffe (1992), Inglehart (1990), Touraine (1988), Melucci (1995), Castells (1996) and Cohen and Arato (1992). We call this version as “the break approach” since it is post-Marxist in its presumption of a more radical break between past and present social movement forms and its emphasis on the decentralized nature of power and resistance. The “cultural approach” focuses on daily life, civil society and the formation of free spaces between state and civil society (Buechler, 2000: 48). The most important characteristic of this cultural version, lies in its argument that the old worker-based constituencies for social activism have been transcended along with industrial capitalism.

We hold that NSMs are alternatives that are replacing class struggle. For example, according to Laclau and Mouffe, NSMs are result of the new hegemonic formation that emerged after World War II. This hegemonic formation is based on an intensive accumulation regime (commodification), welfare state (bureaucratization) and mass communication (homogenization). These new developments caused new antagonisms: contrary to class-based antagonisms like labor-capital conflict, the new antagonisms are not class-based because they have spread through a capitalist way of life. Therefore, we cannot speak of “one central antagonism,” but of “antagonisms,” or of “one central subject,” but of “subjects.”

Class conflict is only one of these antagonisms. NSMs are expressions of people’s resistance to these new antagonisms (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992: 201; Bertram, 1995: 89). Similarly, Habermas asserts that class identity is no longer important in political struggles because of changes in social progress (Habermas, 1986: 119-121). With Habermas, who attributes a continuity to modernism contrary to postmodernism, “break” theories can be seen as paradoxical, yet Habermas appears to agree with a “break” thesis in his distinction between the social environment or “the life-world” and social systems or “the system world” (Habermas, 1976; 1984). NSMs resist colonization of the life-space and conflicts result from colonization. According to Habermas (1981: 33), NSMs should be seen as deviations “from the welfare-state pattern of institutionalized conflict over distribution.” Mainly concerned with the “grammar of forms of life,” the new movements are said to be essentially engaged in conflicts over the quality of life, equality, individual self-realization, democratic participation, and human rights.

Noteworthy examples of the cultural version of new social movement theories can be found in Touraine’s and Melucci’s works. Touraine argues the notion of society should be excluded from the analysis of social life while the concept of “movement” should be at the centre of sociological study (Touraine, 1988). Moreover, he argues that the post-industrial, programmed society stands at the heart of contemporary social movements. In a programmed society, power and domination are produced by the control of culture and information, and thus, antagonisms and conflicts emerge from the cultural and moral arenas, rather than economic ones. In a programmed society, the dominant class is the technocracy, and workers cease to be the main challengers of the status quo. The key class conflict is socio-cultural rather than socio-economic; it revolves around the control of knowledge and investment. A social movement is “the organized collective behavior of a class actor struggling against its class adversary for the social control of its historicity” (Touraine 1981: 77). In this respect, the transformer “subject” in a programmed society is a new social movement because the concept of social movement takes the place of the concept of the class. In this society, the “revolutionist subject” is no longer “working class” but “new social movements” (Touraine, 1995: 274-282). For Melucci,
contemporary activism reflects the semiotic aspects of a post-modern information society. The social realities of these collective movements make traditional political categories impossible and necessitate new analytical methods (Melucci, 1995). According to Melucci, NSMs have six major characteristics:

1. NSMs are multi-dimensional phenomena that pursue diverse aims and influence various levels of a social system;
2. NSMs are not concerned with production and distribution processes; rather, they challenge the administrative system on symbolic grounds;
3. NSMs are self-reflexive actions;
4. NSMs have a planetary dimension; they display global inter-dependence and trans-national dimensions;
5. NSMs rely on a specific relation between latency and visibility; and
6. NSMs bring about institutional change, new elites and cultural innovation (Melucci, 1995: 112).

One of the basic problems of the “break” theories is peculiar to Western nations and advanced capitalist societies (Pichardo, 1997; Mesazros, 1989). For example, Habermas’s and Mouffe’s theories are dependent on development and welfare state conditions; in Touraine’s works, the programmed society based on the production of symbolic goods is emphasized more. Additionally, the effects and activities of NSMs have been changing in countries that are highly postmaterialist, such as the Netherlands and Germany. These two countries, both with strong NSMs belong to the EC countries with the lowest percentage of respondents reporting participation in acts of civil disobedience. Conversely, France, one of the more ‘materialist’ EC countries, has the highest level of reported participation in such typical unconventional forms of protest (Koopmans, 1996). At the same time, although Turkey is not a society composed of postmaterialist values, NSMs like feminist and environmentalist movements appear. This is a contradiction not easily explained by current social movement theory. Another problem is the sharp distinction between conflicts and antagonisms, and the relations of economic production. Thus, new social movement theorists tear economic production from social totality and for them, capitalism is no longer a structural totality.

The political version of social movement theory draws on the most promising neo-Marxist scholarship to argue that the central societal totality is advanced capitalism and that there are strong connections between advanced capitalism and the emergence of NSMs (Buechler, 2000: 48). This version of new social movement theories can be named the “continuity approach.” According to this theory, NSMs can be a potential power for progressive change if appropriate coalitions and alliances between class-based and nonclass-based movements can be forged. This approach identifies the social base of NSMs in terms of class (Buechler, 2000: 48). New antagonisms are reflections of the conflict between labor and capital. Scholars such as Offe (1985; 1988), Wallerstein (1993) and Raymond Williams (1989) best represent this version of NSM theory. For instance, Offe alleges that NSMs are the result of “the structural proliferation of social conflicts” (Offe, 1988: 31). Under advanced capitalism, three types of conflict set these apart from traditional labor-capital conflict:

1. Conflicts that emerge as a result of the domination of technological rationalism;
2. Conflicts that emerge as a result of the domination of bureaucratic rationalism; and
3. Conflicts that are caused by the family and patriarchy (Offe, 1988: 31).

These conflicts cannot be reduced to class struggles but constitute a total system with labor-capital conflict. Meanwhile, also according to Offe, the values of NSMs like freedom, equality, participation, peace and solidarity are not “new” but are ethical norms inherited from progressive movements of the working class and bourgeoisie. Therefore, NSMs cannot be “anti-modernist” or “postmaterialist,” but are modern critiques of modernization (Offe, 1985: 835-836;
Bagguley, 1992: 31). Offe compares NSMs with historic, class-based movements in respect to their actors, themes, values and modes of action. The actors of NSMs are groups and individuals gathering around various themes on behalf of diverse sections of society. The themes raised by NSMs are peace, environment and human rights. NSMs highly value individual autonomy and identity over central control. Finally, NSMs enjoy an internal informality, minimum differentiation and external protest policies based on demands (Offe, 1985).

Wallerstein attempts to link production and non-production spaces: for example, the inner logic of capitalism with racism and gender relations. There are two basic characteristics of capitalism: first is augmentation of waged labor in order to enlarge the surplus value, that is proletarianization; and second, is to create structural stratification in the waged labor in order to decrease the price of labor. Thus, sex and racial discrimination contribute to a stratified/differentiated-wage labor that favors capitalism. Capitalism forces everyone to participate in waged labor, and re-produces race and sex discrimination in the labor force in that process of proletarianization (Wallerstein and Balibar; 1993: 47-49). Capitalism cannot support discriminatory practices that exclude women and ethnic minorities from waged labor. However, an egalitarianism that eliminates stratification in the waged labor force is also dangerous. Therefore, for Wallerstein, social movements that challenge race and sex discrimination have the potential power to threaten capitalism.

The following table illustrates the basis characteristics and differences between these two versions of NSMs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Break Approach</th>
<th>The Continuity Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• NSMs appeared as a critique of socialist ideology, the modernization process, and the welfare state</td>
<td>• Demands (i.e., for peace, environment and human rights) of NSMs are reactions to problems that emerged from the class structure of capitalism and are not autonomous from economic structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NSMs are middle-class based movements</td>
<td>• NSMs are composed of old and new middle class, unemployed, students, retired and based on the alliance among these classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NSMs are identity-oriented initiatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NSMs display decentralized and less hierarchical modes of organization</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As it can easily be seen, the literature on NSMs and their distinctive characteristics is not only abundant and varied, but also considerably subjective. The two types of NSMs discussed in this section will be used as a referential framework for the rest of the article. The KAOS GL in Turkey will be analyzed with reference to these approaches. In this respect, the answer to the question of which theory applies more to the KAOS GL organization will be the main focus.

**Democratic Openings And New Social Movements In Turkey**

Discussions about democratization in Turkey usually begin with the absence of a tradition of civil society. Several have noted that a civil society never existed in Turkey because it lacked associations, foundations and movements (Dodd, 1992: 28; Bora and Çağlar, 2002: 337; Heper, 1991: 45; Kucukomer, 1994: 124; Saribay, 2000: 48 and 62; Mahcupyan 1996; Insel, 2003). For some scholars, the weak-civil society along with strong-state tradition in Turkey constitutes obstacles in the way of democratization (Barkey, 2000; Ergil, 2000). This tradition situation is largely a legacy of history: the state acted almost completely independently from civil society and the state constituted the primary context of politics (Keyman and Içduygu, 2003: 223). According to these approaches, the absence of a liberal state form and structure is one of the most important political issues in Turkey, a historic relic of the Ottoman Empire (Heper, 2000: 45).
Turkey should, therefore, be considered a “tutelary democracy” which is hindered in its development and democratization (Szyliowicz, 1966: 283; Ergil, 2000).

Thus, Turkish political tradition has characteristics of “continuity” rather than “break.” Besides the strong-state tradition, the place and the function of the military in the Turkish body politic since the founding of the Turkish Republic must also be considered in order to fully comprehend democratic processes in Turkey. Unlike Western armies, the Turkish military is politically autonomous and can operate outside the constitutional authority of democratically elected governments. Sakallioglu points out that “the hallmarks of the civilian world, according to the military, are its praetorianism, instability, careerism, populism, lack of prudence, corruption, and irresponsibility” (Sakallioglu, 1997: 153).

The relations between the state and society began to change after 1980. For instance, according to Gole, while “a state-centric modernization” proceeded from the 1920s to the 1980s, after the 1980s, the focus of political practice shifted toward “society-centric modernization,” or from the state to society (Gole, 2000: 434). The legitimacy of the strong-state tradition was the source of a political crisis that began in 1980 (Keyman and Icduygu, 2003). 1980s have witnessed new international pressures towards economical adjustment. As the world economy becomes integrated with unprecedented speed and intensity, countries such as Turkey are finding that they have little choice but to adapt their economies and policies based on the imperatives of this new global system (Kasaba and Bozdogan, 2000). This new order has partially eliminated the state-centered economic policies by bringing its domestic political structure in line with international norms.

The emergence of NSMs in the 1980s began a period in which Turkey underwent great social and economic transformations. Although the government pursued a state-centered import-substitution policies prior to 1980, after the military intervention of 1980, Turkish economy adopted new integration policies towards global economy. Turkey had long followed a liberal, export-oriented, economic policy. This policy remained in effect until the mid-1980s.

However, because of rapid population increase, insufficient work opportunities and poverty, millions of young and unemployed people started to migrate to the large cities, especially to Istanbul and Ankara. More than half of the population now lives in squatter houses in the suburbs of large urban centers. Poverty and unemployment rates increased. But this rapid social-culural, demographic, political and economic change engendered even deeper changes in the moral, political and cultural values of society. Class structure, status, religious and cultural values and groups changed, diversified and restructured in the 1980s (Simsek, 2004: 119). These transformations contributed to significant qualitative and quantitative increases in civil society organizations, new social movements and many disadvantaged groups to organize. The most known social movements developed in Turkey are Islamist, Feminist, Environmentalist, Ethnic and gay and lesbian movements. The KAOS GL organization is one of these groups to emerge as a result of latest developments in Turkey.

A New Social Movement in Turkey: Example Of KAOS GL

The Goals of KAOS GL

The Turkish gay and lesbian liberation movement emerged from the interaction of the international gay and lesbian movement and the changing socio-political situation in Turkey. The socio-political changes mentioned above in Turkey were catalysts for the organization of gays and lesbians to fight for political, cultural, social and democratic rights. This movement appeared in Turkey after 1990, although it appeared in the late 1960s in other parts of the developed world. In Turkey, the first gays and lesbians came together at universities and at specially designated places; later, they tried to become more visible through journals, peri-
odicals and the Internet. They gradually organized into more effective associations and sought visibility through social activism, political meetings and demonstrations.

There are several organizations of gay and lesbians in Turkey. These include LambdaIstanbul, Legato, Bears of Turkey, BearAnatolia, Spartakus, Sappho's Girls and Venus's Sisters. Among these groups, KAOS GL is the most effective, well-known and oldest. KAOS GL has a clear connection to all of them. In September 1994, KAOS GL was established by two gay men in Ankara. The founders say that the “KAOS GL aims to create their identities and their lifestyles [by] refusing heterosexual male power. This is a political standing” (http://www.kaosgl.com).

The work of gay and lesbian groups outside of Turkey has clearly shaped the claims of KAOS GL. This group claims to be interested in all of the problems experienced by gays and lesbians. This claim demands KAOS GL to base its work on the lived experiences of homosexuals in Turkey and on an indigenous heritage. Thus, they aim to improve the status of gays and lesbians against the social, moral and cultural climate of Turkey. “A. E.,” one of the founders, explains the goal of a local belonging:

Homosexuality was being seen as a thing, a phenomena coming from the West, with Western origins. For example, Necmettin Erbakan, who is a famous politician, and was prime minister a couple of times, said that what to come from West to Turkey is only homosexuality. However, this approach towards homosexuality is not only attributable to Turkish people, but it also experienced by other people in the world as well. During World War II, the Nazis killed homosexuals in the belief that homosexuals were Communists or Russian spies. Similarly, Stalin said that “homosexuals are spies of the West” while sending them to the prisons and mental hospitals. The dominant ideology in Turkey was similar. We are not the homosexuals imported from abroad. To counter these perceptions about homosexuality, KAOS gathered together homosexuals who are ordinary: students, workers, etc. The concepts of a homosexual movement, of emancipation for homosexuals, or for homosexual liberty were used by KAOS for the first time in Turkey. It was assumed that homosexuality was peculiar to metropolises, Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir in Turkey. However, our periodical is bought in these metropolises and in little cities. All homosexuals in Turkey have noticed that they have a gay or lesbian identity and they have a right to be visible, to speak.

The basic goal of KAOS GL is to demonstrate that homosexuality should be accurately perceived and acknowledged. Another goal of the group is to develop a united and adversarial political movement. KAOS GL perceives homosexuality “not only as a sexual preference, but also as a political preference and they refuse to be stereotyped as slangy public usage of ‘homosexual’”. Their periodical emphasizes that Turkey is a heterosexist society, that people are classified in terms of social categories based on gender in a patriarchal, capitalist society, that this heterosexual-patriarchal dominant ideology is the result of a stratified society, and that this ideology is reproduced by capitalism. In sum, the group focuses on strengthening and developing a sense of identity among its members and on reaching our to the wider gay and lesbian community.

Structure and Participants

KAOS GL is accessible to all homosexuals, bisexuasl and heterosexuals – whoever is willing to challenge to the politics of sexuality. However, this organization does not include transsexuals and transgenders. “Z. E. “ explains:

Majority of us are students. We have a lot of problems overcome. We have no time to be interested in the problems of transsexuals and transgenders. We hear that there are a lot of pressures on them, but a more organized structure and movement is needed to address their problems.
We observe that KAOS GL is composed primarily of students and of middle-class individuals with high salaries. The majority of participants speak at least one foreign language and have university degrees. However, KAOS GL is a little group composed, of 20-30 people. There is no hierarchical order in KAOS, and thus there is no leader or boss; rather, it is an informal and unstructured group. Volunteering is important to participation in its activities. The ages of the members range between 20 and 30 years old. Members of KAOS GL consider problems in “coordination meetings.” The group reaches decisions by consensus after long debates and persuasion, not through vote. The individuals who participate in the coordination group live openly as homosexuals. They have also explained their homosexual preferences to members of their family and to their friends, that is, they have “come out.”

KAOS GL appreciates the importance of electronic networks for communication in contemporary social struggles, and largely benefits from information technology in its campaigning and internal political work. KAOS GL group has a website, www.kaosgl.com, with thirty subscribers, that is used in order to debate the problems of gay and lesbian workers. About 10 to 15 people are responsible for activities in the group. KAOS GL divides itself into working groups focusing collectively on projects such as “organization,” “academy,” “library,” “periodical” and “projects.” These groups come together once a week to present their work at coordination meetings.

Although the founders say that KAOS does not have a hierarchical structure with a leader or boss, two members of KAOS GL are natural leaders; they are dominant and more effective in the group because they take full responsibility for organizing communication among the members, for setting up meetings and for determining the meeting agenda. Other members have limited responsibility for meeting affairs. As a matter of fact, we observe that some participants cannot openly express their opinions and they do not a voice in debates. Thus, members of the group are not entirely in accord with each other in terms of ideas and aims. Some members think that insincerity, impertinence and mistrust are widespread in the group.

A lot of members have left the group in the last ten years because of personal disagreements. As a result, the number of the group members changes continuously and only four members regularly attend. According to “B. E.,” one of the members, explains the fluctuation in membership this way:

The dominant members of KAOS expect that everyone should behave according to the dominant people's preferences. Perhaps, it will be best if we had a boss. The different ideas and behaviors are not tolerated and different people have been even identified as the “other” here. There is not homosexual solidarity, no friendship in KAOS. For example, if I face violence because of my homosexuality, I do not think that KAOS would support me.

The aim of the KAOS GL community is “to create a united social movement with a political and ethical preference.” However, we observed that the intentions and the aims of the group are generally unknown to the majority of members and are not accepted by others. According to these members, KAOS GL is a place to find friends and lovers. We conclude that some gays and lesbians do not join KAOS GL just because they see homosexuality “as a way of life” or “as political or ethical preferences”. On the contrary, they feel that they belong to KAOS GL because it serves a social function. KAOS GL must bring the expectations of these participants in harmony with the group's aims. Furthermore, one of the lesbian members complains that the group has too political an approach to sexuality and other problems:

In my opinion, some gays and lesbians left the group because the KAOS GL organization has a certain political preference towards some issues. For example, some opponents within the group think that this is an unreasonable discourse especially when KAOS GL states that the group is taking side of exploited and poor people.

Therefore, some members criticize participation in annual May Day meetings and demon-
strations. In spite of this criticism, individual members of KAOS GL maintain close relations with leftist or socialist parties. KAOS GL, as a group, however, has no formal affiliation with these parties.

The founders of KAOS GL draw a line between themselves and the homosexual individuals outside the group. "L. E.,” a homosexual who does not participate in the group, critiques the existing structure of KAOS GL:

KAOS GL must listen to people coming to the association. If KAOS GL does not listen, it will continue to stay a small group. The methods of communication of KAOS GL with homosexuals are wrong. It behaves like a teacher in its treatment of homosexuals from outside the group, and it is really cold toward us. KAOS GL wants their members to wear a uniform. This is wrong.

In this manner, we observe that KAOS GL has failed to create a common language among homosexuals in Turkey. The members of the group critique and accuse non-member homosexuals for their “unawareness” of their own political-social positions within the society. This unawareness is strongly related with their perception of homosexuality as a sexual preference. There is, then, competition and conflict between the individuals both in and outside the group.

Activities of KAOS GL

The primary activity of the group is to publish a national periodical available in all cities, and the second is to organize member meeting in different places. Besides these, KOAS GL activities include organizing conferences and conversations about sexuality, homosexuality, AIDS, feminism, homophobia and human rights, and to participate in May Day and International Women's Day marches, as well as anti-war and anti-NATO activities. A leaflet explained their reasons for participating in May Day Marches:

We, women who love women and men who love men, are here. We are homosexuals. While one male worker and one female worker are being married in the strike square and they are adding their loves to their struggles, have you ever thought that Ahmet (male) who loves Ali (male) or Hatice (female) who loves Ayse (female) are in the same strike square? Do you have any idea how they feel? We are everywhere: in villages, metropolises, factories, schools and the streets. Homosexuals are not deviant or sick, but capitalist society and its system is deviant, sick and harmful. Either we will be emancipated together, or we will be corrupted together.

Finally, KAOS aims to establish a gay-lesbian student network for discussing the problems of gay and lesbian students and preventing homophobia in the curriculum. KAOS also fights for organizing gay and lesbian educators and school workers. The group directs projects addressing human rights, homosexual rights, parents whose children are homosexual, problems of working life, media relations, psychological aid for gay and lesbians, law and education. Additionally, the group provides shelter to unemployed people and workers.

Conclusion

Considering this data, should KAOS GL be categorized according to the “break” or “continuity” theory of new social movements? The answer is that it is both, according to the criteria formulated in the theoretical section.

The members and devoted actors of this organization are mostly students, urbanized and from the old and the new middle classes. According to Offe, it is based on the alliance among the classes. However, as appropriate to break theories, KAOS GL demands recognition in the public sphere and tries to create a homosexual identity and way of life. Thus, it can be said that KAOS GL is a post-material and identity-oriented movement. However, members are aware that the heterosexist-patriarchal dominant ideology that oppresses their identity is the result of
the stratified society and that this ideology emerges from the class structure of capitalism and is reproduced by capitalist society.

The issues raised in KAOS GL go far beyond a mere reaction to heterosexism and homophobia and the group is demanding new things for its community. They seek particularistic goals of their own rather than totalizing goals for the whole society. Additionally, it is possible to say that KAOS GL is organized in a decentralized structure. They hold congresses and constitute platforms and initiative groups. However, it is not successful in bringing gays and lesbians together, in bringing about new perspectives and ways of thinking to their participants, and in organizing from below. As we can see, not all gays and lesbians want the same thing and do not insist on the same demands. In spite of its decentralized structure, there are natural bosses or leaders in the group who sometimes seriously hinder the development of democracy within the group and deliberation among members.

On the other hand, old Marxist groups and some socialist parties approach KAOS GL with suspicion. Before founding KAOS GL, a number of members had participated in the New Leftist and Marxist organizations such as ODP (Freedom and Solidarity Party) and TKP (Turkish Communist Party). Although some socialist parties such as DSIP (Revolutionist Socialist Worker Party) and ODP have invited KAOS GL to work with them, KAOS GL has refused this invitation, since its members are not at the disposal of these organizations. There are also people who have opposing political ideas such as anti-socialists, anti-communists, anti-anarchists and the anti-Kurdish movement in KAOS GL as well as socialists and anarchists. Nowadays, KAOS is not connected with the leftist or socialist parties as a formally affiliated group although some of its members are.

KAOS GL, in the future, may be an embryonic example that different types of organization are possible. However, in contrast to examples in Europe, the gay and lesbian movement in Turkey is not an archetypal NSM. Instead, it is a kind of hybrid, combining features of both “old” and “new” and both “continuity” and “break” theories, in the context of the construction and defense of identity. At the same time, gay and lesbian movements have not been very effective in Turkey. Time will show whether they will cause the substantial transformations and re-structuring in Turkish society.
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Notes:

1 Klandermans 1990 argues that differences between old and new movements are blurred.

2 D’anieri, et. al. 1990 and Rose 1997 argue that NSMs are not peculiar to advanced industrial society.

3 See Pichardo 1997 for critiques about this argument.

4 According to Rose (1997), theories explaining these movements fall into three broad camps: New class theory, new social movements theories and cultural shift theory. In this paper, we are engage in the new social movements theories.
Feminism and Its Impact on a Couple’s Life

Maria Nicoleta Turliuc

The present study tries to point out several aspects: the main feminist claims and objectives on an international scale, their “naturalization” and peculiarities in the Romanian context, the degree to which feminist ideas are accepted by the young and also their perception of the impact of feminist ideas on a couple’s life, including sexual aspects.

Feminism and its Problems

Both in practice, as well as in its discourse, the feminist movement is characterized by an impressive diversity. Women’s fight for emancipation, like that of minorities, has agglutinated in time in the form of more and more courageous actions, which have outlined a philosophical and socio-political trend with implications on an international level.

Without elaborating too much on this aspect, we will say that, in defining and understanding feminism we must begin with two conceptions: feminism as a theory or ideology of equality between sexes and feminism as an activity organized with the scope of enlarging or obtaining new rights. Both as a theory and as movement, the feminist trend has appeared and developed especially in the western cultures. The attempt to eliminate sexual discrimination implied a difficult, gradual process, which has generated changes in the legal system that legitimated the woman’s distinct identity, separate from that of her husband: her right to property, education, to practicing several traditionally masculine occupations, to vote, to prosecute and claim damages etc. The feminist excesses and exaggerations have, however created a strong rejection coming from a large number of persons.

Feminist researchers of intimate life have underlined the fact that “the normality of a couple’s life is installed together with the equality of partners/spouses regarding housework—which does not abolish the complementary aspects of gender roles – and professional projects. The woman would not still be condemned to personal sacrifice in favor of others, but could follow her own professional realization, autonomy, and adequate, fair cooperation with her partner/husband in domestic activities and in raising and educating children.

More recently, by accepting the existence of gender differences, feminism has emphasized the definition of feminine peculiarities, the development and valorization of women, the construction of alternative organizations for women, and the full entry of women into the globalization process (Manuel Castells, 1999).

Feminism in the Romanian context

In the Romanian context before 1989, women were encouraged and even obliged to join the working force. They were given the possibility of instruction, social services specially designed for child education and surveillance were created, even if access to contraception was limited, and abortion prohibited for a very long period. Also, women’s organizations existed in all fields and levels, even if they were subordinates of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, equality in rights was only a formality, as sexist attitudes were still present in society; the patriarchal system still dominated the institutions, and social and political life.

Following the fall of the communist regime, an organized feminist movement did not exist in Romania, and the old women’s organizations disappeared. Anyway, despite the developments in many other ex-communist countries, the Romanian “feminist movement” was reduced to some groups of intellectuals trained in the West, professors: researchers or leaders
of NGOs. After 1989, the feminist influences led to the creation of specific organisms intended for the problems women had to deal with, organizations and institutions that would provide an overflow of claims, ideas and pressure in favor of women. On the other hand, even if they were not so numerous, these organisms could not claim to be speaking only on women's behalf.

The percentage of women in the Romanian public life is still extremely small in comparison to the rest of the South / East European domain, even if it there has been a slight and relatively constant tendency of increasing the number of women in the two chambers of the Parliament and Government, from 1992 to the present. Even so, Romanian women do not seem too tempted to follow politics and to crystallize their individual autonomy through collective action and identity. Moreover, as a consequence of making public some of the side effects of the feminist movement, of experiencing and becoming aware of them, many of the Romanian women (intellectuals) avoid being associated with the feminist movement. They are tempted to justify their lack of solidarity with the collective feminist actions by denying the existence of discrimination and sexist attitudes, which in reality they are faced with in many different situations. If they do recognize the existence of such problems in public, then they are ready to ascribe them to other representatives of the feminine gender. It is as if the lack of "real" personal motives would absolve them of the guilt of undermining the cohesion of the feminine minority and of not upholding its fundamental interests. This whole state of matters caused Laura Grünberg (1997) to allege that Romania is "just" a "discretely sexist" country.

Men, on the other hand, seem to be ready to admit, both formally and publicly, the justice of the fundamental claims of the feminist movement. It is still to be seen if this admittance is an intimate, private one. Why is the public conformity of men regarding the equality of rights of the two sexes relatively high? It may be their desire not to appear weak and vulnerable, "dependent" on their special status or maybe it is their need to show themselves as progressive and open to change. In any case, this is how things stand in all countries that have advanced equality of rights between the sexes.

In Romania, the feminism is better known (and more acceptable) as a political theory, and not as specific intellectual thoughts about feminine sexual identity. Even if in western cultures feminism existed as a diverse group of theories, in Romania “the singular” is acceptable and has some meaning. Some feminist theories have not apparently drawn scholars’ attention or created public debate. Perhaps our still strong sexual taboos prevent us from talking about the real core of feminist thinking, about feminine identity, sexuality or pleasure, maintaining a superficial image of feminist works.

The access of women to financial and sexual autonomy – their liberation, be it slow and relative, from the domestic restraints and the appearance of new intimate lifestyles – represents a historic process that affects Romanian women too, a process that has generated a crisis in the traditional gender roles and in the Romanian family core. Women's emancipation helped men become aware of the fact that through the way they perceive women – especially their wives or partners – they actually express themselves. These slow changes, whose deployment has become more and more rapid these days, have marked the family and the lives of couples.

The hypotheses and the research design

The main objectives of this study are establishing the degree to which young people accept feminist ideas and their perception regarding the impact of these ideas on the couple’s life (including sexual aspects). The attitude towards feminism was underlined by means of a questionnaire we have built, in which subjects expressed their degree of approval or disapproval with some items that express some of the main premises of feminism. The subjects’ opinion regarding the influence of feminism on married life were marked out by a qualitative analysis of the free responses given by the subjects in relation to each of the feminist ideas. Afterwards,
we asked the subjects to assess the impact of feminism on the couple's sexual life using a novel scale that we built, taking into account their freeform responses.

The research hypotheses are:

- There are differences between the degrees of accepting feminist ideas depending on the sex of subjects, women being more willing to accept the feminist ideology than men;
- Subjects do not have a clear, distinct idea regarding the influence of feminism on the couple's life; their opinions are divided and there is no equal distribution between the answers given by the entire group;
- There are differences between men's and women's opinions regarding the influence feminist ideas have on the couple and family life; and
- There are differences between men's and women's opinions regarding the impact of feminist ideas on the sexual life of intimate networks.

Professors and students from several faculties of Al. I Cuza University in Iasi developed the instruments and their application. This scale (see research methods below) was tested on a group of 197 subjects, 100 women and 97 men. From the Department of Psychology were 65 students, 35 women, 30 men; from Philosophy, 62 students, 30 women, 32 men; and from Theology, 70 students, 35 women, 35 men. A second scale was tested 160 students from the university, 80 women, 80 men. All subjects were volunteers.

Research methods: The Instruments

1. The first test involved an assessment scale for the attitude towards feminism based on the Lickert type. In building the scale we asked experts engaged in gender research in the departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Languages, to identify some of the main ideas of the feminist movement, especially those that could have a direct influence on the couple's life. A numeric value for each of the 24 select items which constituted the questionnaire were assigned. After the pre-testing the correlation coefficient was 0.80, for a total of 20 items, therefore we had to eliminate four of the items. We added to each of the 20 items an open-ended questions regarding the influence of each idea on the couple's life.

2. The second test was an evaluation scale designed to measure the impact of feminist ideas on the couple's sexual life. In building this scale, we asked students enrolled in the course "The Psychology of the Couple and Family" to name three to five main consequences of feminist ideas on the sexual life of an intimate couple. From the analysis of the frequencies of the subjects' responses we kept those responses overrepresented in comparison to the average frequency, to which we added a Lickert type scale. Finally we asked the subjects to assess each of the items with pluses (+) or minuses (-) to evaluate the effect of the idea as positive or negative.

Results and discussion

H1) There are differences between the degrees of accepting feminist ideas depending on the sex of subjects, women being more willing to accept the feminist ideology than men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>70.9072</td>
<td>-6.737</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>78.82</td>
<td>-6.727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to verify the hypothesis we used a T-test for independent samples; the data obtained confirmed the research hypothesis, as there are several statistically significant differences between the two groups, with p value smaller than 0.05. This difference shows that men are
more unwilling to accept feminist ideas in comparison to women, who accept them more. Of course, men are interested in preserving their status, women being the social actors engaged in the process of changing their role and position in private and public spheres.

H2) Subjects do not have a clear, distinct idea regarding the influence of feminism on a couple's life; the opinions are divided and there is no balanced distribution between the responses of the whole group.

We have used a Chi-Square test to verify this hypothesis, as well as to analyze the distribution and the degree of its balance. The data obtained as a result of the test are presented in the table below; taking into account the significance level, which is smaller than 0.05, we can say that the hypothesis is confirmed. See Tables 2a and 2b.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymp. Sig.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymp. Sig.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 16.4
b. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.9
c. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 19.7
d. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 24.6
e. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 24.5
f. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 21.9
g. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 28.1
h. 0 cells (0%) have expected frequencies of less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 32.8

Thus, for Item 1, that women have the same capacity for controlling their emotions as men, the Chi-Square test value is 155.142, p = 0.00. Therefore, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed along the 11 categories (the number of liberty degrees), the majority of responses tend to the category “balance.” Women’s self-control capacity is considered by subjects a factor of balance in the couple’s life.

For item 2, that women are equally capable of thinking as logically as men, the Chi-Square test value is 193.69, with p = 0.00. Therefore, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed along the 10 categories, the majority of responses tend to the category of “communication.” Subjects consider that women’s logic thinking influences the level of communication between
the two members of the couple.

For item 3, that a woman can be strong and does not need the protection of a man, the Chi-Square test value is 178.95, with \( p = 0.00 \). Therefore, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed along the 10 categories, the majority of responses tend to “unbalance” the category. The effect of a higher personal strength of the woman is, from our subjects’ perspective, one of unbalancing the relationship with the natural interdependency and mutual support between the partners or spouses being reduced.

For item 4, women must be legally protected from sexual abuse of their partners, the Chi-Square test value is 94.83, with \( p = 0.00 \). Here, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed along the 11 categories, the majority of responses tend to the category of “balance,” with protection – even if it is imposed from the outside – being valued as a factor of balance for the couple’s relationship.

For item 5, marriages between persons of the same sex should be legal, the Chi-Square test value is 237.77, with \( p = 0.00 \). Again, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 9 categories, the majority of responses tend to the category of “warp” – relationships between persons of the same sex are considered anomalous and their legal recognition unacceptable.

For item 6, we must eliminate the sexism in social assessments and of self-respect that support assessments such as “the sexier you are, the more appreciated you will be,” the Chi-Square test value is 228.62, with \( p = 0.00 \). The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 9 categories, the majority of responses tend to the category of “valuing personality.”

For item 7, men’s aggressive and abusive tendencies are consequences of the influence of environment and education and should be corrected, the Chi-Square test value is 88.11, with \( p = 0.00 \). Here, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 7 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “balance.” In other words, subjects think that attenuating masculine aggressiveness can help the balance of a couple’s life.

For item 8, that women should live their lives first for themselves, according to her own objectives and only secondly for those of family, the Chi-Square test value is 210.12, with \( p = 0.00 \). The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 7 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “chilling the relationship.” The woman being more concerned about her own needs and objectives is assessed by the subjects as potentially destructive for the emotional relationship of the partners/spouses.

Insofar as item 9 is concerned, that a woman must be able to support herself and be economically independent from men, the Chi-Square test value is 77.98, with \( p = 0.00 \). Here, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 8 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “material welfare.” The majority of subjects consider that the effect of women becoming economically independent (the ones living in couples) is that of an increase in the couple’s material welfare.

For item 10, that women have the right to initiate and find sexual satisfaction in sexual intercourse, the Chi-Square test value is 127.87, with \( p = 0.00 \). The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 6 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “sexual fulfilment,” women’s sexual initiative being evaluated as positive.

For item 11, that for women to accomplish her social and domestic duties, men must do domestic and social work that was previously assigned only to women, the Chi-Square test value is 129.42, with \( p = 0.00 \). Again, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 8 categories, and the majority of responses tend to the category of “confusion of role.” Subjects’ answers may suggest that, in their view, the complementarity of gender roles is more
useful and necessary for the couple's well-being than a rigid equality (of gender roles).

For item 12, women must be equal to men legally and socially, the Chi-Square test value is 216.45, with p=0.00. The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed along the 9 categories and the majority of responses tend toward the category of “equal chances.” The majority of subjects did not take into account that legal equality confers on spouses or partners equal chances for self-realization in and through the family and couple’s life, together with the professional aspects, and the woman’s recognition as an equal partner in the couple’s activities and decisions.

For item 13, women have the right to free from the husband’s verbal, emotional or physical violence, the Chi-Square test value is 143.21, with p = 0.00. The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed in the 8 categories; the majority of responses tend to the category of “mutual respect.” The majority of subjects consider that the woman’s right to be protected from the husband’s violence represents a very important condition for maintaining mutual respect.

For item 14, a husband who abuses his wife psychologically and physically must be punished, the Chi-Square test value is 217.50, with p = 0.00. The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the eight categories, the majority of responses tend to the category of “separation.” Beyond the legal sanctions, abuse contributes to an emotional break-up between spouses and to the appearance of the tendency of emotional, psychological, physical and finally, legal separation.

For item 15, women’s infidelity must be considered the very same way as men’s infidelity, the Chi-Square test value is 181.11, with p = 0.00. It is well known that the double standard that functions in traditional societies favors the tolerance of men’s infidelity and harsh reprobation in the woman’s case, a fact that feminism considered also a distinct case of sexual discrimination. Here again, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 7 categories, the majority of responses tend to the category of “equality.” The majority of subjects consider that the equality between spouses is instituted also through the equal reprobation or tolerance towards men’s and women’s infidelity.

For item 16, a woman is in no way indebted to a man from a social, domestic or sexual point of view simply because he is a man., the Chi – Square test value is 353.27, with p=0.00. The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 10 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “equality.”

For item 17, women have the right to be involved in politics, the army, races, sports, etc. without being discriminated, the Chi-Square test value is 230.43, with p=0.00. The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 10 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “equal chances.”

For item 18, a woman should not be more emotionally involved in her relationship with the man because this makes her easier to manipulate, the Chi-Square test value is 179.59, with p = 0.00. The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 5 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “chilling the relationship.” The majority of subjects considered that unequal involvement sets the premises for the man subordinating the woman, a fact that induces the woman’s frustration and the “chilling of the relationship.”

For item 19, women have the right to abortion, and should not be stigmatized for having one, the Chi-Square test value is 173.92, with p = 0.00. Here, the subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 10 categories, the majority of responses tend to the category of “collaboration.” The right to abortion (as well as other contraceptive methods) represents the recognition of the woman’s right over her own body. The majority of subjects consider that the women should have the right to abortion, but the decision to abort should be taken with the
husbands’ consent, on the one hand, and on the other hand the two should cooperate in using contraceptive methods to avoid abortions as much as possible.

As for item 20 (It is important for the woman to have one or more groups in which she can find support and entertainment.), the Chi-Square test value is 146.41, with p=0.00. The subjects’ choices are not equally distributed among the 8 categories and the majority of responses tend to the category of “diversity and entertainment.”

Taking into account that the responses are not equally divided between subjects, some categories being underrepresented and others overrepresented, the research hypothesis is confirmed. Subjects do not have a clear, distinct idea regarding the influence of feminism on a couple’s life. Their opinions are divided and there is no balanced distribution between the responses of the whole group.

H3) There are differences between men’s and women’s opinions regarding the influence of feminism in a couple’s life.

In order to verify this hypothesis we used the U-Mann-Whitney Test, a test that compares two independent samples, for nonparametric data. The data we have obtained after comparing the two groups are presented in Tables 3a and 3b below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mann-Whitney U</td>
<td>4125.0</td>
<td>4134.0</td>
<td>3967.5</td>
<td>3101.5</td>
<td>4031.0</td>
<td>4732.5</td>
<td>4745.5</td>
<td>4220.0</td>
<td>4221.0</td>
<td>3952.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilcoxon W</td>
<td>8878.0</td>
<td>8887.0</td>
<td>8720.5</td>
<td>7654.5</td>
<td>8764.0</td>
<td>9485.5</td>
<td>9498.5</td>
<td>8876.0</td>
<td>8974.0</td>
<td>8705.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>-1.837</td>
<td>-1.832</td>
<td>-2.280</td>
<td>-4.411</td>
<td>-2.116</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
<td>-1.925</td>
<td>-1.509</td>
<td>-2.320</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asymp Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.762</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.020</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mann-Whitney U</td>
<td>3798.5</td>
<td>3790.0</td>
<td>3543.0</td>
<td>3718.5</td>
<td>4764.5</td>
<td>4554.5</td>
<td>3887.5</td>
<td>4290.0</td>
<td>4291.5</td>
<td>3629.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilcoxon W</td>
<td>8401.5</td>
<td>8543.0</td>
<td>8296.0</td>
<td>8471.5</td>
<td>9517.5</td>
<td>9307.5</td>
<td>8840.5</td>
<td>9540.5</td>
<td>9044.5</td>
<td>8382.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asymp Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.824</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.002</td>
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</table>

The data suggest that there is a difference between the two groups, but only in the case of items 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, with p < 0.05. The research hypothesis is then partially accepted, as we have obtained significant differences for only 10 out of 20 items. In the case of items 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 19, even if there are differences, they are not significant (see the first column in Table 2b.)

In Table 4, below, we present the categories of responses with the highest frequency, both for women and men. They were selected and presented in comparison, the items in which differences were present being written in bold. The items that presented significant differences between men and women (regarding the influence of feminism on couple’s life) are marked by an X in the first column. Also, in the last column, the items that presented a concordance between the categories with the biggest frequencies are marked with an X.
Therefore, the categories of responses with the highest frequency of women and men, regarding the influence of feminist ideas (maintained in the questionnaire) on couple life are concordant in 11 items: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20 and not concordant in items 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 19.

H4) There are significant differences between the women's and men's assessments regarding the consequences of feminist ideas on the sexual life of women and men, and of the couple as a whole.

In order to test this hypothesis the data from the scales regarding the consequences of feminist ideas on the sexual life of intimate couples were processed with a T test for independent samples, the results being presented in Tables 5 and 6 below. In Table 5, the items are presented in a decreasing order of the frequencies obtained initially and also take into account the implicit selection that resulted from the subjects' free responses.

### Table 4

| Significant differences Item No. | The main categories for men | The main categories for women | Concor- | dances |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------|
|                                  | The largest frequency F     | The largest frequency F     |         |
| 1                                | Balance                     | Balance                     | 27      |
| 2                                | Communication               | Communication               | 32      |
| 3                                | Unbalance                   | Unbalance                   | 17      |
| 4                                | The family's safety         | Balance                     | 18      |
| 5                                | Warp                        | Warp                        | 30      |
| 6                                | Valuing personality         | Valuing personality         | 53      |
| 7                                | Stability                   | Balance                     | 19      |
| 8                                | Chilling the relationship   | Chilling the relationship   | 31      |
| 9                                | Material welfare            | Independency                | 17      |
| 10                               | Sexual fulfillment          | Balance                     | 29      |
| 11                               | Mutual respect              | Gender confusion            | 13      |
| 12                               | Equal chances               | Equal chances               | 17      |
| 13                               | The family's safety         | Balance                     | 18      |
| 14                               | Separation                  | Separation                  | 17      |
| 15                               | Break up                    | Equal chances               | 15      |
| 16                               | Equal chances               | Equal chances               | 21      |
| 17                               | The appreciation of family  | Equal chances               | 11      |
| 18                               | Chilling the relationship   | Chilling the relationship   | 32      |
| 19                               | Mutual respect              | Collaboration               | 15      |
| 20                               | Diversity and entertainment | Diversity and entertainment | 22      |

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>EFFECTS</th>
<th>AVERAGE Women/Men</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. the adoption by women of an active sexual role</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>1.437</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. increase in the woman's sexual pleasure</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>2.788</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. a woman has the right to initiate sexual intercourse</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>1.233</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. free expression of the woman's sexual needs</td>
<td>F &lt; M</td>
<td>-3.247</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. women should control over their own body (the right to decide whether they procreate or not)</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>2.337</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. the woman's right to refuse a sexual intercourse initiated by the partner</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>3.277</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. the man's inhibition</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>4.355</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>8. the diminishing of masculine satisfaction</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>5.073</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. the mutual sexual satisfaction</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>-1.066</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. a better sexual life for the couple</td>
<td>F &lt; M</td>
<td>-2.339</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. the spouses' loosening</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>1.553</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. more diverse sexual interactions</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>1.648</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. encouraging homosexuality (feminine)</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>3.073</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. equality in the field of expressing the sexual will</td>
<td>F &lt; M</td>
<td>-2.735</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. the sexual act becomes more erotic</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>1.121</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. a more profound communication</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>3.257</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. accepting sexuality outside the couple</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>4.254</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. the increase in the degree of knowing each other</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>4.459</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. giving more attention to the importance of the prelude and postlude</td>
<td>F &gt; M</td>
<td>-2.698</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data assessing the type of effect (negative or positive) are presented in Table 6 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>POSITIVE</th>
<th>NEGATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the adoption by women of an active sexual role</td>
<td>There are no such consequences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the increase in the woman's sexual pleasure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the woman has the 'right' to initiate sexual intercourse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the free expression of the woman's sexual needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the women get control over their own body (the right to decide whether they procreate or not)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the woman's right to refuse a sexual intercourse initiated by the partner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>POSITIVE</th>
<th>NEGATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are no such consequences.</td>
<td>the man's inhibition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE COUPLE</th>
<th>POSITIVE</th>
<th>NEGATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the mutual sexual satisfaction</td>
<td>accepting sexuality outside the couple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a better sexual life for the couple</td>
<td>encouraging homosexuality (feminine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the spouses' loosening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more diverse sexual interactions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equality in the field of expressing the sexual will</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the sexual act becomes more erotic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a more profound communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the increase in the degree of knowing each other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Giving more attention to the importance of the prelude and the postlude</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistics denote a partial confirmation of the hypothesis in the case of items: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 19. For all the others, the differences between men and women are not significant. Women registered high scores in items like 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 16 and 18: men got items 9, 14 and 19. The analysis of the results suggests that women seem to have had more to gain in the field of sexual life as a consequence of the impact of the feminist ideas, while men seem to have registered a slight loss at the level of sexual activities. Also, there is a clear tendency to assess as equal the involvement, roles and sexual satisfaction at the couple's level and a significant difference between the high number of positive effects and negative ones, which are less numerous.

Conclusions

Feminism represents not just a movement demanding some social or political rights, but a specific ideology of femininity. Similar to political opinions, the opinions about feminism are not equally distributed between the subjects, but divided. These differences have their origins in different worldviews, which have been developed in different social and cultural, educational or spiritual environments.

Feminism is based upon some coherent principles that, when in contact with the individual's mentality, can create a concordance or a cognitive dissonance; accordingly, the subject will accept or reject them. This dynamic is illustrated by the fact that men agreed less with the feminist ideas in comparison to women, and responded in a smaller proportion to the open questions of the questionnaire, proving that thinking about the effects of feminist ideas on a couple's life creates a certain discomfort for them.

Analyzing the data obtained we could come to the conclusion that there are differences between the ways the two sexes understand feminism. Hereby, women naturally accept feminist ideas to a higher degree than men, which implicitly suggests that women want:

Their right to be similar to those of men;

Their interests to be recognized and protected, even if they do not want to be personally involved in this fight, and that women

Approve the ideas or measures that lead to the improvement of their social, professional or family status, and to the diminishing of women's discrimination and the valuing of feminine identity and characteristics.
On the other hand, based upon the desire – more or less avowed – to maintain their status quo, men cannot accept feminist ideas to the same degree, many of them being possible threats to the privileged male position. This difference between the degree of accepting the feminist ideas can originate in at least two correlated causes:

Feminism representatives have not (always) been capable/diplomatic enough in the way they broached problems, trying to obtain too great a change in too short a time (whereas a long established attitude cannot be changed efficiently in a few years); and

Instead of stimulating the will of change, pressing men activated and made even stronger their resistance to feminist change.

If this is really the case of a strategic error, it calls for reorganization at the level of objectives, their extent and the manner of achieving them.

Change requires time to verify its long-term effects – and change can have both positive and negative consequences. In order to become effective and adequate, changes must take place during a long period of time and they must be made in small steps. Also, not only men but also women have to be prepared, especially those with traditional attitudes, to overcome fear of change and to accept their new roles.

As the feminist claims have changed the woman's social status and, concurrently, the relationships between men and women, it is only natural for the couple's relationships to be implicitly affected. At the level of the entire group, the subjects do not have a clear opinion about the impact of the feminist ideas on the couple's life; they clearly cannot understand the consequences of the changes promoted by the feminist movement, their opinions being divided. In other words, there is not a balanced distribution between the responses of all subjects.

We consider it important to underline the fact that the majority of answers regarding the influence of feminist ideas on a couple's life, answers with higher frequencies, indicated positive effects (in 14 of the 20 items), like: the balancing of the relationship (item 1, 4, 7, 15, 16); more efficient communication (2); a greater valorisation of the partner's personality (6); material welfare (9); sexual fulfilment (10); and equal chances (12,17), emphasizing mutual respect (13), better collaboration between partners (19) and diversity and entertainment (20). The negative effects (mentioned in 6 items) include: the tendency to unbalance (3); moral warp (5); the cooling of the relationship (8, 18); gender confusion (11); and separation (14). The tendency to valorise especially the positive effects is present in the case of both sexes.

Taking into account the free responses of both sexes to the questions regarding the effects of feminism on a couple's life, we ascertained the existence of significant differences between the distributions of responses to half the items (in ten out of 20). Also we have obtained a concordance of the categories with the highest frequency in 11 of the 20 items.

In regard to the capacity of self-control (item 1) and to think logically (item 2), the categories of answers with the highest frequency are concordant, endorsing the balance and efficient communication between partners. If these kinds of qualities are accepted in the case of women by both sexes, when it comes to using these qualities in activities specific to men (item 11), they are seen by women as a factor generating gender confusion. These qualities are appreciated by men and considered the premise for mutual respect, even if the women do not seem to wish this "gender change."

The first significant difference regarding the distribution of answers appears at item no. 3, which discusses the woman's power or her lacking the need to be protected by the man. The woman's independence is perceived by men as having an unbalancing effect on men and, implicitly, on the relationship, because the protection that the woman needs is for the man (at least for the traditional one) a barometer of his utility, the measure of the woman's dependence and the degree of certitude concerning the durability of the relationship. In front of a powerful and independent woman, the man does not feel as sure about the relationship, about the
influence he exerts on the woman and about himself; there appears a diminishing of the man’s confidence in his own capacities. Even if the answers are statistically different, both sexes see the independence of women as something destructive for the couple, as unbalancing the family or the couple, cooling the relationship. Naturally, in the case of men, this attitude is also present in the case of women, proving the lack of courage for women to accept their new role and the lack of confidence that they will succeed; it could also prove their capacity to infer how the men (or the couple for that matter) would be affected by women’s lack of need to be protected by men.

Even if there is the possibility of unbalances to appear, these qualities should be cultivated.

The psychological and affective independence is not accepted in the couple’s life by men, nor by women; on the other hand, economical independence (item 9) does not induce any significant differences, even if it is considered a factor of liberation by women and a source of material welfare by men.

Sexual freedom (item no. 10) is appreciated inside the couple. From the feminine point of view, the woman’s initiative is welcomed, but the idea of feminine infidelity is condemned. The tolerance for infidelity is nil, no matter the sex. Sexual freedom, regarding the choice of a partner of the same sex (item 5), is condemned and considered abnormal by women as well as by men.

Reducing domestic violence and its external control (items 4, 7 and 13) is appreciated as an evolutionary leap, which was also necessary for the development of relationships and for reaching a higher level of communication. This leads to balance and certitude in the family life, while breaking up is a better solution than a family with violent behaviours.

Regarding women’s involvement in other groups (item 20) in which she could find support and entertainment, women’s and men’s opinions are divided – there are significant differences between their answers. If women think of this kind of involvement as an act of social integration, of understanding, of putting away monotony, men see it as a source of conflict. In their case, the fact that women’s source of happiness is no longer just the man, but “something else” too, something unknown, uncontrollable, can induce uncertainty, jealousy, and therefore conflicts. The category with the highest frequency is “diversity and entertainment,” which shows a certain opening of men to women’s other sources of satisfaction, as a way to generate men’s relaxation, as they are no longer the only responsible for women’s psychological welfare.

The impact of feminism on a couple’s sexual life is perceived by the subjects as a series of changes in women’s attitudes and behaviours towards the sexual act, and as the diminishing of masculine satisfaction and sexual activity and other numerous consequences (preponderantly positive) on the couple’s sexual life. If the implications are assessed as positive in the women’s case, they are evaluated as negative in the men’s case, but only by women. The men’s responses show their disapproval regarding the manifestation of these tendencies or consequences when it comes to them. It is as if women fear that their gain becomes a loss for men. Women are also more worried about the negative consequences of feminism on the sexual life of intimate couples. Men, for a change, underline more then women in their answers the idea of equalizing the roles, the involvement, the initiative, and the satisfaction of both sexes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SQUATTER, QUEER AND ALTERGLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT: THE MANY DIVERSITIES OF MULTICULTURALISM

Saskia Poldervaart

Introduction

Two years ago in an article about the Dutch conference “Feminism and Multiculturalism,” I criticized the narrow meaning that multiculturalism and feminism has in most Western countries (Poldervaart 2002). In dominant Western debates, multiculturalism is limited to the integration of non-white and Islamic people into the dominant male, white, heterosexual and middle class culture, as if multiculturalism is not more than differences in color and religion. In this way, the cultures of gay/queer and of protest groups criticizing dominant culture, disappear from the picture of multiculturalism. Feminism was defined by the conference organizers as “striving for recognition of equality, of equal opportunities and equal rights.” This definition is, however, very limited. Most feminists want more! Moreover, such equal rights feminism stimulates in practice the idea that only non-white people have to struggle for feminism because “we, women in the West” have equal rights already. Both restricted meanings (of feminism and of multiculturalism) strengthen the difference between “we” (white, supposedly progressive) people against the “other” (colored or Islamic), make coalition-politics between these groups very difficult, ignore all other diversities among people, and fail to criticize the dominance of neo-liberal politics.

In this paper, I will elaborate the contemporary connections between different protest movements that criticize dominant Western culture. I want to show that just because these movements are influenced by postmodern notions, such as like rejecting uniformity and essentialist identities and taking “responsibility for ‘otherness’” (White 1991), their members really try to bring multiculturalism into practice. Multiculturalism means: different cultures within a society. Physical characteristics or nationality or religion have nothing to do with it (Nottelman 1996: 3). Every society is considered multicultural, because within all societies there are different cultures (between classes, hetero-homosexuals, rural and urban cultures, different interpretations of religions, etc.). Even without colored people, a discourse on multiculturalism is important. Because this conference is about “new social movements and sexuality,” I restrict myself to three contemporary movements that criticize dominant culture: the squatters, queers and alterglobalists. I will start with the squatters’ movement because this movement is the oldest.

The squatters’ movement

When the grassroots activism of the student movement and the autonomous women’s movement diminished in the 1980s in Europe – the feminist (and gay and lesbian) movements became more institutionalized, while the activism of the squatters movement increased. Marxist ideas disappeared and anarchists’ notions became more popular. Especially in the Netherlands, where the government bought different squat buildings after 1982, the threat of eviction disappeared, and all kinds of alternative cultural and political initiatives could arise (Duivenvoorden 2000). Projects, small industries and services started that formed the basis of the typical squat subculture: grocery stores, bookshops, clothing shops, hairdressers, tool
rental stores, bike repair shops, health project offices, feminist centers, galleries, music studios, free radio, etc. “Back then it was no problem at all to live in what might be called a squatted zone for almost 24 hours a day; even on holiday you could travel to squats in other European countries” (Kallenberg, 2001: 92-93). But by the end of the 1980s, things changed. Because of new “anti-squat” legislation, property owners could easily evict the squatters; currently most squats exist for only a few months. Therefore, it is now harder to establish concert halls, restaurants, shops and other provisioners. Some groups choose to move into legalized squats, where they organize their cooperative of “Volkskeuken” (People’s Kitchen, vegan food for a few euros), squatting consulting centers, info cafés, etc. Another reason why most of the workshops and other provisioners ceased to operator or chose a legal format is that social services no longer tolerates extended unemployment, or the performance of useful or pleasant volunteer work while receiving full unemployment benefits. Squatters are idealistic, but also strategic: in order to survive, they constantly have to use the possibilities the system unintentionally offers them.

The Dutch squatters movement was a big movement between 1976 and 1984. Squatters were large in numbers and well organized into neighborhood groups; they had political power and staged spectacular riots, and thus gained a lot of media attention. The squatters’ movement disappeared as a media phenomena after 1984, after the eviction from their biggest building Weyers. However, the legalized squats and networks survived and became fertile grounds for other initiatives and experimental ways of life (Kallenerg: 95). Out of the squatters’ movement sprang “the” movement: a network of squats, communally owned houses, food co-ops, Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS: working for each other without exchanging money), music bands, festivals, action groups, research groups, mobile kitchens, groups helping refugees, etc. Within this movement, a few thousand people are now on the move in Holland. Some of them participate out of political motives, while others participate because this lifestyle pleases them. They want to express and realize their desires outside of mainstream ideology of the market and the State and to live their own way of life collectively. (ibid).

At the end of the 1980s when the media declared the squatters movement dead, another important change occurred. Activists in “the” movement explicitly rejected the idea that they all agreed on one ideal with a common political program or had one shared utopia. Yet, as Jean François Lyotard has pleaded, the desire to create something different here and now still remains (White, 1991). There is an ongoing discussion about the necessity of creating an alternative economy, how life can be de-economized, how you can help other people and have a good life yourself, and how the street should be used for more than just automobile traffic but also for fun, dance, laughter, social contacts and love. Using the Do-it-Yourself (DIY)-culture of the punk movement, “the” movement shows that everyone can make music, records, and ‘zines. Just do it. There are enough places to live in; you only have to occupy them. Today’s movement is relatively open and lacks the pressure of uniformity that was characteristic of the earlier squatters’ movement (and the women’s and gay movements). In their network of friendships, the contemporary squatters undermine the prevailing relations of production, society, politics, family, the body, and sex. You cannot locate “the” movement permanently, but it manifests itself in the occupation of public spaces that give it meaning temporarily as non-commercialized public meeting places. Lacking a single clear goal or program, you can observe a multitude of struggles.

In the 1980s, the squatters’ movement not only became “the” movement through the involvement of all types of political and social networks, but also the site of a fierce feminist struggle. “In no other movement has feminism played such a big role as in the squatters movement” (Huijsman, 1989, p. 221). Feminist activists organized themselves in autonomous women’s groups within the squatters’ movement; at the same time, they criticized the male squatters
continuously for their attitude and behavior. “In the squatters’ movement the men in particular are changed by the feminist women” (ibid, p. 250). In the journals of the squatters’ movement, much was written about feminism. However, the regular media did not pay attention to this aspect of the movement. Therefore, only a few people know that half of the squatters have been and are women. Similar to feminism, the slogan, “the personal is political” and the idea “politics start in daily life” became central concepts in the squatters’ movement (Kallenberg 2001, Van Tricht 1995). In this alternative way, the predominantly male squatters’ culture changed into a culture that was more open to women’s daily life experiences.

In the 1980s, the squatters’ movement had some active lesbian and gay groups too. Because the unconventional way of life and appearance of the squatters, dressing in all kinds of gender-bending clothes, seeing boys with make-up and girls with bald heads was not unusual. By the end of the 1990s, these gay groups seemed to have disappeared, replaced by people who identified themselves as queers. One squatter-queer told the researcher Van Ree (2004):

For a long time sexuality wasn’t a hotly discussed item in the squatters’ movement, but nowadays it is. […] We queers are the needed color for the scene. Now the word queer is on the lips of everybody, but in the years before sexuality was considered in a more conservative way. Last year I was involved in radicalizing Dutch sexual minorities by organizing special parties. Others have the idea that this isn’t political enough and organize something for people on a more philosophical queer level.

Another squatter said: “Queer is an effort to make the struggle more playful” (ibid).

Van Ree states that “the” contemporary (squatters) scene in the Netherlands shares many similarities with the radical gay scene of the 1970s in the U.S, as described by Patrick Moore (2003). Moore shows the rising role of pleasure in the growth of homosexual culture in New York and San Francisco in those days. Similarities to the contemporary squatters’ scene are, according to Van Ree, the pleasure of doing things together (listening to music, cooking, dancing and drinking) and the use of old buildings and dark, scarcely lightened places. Van Ree concludes that both movements protest against the normalizing culture and clean surroundings. With these critiques on dominant culture, I consider both movements as parts of the multicultural discussion.

The queer movement

There are similarities and differences between queer theory and the queer movement. Both are developed from gay theoretical and political priorities, are inclusive in scope, and incorporate not only gays and lesbians, but also bisexuals, transsexuals, transgenders and, indeed, anyone or anything not one hundred percent conventionally heterosexual or traditionally “gendered.” However, whereas queer theory seeks to destabilize all identities, queer politics often becomes an affirmation of identity, mobilized for strategic purposes. Queer identity is thus provisional and contingent, defined in relation to the heterosexual presumptions it seeks to unsettle: “Those who knowingly occupy a marginal location, who assume a de-essentialized identity that is purely positional in character, are properly speaking not gay but queer (Jackson, 2003: 70). This emphasis on de-essentializing identities shows that queer theory and queer practices to some extent, hinge on some important aspects of postmodernism (Turner 2000: 30). In queer theory and the queer movement, common beliefs and traditional theories about gender and sexuality are contested and considered as concepts that can be deconstructed. Queer theory is oppositional to all binary categories (female-male, gay-straight) and wants to change the fixed character of these categories.

Queer was originally a word of abuse for gay people. But William S. Burroughs, the famous
Beat writer in the years 1950-1960, took back this word as a title of honor for all sexual minorities (Kosman, 2004, p. 17). In 1991, Teresa de Lauretis, a feminist film theorist coined the term “queer theory.” Later, Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick contributed to the theoretical concept.

Queer theory also has its critics. For example, Stevi Jackson (2003: 70) and Merl Storr, 2003: 157) state that queer theory is limited to the extent that it takes place at the level of culture and discourse, paying little attention to social structures and material social practices; in queer theory, the material economic conditions of society and culture have been lost. Jackson adds that Judith Butler’s ideal, a world of multiple genders and sexualities, does not envisage the end of gender hierarchy or the collapse of institutional heterosexuality. Other critiques of queer theory, for example, those of Max Kirsch (2000), are similar to those made by some feminists against postmodernism, who hold that social action can not take place without a clear (female or gay/lesbian) identity; because of a destabilization of queer identity, collective action and organization are hardly possible.

Yet a big international queer movement now exists (just as the feminist movement did not disappear when it criticized the fixed female identity). However, it has taken years for the gay and lesbian movement to grudgingly accept transsexuals, transgendered people, drag queens, even bisexuals into their movement; they were largely treated as embarrassments in their fight for tolerance, acceptance and equal rights. Aaron Devor and Nicholas Matte (2004) give a clear description of this struggle in the United States from the 1970s through today. In particular, in the lesbian and feminist movements, hotly contested battles arose over the question of whether or not male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals are “women” for the purposes of inclusion in “women-only” organizations. “Transgendered and transsexual people have posed the greatest challenges to gender definitions at a historical moment when women in general, and lesbians in particular, have begun only recently to feel that they exist as political players in their own right” (Devor/Matte, 2004: 181). Many lesbian-feminist organizations have insisted on a definition of womanhood that leaves no room for women who were born male. For example, at the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival, a five-day women-only annual event that started in 1976, trans-women and trans-men attempted to attend the festival and set up an informational and protest “Camp Trans” outside the gates of the festival from 1991 until 2003. The organizers of the festival eventually bowed to pressure and said that anyone self-defined as a “womyn-born-womyn” would be allowed into the festival.

In addition, the combined gay and lesbian movement has proved resistant to aligning itself with transgendered and transsexual people. Since 1997, more consistent progress toward unity had been made, with various gay and lesbian organizations expanding their mandate to include transgender perspectives. On of the earliest U.S. groups to do so was the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, which in September 1997, amended its mission statement to include transgendered people. PFLAG, Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, expanded its scope in 1998. Transgendered activists were invited to speak at the Millennium March for Equality in Washington, D.C. in April 2000, after an extensive struggle. One result of this fight over identity occurred in March 2001, when the Human Rights Campaign, which calls itself “America’s largest gay and lesbian organization” amended its mission statement to include transgendered people. Devor and Matte explain the important contributions of transgendered and transsexual people to the queer movement by showing the historic relationships between transgender and homosexual groups in the U.S. They argue that much of the recent growth of gay and lesbian pride was built on an ethnic-like gay identity that necessarily defined inclusion by excluding others. This “pride” was created at least in part to counteract a society that taught gays and lesbians to be ashamed of who they are. But as they have found their pride, many retreated in shame from the transgendered and transsexual people who had always been
among them. Their idea of “You’re Strange and We’re Wonderful” remains a dark corner in the struggle for gay and lesbian rights. Transgendered and transsexual people have understood the need for alliances and have made many important contributions to the fight for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered rights (Devor and Matte, 2004: 202).

However, although the struggle for “rights” remains important, I think the importance of queer theory and movement is that they want more than just rights. Michel Foucault states:

Human rights regarding sexuality... are not solved now, still I think we have to go a step further: the creation of new forms of life, relationships, friendships in society, art, culture and so on, through our sexual, ethical and political choices. Not only do we have to defend ourselves, not only affirm ourselves as an identity but as a creative force. (Foucault 1989/1996: 383)

You can see this “more” already in the slogan on T-shirts of queers that read “Queer, the privilege to imagine more.” Gwen van Husen believes that the aim of queer theory is to queer (the whole) culture. She concludes after her research on the people attending the Queeruption festival in Amsterdam (June 1-7, 2004), however, that the queer scene limits itself to its own queer culture and appears unwilling to queer mainstream society (van Husen, 2004:13). I will elaborate on this.

In April 1990, Queer Nation was organized by four gay men in New York, born out the radical action group ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power) directed for the struggle against AIDS (Seidman 1997: 192). Their slogan was, “We’re queer. We’re here. Get used to it.” In an early leaflet, Queer Nation stated, “Queer means to fuck with gender. There are straight queers, bi queers, tranny queers,lez queens, fag queers, SM queers, fisting queers in every single street in this apathetic country of ours” (Whittle 1996: 196). Within a short time many people became active in Queer Nation. They distributed leaflets in shopping centers with the slogan: “We’re here, we’re Queer, and we’d like to say hello.” They went to heterobars for kiss-ins.3

Saying “I am queer” challenges the categories of mainstream society, so that a new category – or categories – that criticizes all existing, fixed, categories, is needed. This criticism opens up fresh perspectives, according to Beck: “It is impossible not to be inspired by the queer: the diversity of queer strategies and perspectives testifies to the enormous creativity and imagination of American ‘post-gay’ undertakings in language, theory, art and actions” (2003: 281).

Other organizations, similar to Queer Nation, were set up, but most disappeared within a few years. Despite their brief existences, these organizations, “represented an important change in LGBT [lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender] activist politics and continues to influence how we organize and think about our struggles and communities” (http://www.4edu.info/LGBT/ESL_16.1_queer.htm, 25-5-2004).

In the past few years, queer culture has become a global phenomenon. “The globalization of capitalism and the economic forces that sustain it have necessarily led to globalization of queer culture” (Kirsch 2000: 77). In this international movement, “Queeruption” was organized in 1998; it is an annual festival of queer culture. While some Queeruption gatherings are communal and others more spread out, some held in the city and others in rural areas, the overall effect is one of building radical queer communities, locally and internationally. Ongoing discussions within the community include topics of race, class and cultural exclusivity, ableism (discrimination in favor of the able-bodied), gender binarism/transphobia, and the reproduction of oppressive sexual norms within radical communities (http://www.queeruption.nl/index2.htm).

In 2004, a Queeruption festival was held in Amsterdam. In their announcement, the organizers stated: “Queeruption is for expression and exploration of identity, climbing over the artificial boundaries of sexuality, gender, nation, class, against racism, capitalism, patriarchy and
Van Husen interviewed a dozen visitors and saw three important themes for these queers; I describe them below (p. 9-11).

The first theme is the notion of outsiderhood. All interviewed queers expressed the feeling that at some stage of their life, they did not quite “fit in” the neat categories of mainstream society or their local cultures. When society deems an individual as deviant or abnormal, he/she can either opt for a process of adaptation or actively choose to reject the norms of society and take a certain pride in being an outsider. Then, the search for those with a common identity or experience starts. This notion of being an outsider keeps gatherings like Queeruption together. However, W. B. Turner (2000: 8) states that because most individuals will experience a failure to fit precisely within a category, this experience opens up the possibility that we’re all queer. Many queers told Van Husen they did not fit into the mainstream gay and lesbian culture because they either refused to identify as man or women, or as gay or lesbian. They consider the gay and lesbian scene conservative and commercial. A lot of them connected their own position in relation to other oppressed groups. This feeling of solidarity seems to form one of the cornerstones of a community such as Queeruption (Van Husen 2004:10).

The second theme is freedom. Closely connected to the sense of being an outsider is the need for freedom. “The right to be oneself” thus becomes a mechanism for self-protection rather then a call for equality” (Kirsch 2000:122). Van Husen observed that a lot of visitors did not even venture out of the squat building in which Queeruption took place. Their aim seemed to be to create a temporary “Free Place,” where queers had the freedom to be themselves. “The whole atmosphere at Queeruption to me was one of squatters on camp” (p. 10). These queers showed unwillingness to change mainstream society and preferred to isolate themselves in their self-created special place.

The third theme is a close connection to the anarchist squatters’ movement. Van Husen was surprised to see how the two scenes, at least in Amsterdam, overlapped, although not all queers are part of the squatters’ subculture and not all squatters identify themselves as queer. Some queers told her they ended up in the squat scene through their taste of music, or by frequenting squat parties. Others explained this link through political affiliation; for them, being queer automatically means having a radical left political orientation because the political right denies them their peaceful existence. Other queers stated that the personal freedom within the anarchist movement made it into the one scene where queers could express themselves. According to Van Husen, both the queer and anarchist movements are cultures of resistance; they share the same rejection of sexism, racism, and other inequalities in mainstream culture. The DIY aspect in Queeruption comes directly from anarchic ideals of “the” squatters’ movement and some queers believed that anyone unwilling to participate in DIY was not welcome in Queeruption.

This point shows a weakness in the multiculturalism discussion: how open are the different
cultures of resistance to people who participate in the dominant culture?

*The Contemporary Queer Scene in Amsterdam and the greater Netherlands*

Queeruptation is, of course, not the only queer activity in the Netherlands. Van Husen mentions eight other gatherings or events and lists their websites when available.

1. Queernight, every Monday in the Vrankrijk squat in Amsterdam (www.vrankrijk.org).
2. Ladyfest, a festival organized by hetero and lesbian/queer women who call it queer, punk, independent, was held in different squats in Amsterdam in 2002 and 2003, with another scheduled for 2005 (www.ladyfest.org).
3. The Pink Lighthouse organizes various queer squat parties at various (mostly squatted) locations in Amsterdam (www.squat.net/pinklight).
4. Kitty, a queer alternative music night is held on the last Saturday of every odd month at the ACU (a legalized squat) in Utrecht (www.acu.nl/kitty).
5. Queeruquerque, a small group also in Utrecht, is connected with anarchist activities.
6. The Planet, is a queer underground dance party at the OCCI (connected with “the” movement) in Amsterdam; it is organized by Spellbound productions (www.spellbound-amsterdam.nl).
7. The Noodles hold an event the third Sunday of the every month. They also organize the Queer Café at Saarein, known as a “women’s/lesbian bar,” in Amsterdam (www.Noodles.nl).
8. Artlaunch was a queer festival night held in May 2004 at the Melkweg, a publicly funded alternative space in center of tourist Amsterdam. The focus lay on music, performance and visuals (www.artlaunch.nl).

Only the Noodles and Artlaunch events are unconnected with “the” (squatters’) movement. From 2003 on, many queer activities and initiatives arose, mainly in Amsterdam (see Rianne Neering, 2004: 36). On the one hand, the queer scene in its expressed solidarity with all other oppressed groups, is open for all kinds of people. On the other hand, saying “I am queer” excludes other people and goes against the destabilizing quality of queer theory. While queer theorists seem to be more open than queer activists to the possibility that straight people can be queer as well, it seems that queer activists, at least the Dutch examples discussed here, are especially connected with the anarchist (squatters’) movement. In this way, they exclude non-anarchist queers. At the same time, because “alternative social practices” are very important in the queer movement, this movement is connected with (the DiY part of) the alterglobalization movement.

*The alterglobalization movement*

In November 1999, after the “battle in Seattle,” a social movement came to the media’s attention that was quickly labeled the anti-globalization movement. However, this movement is not against globalization, but strives for globalization in another way, organized bottom-up instead of top-down. It was described as something totally new. But it would be wrong to think that this movement suddenly formed in Seattle, just as it is incorrect to think that activists had discovered a new theme and that this movement only consists of people from rich Western countries (Van Stokrom 2002: 37).

Long before 1999, all kinds of action groups started in the “developing” world of the South (Kingsnorth 2003: 172-173; 312). These groups soon connected with affinity movements in the North, which were fighting against the globalized and centralized powers of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union; demonstrations had been held in Berlin in 1988, in Madrid 1994, and elsewhere in Europe almost every year since then. Older activists, particularly those who mobilized for “Jubilee 2000,” and those affiliated with peace
movement organizations such as the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (founded in 1917), traced their opposition to globalization back to the early 1980s mobilizations around third-world debt, and related struggles for economic and social justice in Central America and other developing regions (Smith, 2001: 4).

In addition to these more formal social movements, all kinds of informal groups were organized. They started actions against the commercialization of almost every aspect of life. In 1984 Adbusters (culture jamming) in Canada and the United States protested the prevalence of billboards in public spaces; in 1995, British activists began “Reclaim the Streets,” actions turning the streets in public places for people, not cars. The rise of the Zapatistas in Chiapas gave new inspiration to the whole movement. This Mexican group sent their manifesto against NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) out to the world via the Internet on 1 January 1994. In the summer of 1994, and again in 1996, the Zapatistas invited “leftist activists, youngsters, women, gays and lesbians, people of color, immigrants, workers, farmers around the world” to discuss new ways of thinking about power, resistance and globalization with them (Klein 2002: 177-188). The meeting of 1996 resulted in the foundation of the People Global Action (PGA) and many attendees at this meeting would play key roles in organizing the 1999 Battle for Seattle.

The contemporary alterglobalization movement has different parts, which use different strategies. You can roughly distinguish the Do-it-Yourself-activists, the more formal Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), including the trade unions, and revolutionary socialists. In spite of the predictable troubles between the various parts of the movement, they were able to work together by respecting diversity. This coalition of different movements is a new phenomenon in the history of social movements. However, because only the DIY approach has clear connections with the squatters’ and queer movements, and because it is just these movements who are practicing another, non-dominant, culture, I will concentrate on this part of the alterglobalization movement.

DIY activists try to realize their ideals in the here-and-now. Although the DIY concept was “invented” in the North, many poor groups of the South use the same strategy. The Zapatista activist Esteva has addressed this:

People have been disillusioned with the ballot box for a long time, here and all around the world. And yet they are disillusioned too with rebels who come with guns and say: “give us the state, we will do it better.” So what are we seeing in Chiapas? It is an alternative to both – a new notion of doing politics. You could call it radical democracy. People take their own destinies into their own hands (in: Kingsnorth 2003: 42-43).

The Zapatistas’ ideas about “taking your own destinies into your own hands” influenced many other groups around the world. An activist from Durban, South Africa told to Kingsnorth:

We feel it’s time for new approaches. As a movement we need doing things ourselves, you know, Zapatista-style. Taking it back: communities doing it themselves, instead of always reacting to whatever shit the government gives them (ibid: 102).

A women in the Brazil Landless Movement (MST) states: “People have to work for their own transformation, making their own answers” (ibid: 257). In the North, DIY activists emphasize the importance of “free places” – public spaces that do not belong to commercial trade and industry (Klein 2002: 204). All these activists have in common a creation of their own alternatives, protesting against the commodification of everything.

Analyzing the publications of these various organizations and movements, I distinguish seven characteristics of the DIY-section of the alterglobalization movement. First, I note a rejection of “collective identities”: because identity is considered a process of creating and main-
taining borders (between women and men, gays and heteros, black and white people, etc.) and encourages group conformity (Heckert 2002), the ideal is to strive not for a single identity, but for many identities. The concept of identity is changed into affinity (McDonald 2002). The most important thing is not to be something together, but to do something together; not where you come from, or to which group you belong, but what your aim is (Holloway 2002). In this way, the DiY-activists criticize the existing intentional communities because, in general, most of these “communes” do not make a conscious effort to reach out to people who do not share their political and/or counter-cultural views. Unlike these communities, DiY-alterglobalists plea for “breaking out of the ghetto, to take up the challenge of putting into practice the importance of diversity, sacrificing the security, predictability and simplicity that come from relatively closed and homogeneous collective identities (Abramsky 2001: 554, my italics). The “free places” they see as alternative political and socio-economic spaces have room for differences and do not have precise boundaries and identities.

The second characteristic is personal change and that politics starts in daily life. The rejection of collective identities does not mean that identities are no longer not important. It does matter whether you are a “woman,” a “colored” person, “homo” or “lesbian,” or your economic situation. Although the feminist slogan “the personal is political” is used in the alterglobalization movement, and DIY is described as “personal” politics (Kingsnorth 2003: 327), until recently not much attention was given to feminism and the gay/queer movement. Only some alterglobalist men recognize feminism as their forerunner: “The feminist movement tried to show us new insights and practices but we have generally managed to ignore them” (de Marcellus, 2003: 6). However, things are changing as emphasis is placed on personal politics. “Self-criticism and personal change are not apolitical – refusing to be what the system requires you to be is a profound and powerful form of direct action” (Subbuswamy and Patel 2001: 543). The activists also recognize that they too are influenced by “the system”: “we have to eliminate all forms of oppression and domination within our own circles” (Abramsky 2001: 562). Therefore they emphasize that politics starts in daily life.

The third characteristic is that DIY activism consists of networking and fluidity. John Jordan (2002) describes that what was emerging in the mid 1990s as a decentralized “movement of movements” held together by poetry, stories and relationships, rather than programs and ideology. This was a complex web of inspiration rather than coordination. The desire for self-organization and self-determination is both the means and the ends of this movement of movements. The ideal is to be ungovernable.

The fourth characteristic is that the movement is global and local. According to Klein, never has a movement been so international while at the same time so local (2002). Because of this emphasis on local initiatives, DIY activists reject the idea of one central program. They do not construct social models with one vision of utopia, because to do so would be the same model used by neo-liberals (Klein 2002). They want to respect the autonomy of groups and that do not fit into one universal model for everybody.

The concept that revolution has many different meanings is the fifth characteristic. The DIY-part of the movement does not strive for “unity” and it rejects power in its traditional meaning. “Revolution is not a moment in the future in which the power is taken from the ruling class, but is a social process that is lived daily in the here and now” (Longo Mai 2002). As the Dutch-Belgian journal Mba-Kajera uses as its slogan: “Revolution is not to overthrow the existing system, but the creation of something new.” “The starting point is not how to oppose capital, but how to build a better life beyond it” (Jordan 2002). These ideals are expressed and brought into practice in “free places” in many squatted buildings, in more legalized “social centers” as in Italy, in the communities organized by the Piquetero-movement in Argentina, and by the Zapatistas in Mexico.
The sixth characteristic is the goal of DIY-activists to deepen the quality of relations between people by creating diversity. One of the means to do this is the narrative, story-telling structure of their actions that allow activists the possibility of telling personal stories (McDonald 2002). The movement has learned that a web of testimonies and experiences is more important to stimulate the imagination of people than to command them (Jordan 2002). In their story-telling cultures and in their rejection of the conquest of power, the movement gives a lot of attention to language. Above all, the Zapatistas have proven that it is possible to develop a new language of resistance – a language that is full of imagination, story-telling, and riddles and paradoxes, rather than known securities (Holloway 2002). Another means for creating better relations between peoples is the continual emphasis that people often show altruistic behavior, and that people will do things for each other, even though there may be no benefit for themselves (de Marcellus 2003). In this way, they fight against the idea that people are only calculating citizens, a tenet of neo-liberalism.

The final characteristic is their emphasis on fun and the “struggle against the theft of the public by the private”. (Kingsnorth 2003: 319). The importance of fun can been seen in their language, their clothes – during actions they wear mostly pink and silver (Evans 2003) – and their music. They consider frivolity an important tactic in their overall strategy. The importance of the public is seen in the actions of Adbusters who protest against the commercial pollution of public places and in actions by “Reclaim-the-Street” activists used the streets for all kinds of activities. The alterglobalization movement can be described as “a struggle to reclaim space” (Kingsnorth, 2002: 319). The plea of alterglobalists is similar to those noted by Gert Hekma in his essay in this volume: a plea for a public sexual culture that would be pleasant and good for the safety of the citizens and for the integration of different groups.

To sum up: The DIY activists of the alterglobalization movement try to create something new that is independent from government institutions, without commercials, and organized “from below”. They network between a multitude of projects in the North and the South; their projects consist of creating “free places” in which non-capitalist ways of thinking and acting are stimulated by story-telling, imagination building, helping each other, fun making, rejecting securities, reclaiming public spaces for more than automobile traffic and respecting the autonomy of different groups. I believe this work in affinity groups – in which unity is not prescribed, diversity and a plurality of alternatives are emphasized, and personal politics are practiced – can be considered a truly multicultural practice, because DIY activists accept all kinds of “otherness.”

Conclusions

I have described how the squatters’ movement became “the” movement when they broadened their squat actions to other struggles and experimental ways of life. In the Netherlands the queer movement arose from “the” movement. You can state that the queer movement and the alterglobalization movement have much in common especially when alterglobalists began to discuss sexuality and the queer movement started criticizing the social structures, material social practices and expressed solidarity with other oppressed groups. The question remains, however, whether the “free places” of both movements are open enough to people unfamiliar with Do It Yourself anarchist ideas. If both movements really want “to queer the culture” then they will have to accept all kinds of “other” people and to accept the many diversities of non-dominant cultures. It appears the Zapatistas try to be as open as possible to these diversities. Therefore, I end by reiterating their invitations of 1994 and 1996, directed to leftist activists, youngsters, women, gays and lesbians, people of color, immigrants, workers and farmers around the world. Their invitation was not meant to unite them all, but to discuss new ways of thinking about power, resistance and globalization, to learn from each other and to respect their differences and autonomy.
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Notes:

1 I will not elaborate on these post-modern notions, only touch upon these notions in this paper. It is interesting to mention that the contemporary alterglobalization movement is called “grassroots postmodernism,” in Notes from Nowhere, 2003, p. 36.

2 In my article, “De meervoudigheid van “het andere,” I also show cultural differences between different religions and classes in the Netherlands.

3 These kiss-ins were already organized by the American radical gays in the 1970s and also in Holland where groups such as "De Rooie Flikkers" have done these kind of actions. The difference with Queer Nation is that the groups in the 1970s had, as a starting point, a fixed sexual identity (Hekma 2004: 125).

4 This distinction has much in common with Adam Lent's division of all kinds of (historical) social movements: personal-local (DIY), temperate (NGO's) and transformatory (socialists). He describes this personal-local approach as based upon the notion that individuals who are dissatisfied with the existing conditions must change themselves and their immediate environment; the change usually involves enhancement of self-confidence, self-reliance, and self-respect [...] and a re-organisation of one's everyday life. They may be meeting and forming bonds with those who are similarly dissatisfied. These changes were undoubtedly an important aspect of utopian socialism and anarchism. (Lent 1999: 176-177).

5 This point is what Kate Nash (2001: 86) concludes about contemporary social movements: “They acknowledge that many of the changes towards which they aim can only be achieved [...] by the refusal of subordinated identities and the development of life-styles and communities in which more egalitarian social relations are prefigured... They contest what is “normal,” they challenge the idea of citizenship as consisting of individuals enjoying identical rights... and imply a more open, pluralistic model of society.”

Subcomandante “Marcos” of the Zapatistas once answered a journalist who asked who he is: “Marcos is homosexual in San Francisco, black in South Africa, an Asian in Europe, Chicano in San Ysidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, a Maya-Indian in the streets of San Christobal, a Jew in Germany, a Gypsy in Poland, a Mohawk in Quebec, a pacifist in Bosnia, a lonely women in themetro at ten o’clock in the evening, a farmer without land, a member of a gang in the slums, an unemployment worker, an unhappy student, and, of course, a Zapatista in the mountains” (Klein 2002: 179).
THE DEMISE OF GAY AND LESBIAN RADICALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

Gert Hekma

Introduction

The Dutch witnessed a major sexual revolution around 1970 when the demands of the homosexual rights and the sexual reform movements made the government change laws and institutions. The Netherlands had been one of the more conservative Western countries until the 1960s and jumped to the vanguard of sexual liberalism in the 1970s when changes in public opinion changed laws and institutions. Some of the most important changes were the decriminalization of homosexuality, pornography, prostitution and abortion, divorce became easier, contraception and sex education were more widely available and the media became strongly more attentive to issues of sexuality, as well used more sexualized images. Gay men and lesbian women were allowed into the army in 1973 and that same year the homosexual rights movement received legal recognition. Around 1980, transsexuals were allowed to legally change their sex and the costs of medical treatment were covered in health care programs.

Public opinion surveys showed that the Dutch, rather than rejecting all of these social innovations, had began to accept them. A quickly growing majority of the population started to support these changes around 1970. In 1993, an anti-discrimination law was enacted, and in 2001, same sex couples were allowed to marry. Another remarkable change that has not been widely publicized, was that since 1980 in many cities the police officially stopped persecuting and harassing gay men in their public cruising grounds (parks, toilets, highway stops and beaches), and instead began to protect them against queer-bashers. Of course, not all police officers were ready to follow such rules and to this day, the police chase gay men in such locations. Other institutions such as the highway authorities do their best to remove gay cruising from highway stops.

AIDS had a double effect. On the one hand, there was the feeling that this mortal epidemic would restrict the freedoms of gay men and other affected groups, on the other hand, the discourses on AIDS and safer sex made sexuality much more real and visible in the public realm. Sexual libertines feared the domination of a discourse stressing AIDS was punishment for sexual sins, but the explicit terminology required to explain dangers of AIDS as well as the lessons of safe sex led to more open discussions of sex. In earlier times, sexuality could hardly be discussed, and if so, only in covert or implicit terms, but AIDS and safe sex education necessitated clear terminology and plain words. In sex education, the use of slang was considered uncivilized until the mid-1980s, when using four letter words became appropriate for sex education. The Dutch government and the gay movement worked together to combat AIDS and saw no reason to close gay sex establishments, unlike other countries. Despite the miseries of death and disease among gay men, AIDS has had an overall positive effect on gay and sexual emancipation. The media were at greater ease to speak on sex and homosexuality and did so largely in affirmative ways, beginning around 1990. The fight against AIDS also brought gay couples various social welfare rights in social security, housing, job benefits, pensions and inheritances. The epidemic made demands for marital rights understandable. Gay men were not sexual monsters but men with lovers and friends.

All these sexual evolutions made both the Dutch and foreigners believe Holland tolerant in sexual matters. Most Dutch even think full (homo)sexual emancipation has been reached. Straight and gay people believe that the gay movement can close its doors. Opening marriage
for same-sex couples was seen as the end result of the struggle for emancipation. They mistake, in my eyes, legal rights for social emancipation. Anti-homosexual slander and aggression remains widespread on the street, in schoolyards and other places, especially among young men who should be beyond such prejudices growing up in a presumably tolerant time. Older generations also have their problems with queer visibility. Gays and lesbians are fine as long as they stay behind the closed doors of their homes, or in bars and discos, and don’t parade their “vices” like leather and drag in public. The media are, of course, the exception to this rule because queers are fun to see on TV, but less so when living around the corner. They are nice on a distance, upsetting when near.

**Results for the gay and lesbian movement**

In 1967, the Schorer Foundation was founded. It gives psychological help to people with problems because of homosexuality. Since 1984, it also helps AIDS patients and organizes buddy-care. It continues to be the gay and lesbian institution with the largest subvention, which comes from the ministry of health. (The subvention for gay and lesbian emancipation was established later). The Foundation is an NGO that currently provides support to gay and lesbian organizations in Latin America and Africa.

The psychiatrist Wijnand Sengers published his dissertation *Homosexuality as Complaint* (in Dutch) in 1969. Its positive reception dates the time when Dutch psychiatrists stopped seeing homosexuality as a “disease.” According to Sengers, persons needed therapy only when they had complaints about same-sex desires or practices. In most cases, the best help a psychiatrist could offer was helping gay men and lesbians to accept their sexual desires. This was much more practical and cheaper than trying to change their orientation. Sengers had not been able to find one convincing case in the then century-old international literature that a homosexual had become a heterosexual through psychiatric help.

In 1971, article 248bis of the Dutch law lowered the age of consent for same-sex sex from 21 to 16 years, the same age it recognized for opposite-sex sex. (Briefly, between 1989 and 2001, the age of consent was lowered to 12, if there was no complaint from the youth, his or her parents and child custody officials). Article 248bis had been passed in 1911 when it was presumed that young men seduced by homosexuals would become queers; the abolition was based on the belief that homosexuality was innate and recognition that young men do not become gay by seduction.

In 1973, the army stopped excluding gays and lesbians on the basis of their sexual orientation, although this is still a problem in the U.S. That same year, the Dutch government granted legal status to the gay and lesbian movement. Although the movement began in 1912, in reaction to age of consent law discussed above, legal and financial responsibility for its activities had always been privately funded.

In the 1980s and 1990s, various social rights were extended to gay and lesbian couples. These included housing, social welfare, pensions, inheritance taxes, partner benefits (such as travel privileges for train or airline employees), and foreign partners. The government acknowledged asylum seekers who sought entry because of homosexual prosecution in their native countries. Very few cases however have been reported on these grounds. Most gay and lesbian asylum cases are accepted for residency under other conditions.

Since 1982, cities started to enact gay and lesbian emancipation policies, with Amsterdam being the first. These include various issues such as education, social support for the elderly, better health care services particularly for STDs, sport facilities, equal rights in city services, and the promotion of gay and lesbian visibility. The City of Amsterdam promised to stop tearing down public toilets and ordered the police to stop harassing gay men who were cruising. Since the 1990s, special projects to enhance the emancipation and visibility of ethnic minority
queers have been added to the list.

The central government started addressing issues later, in 1986. The debates started earlier in 1982, when participants in the gay and lesbian parade of that year in Amersfoort, the heart of Christian fundamentalists territory, were attacked by straight youths. This enraged gays and lesbians as well as many straights and, after long deliberations, forced the government to put some minor funds toward gay and lesbian emancipation. The main aims were to combat discrimination in the fields of law, labor, housing and education. Apart from asylum rights, the government also promised that the police and justice system would do more to prosecute anti-gay violence.

In 1987, Homomonument opened in Amsterdam. It consists of three pink triangles that form a larger triangle. A public toilet is part of the design. Although gays and lesbians were not very eager to donate funds to build it, it is now a famous public space for queers. It is a place for commemorations and parties and for people lay flowers to remember those who have died.

In 1993, parliament passed an Equal Rights Law that promised equal rights on the basis of gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation. The law had been discussed since 1977, but took so long because of vehement Christian opposition who feared that Christian schools would be forced to accept gay and lesbian teachers. In the end, schools could not exclude them simply because of their sexual orientation, but the minister of Interior Affairs, a closeted lesbian, made very clear that this included also living as a homosexual. However the law offered no means of enforcing equal rights and thus is inadequate to counter the forms of discrimination it targets.

In the 1990s, most churches arrived at the stage when they accepted homosexuals and most stopped marking differences between the homosexual person and his sexual practices. The Catholic church continues, insofar as its clergy takes directions from Rome, to hold the position that the homosexual person is not the problem, but that gay sex is problem. Most Dutch Catholics disagree with the church position on this point. Muslim religious leaders have underlined their opposition to homosex, as have orthodox Protestant clergy.

Most Dutch consider recognition of marriage for couples of the same sex as the final step in gay and lesbian emancipation. The Netherlands was the first country to give this right to same-sex couples in 2001, including adoption. Given that less than 10 percent of the existing couples have married in the last four years, marriage cannot be said to be very popular. Nonetheless, most lesbians and gays, even those who view marriage as a sexist and closed institution, acknowledge that this right was necessary for civil equality.

The results of gay and lesbian emancipation have been important. There is now nearly full equality in laws and in official regulations for both gays and straights. Homosexuality is no longer viewed as a crime, a moral sin or a mental disease by most Dutch people. But major problems remain. Social taboos have not been lifted. The education needed to combat these taboos has been promised but few schools provide it. Anti-gay sentiments cannot be demonstrated in public, but continue to be an undercurrent in straight society and lead sometimes to outright verbal and physical abuse. Moreover, heterosexuality remains the public norm. This heteronormativity makes homosexuality by and large invisible in public life. People often say sexual orientation does not matter and should not be spoken about in public when it concerns homosexual preferences. Yet no one ever sees discussing heterosexual relations in public as a problem. This straight norm or mindset means that homosexuals remain marginalized and second-class persons.

Among the various groups of gays and lesbians, the problems are defined very differently. The demands of gay men sometimes run parallel to those of straight men while lesbians may have opposite interests that may coincide with feminist women’s interests. The quest for greater
sexual freedom is shared by some queers and straights, and opposed by others. The most vocal opponents of public gay cruising are sometimes gay people. Many gays wanted to vote for the murdered, openly gay leader Pim Fortuyn, while others adamantly opposed his nationalism and xenophobia. The majority of Dutch gays and straights did not share Fortuyn's tolerant attitude towards pedophiles.

The Netherlands is also experiencing its own turn to sexual conservatism in the twenty-first century. The Dutch have become once more sexually illiberal. Often complaints are voiced that sexual freedom has gone too far, although the gay and lesbian community is not facing direct opposition. The erotic margins are most affected by this conservative turn, particularly sexual activities such as (semi-) public, paid and intergenerational sex. This last issue was particularly controversial. Gays and lesbians as well as sexual reformers protested when the government raised the age of consent from 12 to 16 years in 2001, arguing that doing so would make it more difficult for queer youth to frequent gay spaces. A higher age of consent puts the queer youth and straight adolescents in a difficult position. However these arguments carried no weight in the political arena.

The restraints put on the sexual margins might, in the end, turn against the gay mainstream. The movement is not prepared for such a development. A radical sexual movement that protects the old and promotes new sexual freedoms is needed in the Netherlands. The country and its culture must get rid of its “straight” mind and make a queer turn. But the conservative countermovement is, at the moment, stronger. Let me now turn to some examples of sexual contestation in the Netherlands.

**Counter trends**

The positive attitudes to sexual innovation began to wane soon after the sexual revolution. First, feminists deplored the sexual abuse of women by men who used the vocabulary of erotic freedom to attain their own male-centered, heterosexual goals. Feminists also exposed the hidden violence of incest and domestic abuse in the “holy” family home and beyond. While the original concerns about incest, sexual and physical abuse were not especially gendered, these concerns soon focused rather narrowly on the sexual abuse of female children by their fathers, uncles, brothers and other male kin. This then broadened again to male strangers who abused children of both sexes outside the home.

The first pedophile scares started in the early 1980s. In these cases, the sexual critique was rarely directed against the tenets of the sexual revolution. The culprits were mainly men who had grown up in a traditional world where sex was hidden and could become violent because of a lack of consent. In the early 1990s, the issue of ethnicity was introduced with full force in the sex debates. According to crime statistics, male youth of Moroccan, Caribbean and Turkish descent, appeared to be much more prone to sexual crimes such as rape, than white Dutch male youth. The problem was blamed on their lack of an enlightened sexual education. However, it came to be understood that teachers were afraid to introduce sexual education in so-called “black schools” (with a majority of non-white students) because they feared criticism by parents and opposition from students. Rather than developing a culturally sensitive sexual education curriculum, many schools simply avoided teaching anything about sexuality at all. The sexual tolerance and enlightenment of which the Dutch were so proud of had arrived at its limits. “Difficult” topics, such as women’s sexual emancipation and support for gay rights, disappeared from the educational agenda. Veils for girls and separate gym and swimming classes for boys and girls, demanded by parents to protect the virginity and innocence of Muslim girls were adopted without much ado in most “black” schools. Such adjustments confirm the sexist-straight assumptions that remain grounded in Dutch culture. As women’s and gay issues disappeared from the school curriculum with little trace, religious issues took center stage.
Also during the 1990s, sexual tolerance among the white Dutch came under attack. In 1994, when the European gay parade was held in Amsterdam, the police made a ludicrous series of demands of the organizers who had to promise, among other things, not to permit displays of sexuality or images of homosexual or bestial acts (the combination of pre-modern sodomy). Such rules had never been placed on any other demonstration or meeting. In 1996, the city of Amsterdam decided to revive an old law forbidding the display of erotic postcards on the streets or in shop windows as a means of protecting children against intrusive sexuality. Yet no one protested displays of knives and guns in shop window, and the graphic advertising for Amsterdam’s “torture museum” was considered funny, rather than dangerous for innocent children.

The former progressive-liberal minister of Justice, Winnie Sorgdrager, supports women’s issues but adamantly opposes gay visibility in parades. Leading feminist law professor Dorien Pessers has started to criticize the “filthification” of Amsterdam and called the city “that bordello adjacent to Schiphol Airport.” As a fellow traveler of the small Dutch Socialist Party (of Maoist leanings) she decried the decline of social institutions, including the nuclear family, and the growth of the sex industry. This social critique is also voiced by sexual conservatives on the right and left who defend the nuclear family and traditional gender roles, in their attacks against explicit public sex and gender transgressions. Both right and left express worries that the absence of male teachers in primary education will feminize boys and have called for efforts to masculinize the schools. The aim is to prevent boys from becoming “sissies” and to promote their “innate” masculinity. A new right-wing government, under Christian-Democratic leadership, started a campaign to revalidate gender norms and family values. This details of this program have remained vague however, because the Dutch have quite opposing ideas on this issue, but is likely to shift social and financial support from sexual freedom issues towards more for family-oriented policies.

Men who pursue intergenerational sex are easy targets for sexual conservatives. The age of consent was raised back to 16 in 2001 with the unanimous support of all parties in the Second Chamber of parliament (only some senators of the left in the First Chamber opposed this law change). While the political focus was on ‘preying adult men’ the new law ignores the concerns of young queers who must now wait until they are 16 to participate in gay culture, while straight youth face no such barriers. Youth are, of course, coming out at earlier ages than before, going down from the late to the early teens over the last three decades. At the same time, the police are investigating more or less innocent sexual acts of adolescents that were once seen as merely playing or exploratory activities. Now these acts are prosecuted as rape, and not so “innocent” adolescents face stiff prison sentences.

Criminal laws against child pornography that once targeted only the production and commerce of such material have now been expanded to include simple possession; definitions of pornography were broadened and penalties stiffened. In the past, the abuse of children in the production of pornography was deemed the major criminal problem, nowadays even artistic (morphed) depictions of children come under the definition of child pornography. Now the major problem has become that simple drawn images portraying youth in an erotic fashion would incite “child sexual abuse” (that many children may eagerly desire). Recently, the police have asked to double the number of vice officers who cruise the Internet to track child pornography.

Recent examples of moral panic

Prostitution

In 2000, the Netherlands became the first country in recent times to legalize prostitution. Sex work is now considered regular labor rather than a social taboo or criminal activity. Before 2000, pimping, defined as making money from prostitution, was a criminal offence, while sex
work itself was permitted. The government made the legal change in order to better control the sex industry and to create better working and social conditions for those involved.

However, the legalization did not happen without problems. Prostitution remains a taboo subject and prostitutes are seen as abject people. Banks did not want to give prostitutes accounts or loans, and many cities did not want brothels. Few prostitutes will tell their neighbors, and sometimes not even their family, what kind of work they do. Male sex workers are viewed as even lower than females in Dutch career scales. The labor union Red Thread, which has seen to sex workers’ interest since the early 1980s, does not attract many members, and its subvention from the government ended in 2005. The “black money” that has long been laundered in the sex industry, continues to be a major force in the country’s red light districts. Several specific cases make clear how low the esteem in which the Dutch hold for prostitutes.

The first case concerns streetwalking. In the 1990s, several cities instituted “tippelzones” for streetwalking prostitutes who often were drug addicts. These zones outside the centre of the city allowed hustlers to work, controlled by social and medical health workers and police officers. The main purpose of these zones was to move the burden and noise of street prostitution to less inhabited areas outside the city centre; these were primarily industrial zones which supposedly offered a safer environment for sex workers. The men can negotiate with the women and may have sex in their cars. These places proved highly successful but failed to attract the type of sex workers they were meant for. Rather, women from Eastern Europe and transsexual immigrants from Latin America predominated. Despite strict police control of these places, people soon began to complain that the zones did not contain the drug dealing, illegal immigrants, trafficked of women. For these reasons, the city councils of Rotterdam and Amsterdam considered closing down their “tippelzones.”

At this point, the Amsterdam Labor alderman (“wethouder”) responsible for welfare and diversity hastened the decision to close when he admitted to being a regular visitor of the tippelzone. Although he had done nothing illegal and the police strictly controlled the zone, his admission created a major scandal. The alderman was forced to resign and the zone was closed down. He was accused of abusing drug-dependent women with unsafe sex at discount prices, but he was never charged for these alleged crimes. The scandal and the ensuring public discussion made clear that the Dutch are highly ambivalent regarding sexual tolerance. The complaint that the police had no control of a zone that was the most controlled area in Amsterdam revealed that the city and the police did not want to take the responsibility for supervising prostitution and rather wanted to avoid accusations that officers were like pimps.

Prostitution is always a good target for moral panics and often raised corollary concerns about illegal trafficking of women from outside the European Union, mainly Eastern European countries. Asylum-seekers are other victims of this criminal commerce. Although there are some proven cases, the issue of trafficking is regularly used to create negative public opinion, especially after prostitution was legalized. Opponents cite inflated numbers of trafficked prostitutes, sometimes amounting to half of the total number of prostitutes, to prove the maliciousness of the business. They often claim an increasing number of minors, female and male, are victims of this trade. Their sensational accounts of these activities evoke the tactics of nineteenth century abolitionists who publicized exaggerated reports of “white slavery.” No one disputes the scandal of innocent young women and men who, through economic necessity and sexual naïveté, become victims for sex traders, nor the violent conditions that frighten them against identifying the persons who forced them into prostitution. Yet the press circulates excessive numbers of minor male prostitutes (the legal age for prostitution is 18 years) whose numbers, if the press figures are accurate, would be in the hundreds in Amsterdam alone, many more male sex workers than there are of all ages. Such statistics stir media attention and seem to prove the necessity of the anti-prostitution and anti-trafficking organizations.
A comparable situation concerns “lover boys,” often of ethnic minority origin, who mainly seduce white Dutch girls. The narrative follows these lines: the young women, loners with weak relations to family or friends, are victims of the good-looking “lover boys” who bestow them with compliments and presents and drive them around in nice cars. The men disconnect the women from their families and warm them up for work in prostitution by lending them out to friends for sex, by introducing them to female hustlers, or by suggesting they need money to continue their shared luxurious lifestyle. This is the Dutch national version of the traffic in women (and it duplicates U.S. narrative on the 1960s about African American pimps and white runaway girls). Also in this case, organizations for the protection of women make up with high numbers of victims to prove their necessity of their rescue work. Of course, the real public scandal is ignored: the female victims who know so little about sex and abuse that they become easy prey for these petty criminals.

Another remarkable case of moral panic concerns Fons Spooren, at the time director of one of Holland’s leading football clubs, PSV of Eindhoven. He was severely punished for having sex with underage male prostitutes, many of Moroccan origin, and having transmitted HIV to them. Adding to the scandal was its public location in the Anne Frank park of Eindhoven, where male hustlers work daily. These business boys should have known how to stem the dangers they faced as sex workers. The mayor of the city made headlines in the local press, asking other victims of Spooren (whose name was publicly announced) to come forward for HIV testing, although nobody did, and proven cases of infection were absent. It never became clear whether Spooren had unsafe sex nor whether he knew these young men were under age – he himself denied so. He received a stiff prison sentence of 25 months (including nine months provisional) and was forced to undergo family therapy, because he was a married man with children.

His startling punishment received the general approval from the Dutch, while giving family therapy to a gay or bisexual man who had been outed by the mayor, was at least queer. Of course, the newspapers announced that afterwards he again lived happily with his family, which will certainly have made a good impression on the judges. The major homosexual bi-weekly of the Netherlands, de Gay Krant, tried to save him by denouncing pedophile men in high positions who would have participated in the Dutch equivalent of “ballets roses,” queer orgies for the high and mighty. The men, whose names became public, brought their case to court and de Gay Krant had to retract its unjust denunciations and pay indemnities. This effort to save Spooren derailed completely while it aborted a discussion of what was wrong with sex with men of legal age who willingly engage in prostitution.

**Public sex**

Gay men who cruise for sex in public places such as parks, “tearooms” (restrooms) and at highway stops have been protected from queer bashers by the police in some cities since the early 1980s. Although laws prohibiting public indecency outlaw public sex (a public violation of honorability as it is literally called) and impose a sentence of three months in prison for conviction, the law is rarely enforced; it is mainly used against exhibitionists. Nonetheless, some institutions and cities have closed down traditional sites for gay public sex. In the bigger cities, cruising places are left undisturbed so long as they don’t become public nuisances. In the city of Zwolle, gay men cruising at a highway stop got into trouble when residents quite a distance from this location started to complain. That these people lived so far away that they could not witness evidence of gay sex – which took place after dark in the bushes beyond public view – was never questioned. Gay men lost their “lovers lane,” because the city council preferred to listen to people motivated more by homophobia than any real disturbance.

In the hot summer of 2003, the Zilverstrand (silver beach) close to Amsterdam came under
the surveillance of police after this nudist beach attracted many more cruising gay men and well as straight people looking for heterosex. The police fined one of Holland's most famous lawyers, a gay man, for public nudity on this beach. Although in my opinion, there is little “dishonorable” with nakedness or having gay sex in Holland these days, the courts have decided otherwise and continue to control sexuality (and mainly homosexuality) through these outdated laws. This control has full support of a majority of the Dutch population that wants gay men to stay out of the public and not to flaunt their “abnormalities” or endanger the sexual “innocence” of male youth.

**More sexual variation**

Not only has prostitution and gay sex created public scandals, but also bestiality. When an elderly man was caught having sex with a horse in the spring of 2004, his case was brought to court where the judges decided they could not convict him in the absence of a law prohibiting zoophilia. The existing law against animal abuse could not be used because there had been no proven physical injuries. Neither was it a public indecency because nobody had seen the sexual act. In reaction, the public, the press and parliament attempted to pass a law against sex with animals. The minister of agriculture promised to add all forms of bestiality to the existing law on animal abuse. Very few people raised their voice against such a law or argued that not all sex with animals must be automatically deemed to abusive. Only Midas Dekkers, the author of *Dearest Pet. On Bestiality* (Verso, 2000), spoke up, noting that few people seemed concerned about the mass-slaughter of animals in the bio-industry, yet a minor and rare act of bestiality enraged the general public. There are zoophiles who have sex with animals and dearly love them.

The public outcry against bestiality made clear once more how uneasy the Dutch feel about sexual variation. In the end, the ministers of agriculture and justice decided no new law was needed and that existing laws largely covered cases of bestiality. This decision, against the majority’s voice, was not given wide media attention. Also in 2004, Norway, England and the State of California discussed or passed new laws against bestiality. It is amazing that such a rare act received so much legal and political attention in such different places around the world in one year.

Shortly after this case, a similarly remarkable incident made headlines. It concerned a man who licked the toes of women who had fallen asleep in Rotterdam parks, and then would run off when they woke up. Here again, the prosecution judged the man broke no criminal law because his acts were not deemed sexual. (If they had been sexual, then he could have been charged with sexual harassment or a case of public indecency). Once again, there was a general outcry against this “lawlessness” and both public and parliament wanted a law against non-consensual toe licking. Labor members of parliament asked the minister of justice to make it a crime.

In both cases of bestiality and toe licking, the public reacted as if these minor offences were capital crimes. People used the most horrible insults on chat sites, while no one rallied to the defense of sexual freedom. Only once were some of Midas Dekkers’ critical remarks were posted on the sites. One television program made the concern over bestiality into a comedy sketch, but the general attitude was abjection and rejection.

Toe licking, bestiality, gay cruising, lover boys, trafficking in women, street walking, underage male and female prostitutes, kiddie porn, intercultural rape, adolescent sex, sexual abuse of youngsters, continued discrimination against gays and lesbians, the immigration of marital partners, male and female circumcision: the Netherlands witness many heated debates and the majority of them is about sex as well as about inter-ethnic relations. These debates indicate that both old Dutch and new Dutch need sexual education, sexual knowledge and sexual citizen-
ship. But the official response to these problems remains marginal and haphazard.

_Erosion of the sexual and gay movements_

With the relative success of the sexual reform movement and gay and lesbian organization in the Netherlands has also come the erosion of these same institutions. The major Dutch gay and lesbian movement Dutch Society for Integration of Homosexuality, COC, passed its best time in the 1960s and since then it gradually disappeared into the margins of society. The same happened to the Dutch Society for Sexual Reform, NVSH. The COC has had a faithful following of about 8,000 members since the 1970s, while the membership of the NVSH collapsed from 200,000 to about 1,400 in the same period. Their journals were important media until the 1970s but since then have lost most of their social and intellectual vigor. The central points of debates and decision-making moved to other media and institutions. Since the 1970s, all the media discuss sexual issues at one point or another. Members of COC and NVSH took positions of power in politics and government. This helped to bring about sexual reforms the Netherlands has experienced since the 1970s. But it also means an erosion of the quality of the debates as sexual issues become marginalized in these institutions. Media and politicians work on topics of limited scope and close deadlines and thus have little interest in the general views or long-term analyses. Movements for sexual reform that should take care of such endeavors, have stopped investigating them.

Although these organizations and some concerned intellectuals decry the growing sexual conservatism in The Netherlands, it has not stopped repressive legislation and a greater prosecution of sex acts that in some cases became crimes only recently. Laws governing pornography, age of consent, and sexual violence have become stricter while the right-wing government is now considering outlawing sex with illegal prostitutes. The proposal to forbid bestiality received the support of all parties in parliament, just as raising the age of consent to 16 had. Even Labor and the Green Left pressed for such a law while a biologist like Dekkers condemned the proposal harshly. Regrettably, there is no party that wants to abstain or protest when the government proposes to “stop crime” in the name of “zero tolerance” even if it is the most ludicrous kind of crime.

It is important to state in a conference on socialism and sexuality that it is often not the left that has an open eye for sexual freedom. The former Dutch prime minister and Labor leader Wim Kok embodied sexual boredom and the new socialist leader Wouter Bos flaunts his nuclear family life and absents himself from parliament because he wants to be a good father for his newborn. Their sexual politics have been on the conservative side: skeptical or negative about sexual freedom, positive about the nuclear family. The socialists in France oppose same-sex marriage under the leadership of former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and his wife. Eight years of Prime Minister Tony Blair have brought little sexual progress in England and while Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Germany may have worn out four wives in his private life, he has shown no interest in sexual liberalism for the public good. The Spanish socialists still have the chance to become the exception for the Left, where their government recognized gay marriage in May 2005.

The question becomes how to energize progressive or radical sexual politics in The Netherlands. The main problem is the conservative turn that politics all over Europe have generally taken. The reactionary influence of the U.S. that comes to Europe through political pressure of the Bush Administration, through the media and Hollywood movies and through academia, is a major obstacle for libertine politics. The growing influence of conservative religion in Europe after decades of secularization both within the ethnic minorities and the white majority does not bode well. Europeans have fewer children now, so the population decreases and the median age rises, which are not good signs for sexual liberalism. Many signs of sexual politics point in a con-
servative direction. The left and the liberals, in the past good allies in the struggles for women's emancipation and sexual liberation, mainly show interest in law and order, in the nuclear family, and in sexual “normality.” Conservatives rhetorically exploit examples of women and gays to attack sexist and homophobic Muslims but do absolutely nothing practical to enhance gender and sexual emancipation. The sexual freedoms that the 1960s promised have been realized mainly in the media: from television, movies, newspapers and magazines to the Internet and the porn industry, while legal changes are subverted. Daily life has been affected insofar as the media have intruded into the privacy of the home but not beyond. When we look at recent sexual statistics, it becomes clear that neither the Dutch nor other Europeans have become very adventurous about sexual pleasure. The general picture is that people have exchanged lifelong partners for serial monogamy and that women and gay men have more chances for sexual pleasure. However, there are few locations for sexual exploration for straights and lesbians so they have little opportunity to experiment with sex outside their bedrooms. This may explain the continued popularity of red light districts and tippelzones for straight men – but where can the women go?

The Dutch queer and sexual movements are nearly dead and there seems little chance to revive them. The aims they might pursue have become so varied that it is unlikely they will unite – although it would be a good idea. In the 1960s, the sexual reform and gay and lesbian movements had clear-cut targets that were mostly in the realm of decriminalizing various sexual acts (homosexuality, prostitution, pornography, abortion) and obtaining easier access to divorce and contraception. This created a broad coalition in support of sexual rights. In the Netherlands these worthy goals have been attained, leaving these movements with a plethora of new political themes that are often contradictory. There are suburban lesbians with strong interests in children, adoption and education, urban kinky queers who need space for sexual experimentation, ethnic minority gays who have to combat the prejudices of racist white men and the homophobia of their own groups of origin, gay men who like public sex and need spaces for recreational activities, transgenders who want to pass and queens who want to be outrageous, youth who yearn for a visible homosexual culture and closeted men who prefer invisibility. Gays can be right wing and liberal, out and in the closet, masculine and unmasculine, into sex and into relationships, some like sports and others religion. On the Internet, they show an interest in an enormous variety of sexual fetishes.

Finally, there are the radical queers who have an interesting program that Saskia Poldervaart discusses in her paper (in this volume). But as she indicates, this is a group that looks inside rather than outside. They are more preoccupied with themselves than with changing society. The Amsterdam Queeruption festival of June 2004, indeed offered a wide range of sexual, gendered and political interests, but remained mainly ghettoized in its squat. Its name is symptomatic for the way that politics are done these days: as an eruption. Among the Dutch, feelings of political discontent are widespread and explode at various occasions, as happened with the murdered right-wing leader Pim Fortuyn. His party was able to mobilize on this unrest and enjoyed landslide victory in the elections (from 0 to 17% of the voters in three months), but there is no continuous and stable movement that can bring together these angry sentiments for a movement that promotes sexual freedoms.

Before we turn to a possible new sexual agenda, we should ask why the Dutch have exhausted their sexual liberalism. The main problem, which I mentioned in my paper last year at this conference, concerns the discrepancy between media representations and actual behavior. The media give the impression that real sexual freedoms exist, while actual practices stay behind what the media suggest. This produces anger against the excessive sexualization of the media, and resignation to one's own personal sexual situation. People cannot act upon assumed sexual freedoms because the mental and physical space they need is missing. There are no public sexual spaces and there is no concept of sexual citizenship or sexual learning. Moreover, a
culture of sexual repression that has been ingrained in Western societies cannot be dissolved in one generation. Sexual freedom, whatever it might be, supposes an absence of taboos. But these taboos continue to regulate personal behavior (for example, fear of being labeled a “slut” or a “faggot”). Acceptance of the body and its pleasures has to be re-learned too. The Dutch still need a little stimulation and knowledge to arrive at promised sexual pleasures.

Proposals for sexual change

There is no difficulty in defining a program of sexual innovation that could consist of the following points, some of which I mentioned in my paper last year:

• No naturalization, but a cultivation of sex. It is not important whether sexual drives or sexual preferences are inborn, the question is how to cultivate sexual pleasure.

• Equality for women and men when it comes to sex. Different norms exist for the sexes when it comes to pleasure. Men have more chances and places to find what they want while women are harshly restrained because of ideas about female “nature,” reproduction and on their assumed sexlessness. The dichotomy of men/public/sex versus women/private/love still reigns and encourages outright discrimination for all genders. Transgenders, moreover, propose to get rid of the gender dichotomy and see gender not as a continuum but as performances that are multiple. I have suggested terms such as unmasculine and unfeminine for persons who reject being defined as masculine or feminine.

• The possibility to separate sex and love is better for both. Now the two suffer because the best loving partner is rarely the best sexual partner. Or, when sexual excitement has left a relationship, most people think love is over. But most relationships witness a diminution of sexual desire over time while love may continue. Basing love on sex means that love will suffer from the extinction of mutual sexual interest and sex because it is forced into the constraints of a fixed relationship. Love and sex go in different directions: love is more total and needs time to grow while sex is specific and more about moments and situations. René Schérer spoke last year on the utopian socialist Charles Fourier and summarized his erotic philosophy that love should be multiple, that this plural love was good for social cohesion and for the arts because culture is not built on sexual repression – as Freud would have it a century later – but on its sexual expression.

• To breakdown the dichotomy of public and private because sexuality is both a public and private affair. This dichotomy affects non-heterosexual persons most, as public culture remains heteronormative and excludes people with other sexual preferences. To create public space for sex, we could include the following steps:
  o More sexual education in schools and the inclusion of sexual topics in other disciplines such as history, geography, physical education, etc. The creation of sexual knowledge in universities where it remains largely absent or if it exists, is often focused on biological themes and topics of disease and disaster, not on pleasure or love.
  o More space for public sex. As governments provide space in the form of terrains, buildings, schools, museums and so forth for music, sport, parks, and transportation, they could do the same for sex. The Dutch are very concerned about social cohesion but don’t see the possibilities a public sexual culture could offer. As Fourier already indicated, sexual relations create social bonds and give cohesion to society because they are multiple and intimate. Sex can fill the gaps that exist between various social groups who otherwise refuse to mix, for example different ethnic, religious, class-based or professional backgrounds. Because the idea now is that sex is a private matter, there are few places to get acquainted with or to share pleasure. More space concerns both physical space (as indicated) and mental space that education, the arts, media, and/or fantasies provide.
  o Modern Western societies are missing, by and large, groups that defend hedonism
or libertinism, and ideologies that defend sexual pleasure. Most ideologies that discuss sexual morality have their foundations in religious citizenship, such as Christianity or Islam, but there are too few that offer non-religious sexual perspectives. Liberals have deferred sexuality to the private realm, and socialists have followed their lead. In the few cases that secular ideologies have discussed sexual issues, they most often defend the nuclear family, have little regard for sexual variation, and oppose prostitution. The worlds of medicine and biology that provide most of our modern sexual ideas observe a similar line of thought. Most have been inclined to defend “naturalized” homosexual relationships (as in: Gays can't help it, they are born that way), which has become a general line of defense in the modern world. The media may have become more sexually explicit, but defending sexual pleasure goes too far. Showing the fun or the miseries of sex is the maximum they allow themselves. But there is no movement that defends and promotes sexual pleasure.

Patrick Moore (2004) has shown the richness of the gay culture of the 1970s when gay men created a public culture of sexual pleasure where love, sex and friendship were not exclusive, but inclusive of others. It was a promiscuous culture that was creative in a sexual and artistic sense. This world disappeared with AIDS, and Moore desires to validate it again in the present. A similar culture existed in the Netherlands until it collapsed, due not only to AIDS but also because of the cultural assimilation of Dutch gay men. It will be difficult to revive this past culture again, and revival does mean innovation. But a sexual culture offers many worthwhile characteristics. The Dutch situation has become stagnant. Gay men and lesbian women have increasingly fewer shared interests. The future might be in a queer movement that picks up on the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s and moves past the narrow limits of legal to integral socio-sexual change. A movement that favors hedonism and sexual freedom and brings together queer and straight interests, formulates proposals for sexual change, and creates intellectual perspectives on pleasure.

The positive side of the conservative turn is that larger groups become dissatisfied with the contemporary situation. They consist of workers who get less pay because of global capitalism, others who are laid off due to technological innovation, ethnic minorities that face growing racialized exclusion in the struggle against terrorism, students and scholars who witness the breakdown of universities as centers of debate and research, elderly who suffer under the growing costs of health care, and other marginalized groups. People who have enjoyed or would like to enjoy sexual freedom, see a reduction of the mental and physical space for pleasure. It remains however a question how these various groups fighting against ecological disaster, industrial and financial globalization, various nationalisms and racisms, continuing sexism and homophobia, growing police powers, the prison system and sexual restraints, will interact and become Deleuzian rhizomes, and how they will cooperate and help each other.

Regrettably, many old leftist organizations have no sexual agenda, and if they have any ideas on the topic, as Labor and the Green Left do, they are very tame, even conservative in nature. The old left seems to believe that the media overdo sexuality and need to be restrained. This raises and urgent question for a new left: How can it create sexual spaces and erotic learning and will it address not only economic, religious or cultural citizenship, but sexual citizenship as well.
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Notes:
1 In my paper last year, I concentrated on the long-term and the sexual reform movement. Here, I focus more on the short term and the sexual margins.
2 There is no culture of gay charity or fundraising in The Netherlands (or Europe) as exists in the United States. The Dutch assume the government takes financial care for such initiatives.
3 The term “moral panic” may seem too strong but as these examples concern situations where large parts of the Dutch population strongly overreacted to revealed sexual practices and the media played a key role in producing those reactions, the term is fitting.
Commonly noted and debated as they are, it might astonish readers that the similarities and interrelations between heterosexist and racist hierarchy productions are not the established starting points for left-wingers’ political praxis in Germany. What, we should ask, blocks the development of a politics that will mutually penetrate heterosexism and racism? How can these blocks be overcome? Here, I discuss these questions by exploring a political event that, as I see it, was an attempt to invent such politics, exactly as some of the participants intended.

In 2001 the Berlin ‘Christopher Street Day’ (CSD, the Lesbian and Gay Pride March) chose the slogan, “Berlin stands queer against right-wing violence.” This slogan was the product of a small activist group whose name “queer against right-wingers” was honored with a newly created CSD Prize for Civil Courage. Only half a year later, when I tried to contact the group for an interview on their perspectives and activities, it had disbanded. What were their aims? Had they achieved them?

According to CSD organizers, the Pride March had 500,000 participants. Can all of them be recognized as “queer anti-right-wingers”? Would many of them join any CSD march, regardless its chosen theme, or political demands? This is impossible to determine, of course. There are many different reasons to go to CSD, and many of them do not arise from political aims or activism. The major reason of this ‘de-politicization,’ as critics term it, is a shortcoming in gay and lesbian mainstream ‘politics’: in order to represent its clientele’s interests through lobbying, mainstream politics inevitably becomes insensitive and indifferent to societal problems that do not directly impact homosexuals in general.

Nevertheless, activists focused on lobbying and their detractors agree that marches are political events, a symbolic tactic in a political movement that has shared aims. If they are correct, one rationale for the march was to strengthen antifascist and antiracist forces in the movement (or to instill them). “Queer against right-wingers” might have been an appropriate slogan for the march. And, the Berlin CSD is a well-publicized media event. So, if a tactic can bring out half a million people against racist and neo-fascist violence, one would like to believe that it could help to change the climate and stop further attacks. This may have been a second rationale for CSD to commit itself to this political stance.

Both aims — an impact “against right wing” into the (lesbian, gay, queer…) movement, and from here into society — might seem to be suitably understood by Antonio Gramsci as attempts to change a hegemonic constellation. In order to decide if this is a proper interpretation (and if not, to consider the best methods for creating change), we have to be clear about the prevailing hegemonic constellation itself: How did it evolve? In whose interests is it determined? How are racism and heteronormativity inscribed into it? I will therefore start with an excursus of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. I will caution readers that when I later discuss CSD’s hegemonic constellation, I am not writing about regularity of only one event, but about comprehensive societal patterns that recur in CSD.

**Excursus: Hegemony — dispositif of domination**

In his history studies Gramsci conceptualizes hegemony as a constellation of forces in historical relations. Analytically he distinguishes three “moments or levels” (Gramsci 1971, 180), which are different aspects of one and the same constellation at any given historical moment and therefore can be studied only by their interdependence. The first level is a “relation of social forces which is closely linked to the structure” and exists “objective, independent of human will” (ibid.). This is the ‘merely economic’ level, which never subsists on its own, but always in
culturally and politically determined forms. It is characteristic for Gramsci that he does not apprehend the economic as a sole causal force but as always intertwined with and formed by other power relations. Nevertheless, (and this is unfortunately ignored by many of those who often gladly cite him) Gramsci takes the economic level as the starting point of his thoughts: In the societal structure of production individuals are allocated to gendered and racialized class-positions and therefore belong to groupings who each represent a function “within production itself” (181) and who are set in continuous relations to each other.

The second level is the “relation of political forces,” which arises from the “degree of homogeneity, self-awareness and organization attained by the various social groups” (ibid.). At first there is an “economic-corporate level,” in which members of those groups realize that they share certain interests — in former times merchants and artisans allied in guilds, today business people federate in professional or trade associations up to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. From the resulting narrow group solidarity develops class-solidarity, also arising from the economic field. The Political appears when the group seeks “winning politico-juridical equality with the ruling groups” (ibid.) that is, incorporation into the ruling stratum without a fundamental change in the rules. Finally the grouping might realize that its “own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the merely economic group, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups” (ibid.). The group establishes a political alliance and assumes leadership.

Among the member groups of such alliances, economic and political demands may differ, but they ought to (and will) align somehow. To win hegemony, a group must bring about “not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane” (181ff.). Here, the group makes its own interests the common interests, but may dominate “only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly economic-corporate interest” (182).

It is crucial that the group wins sovereignty over the arrangement in which all other groups formulate their interests. At the same time, hegemony requires that “account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed […], that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind” (161). These sacrifices, however, “cannot touch the essential,” for “though hegemony is ethical-political” it is “based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (ibid.).

Besides the economic and political levels, there is as third level, the “relation of military forces, which from time to time is directly decisive” (183). It has a military-technical aspect — the strength and equipment of military forces — and a military-political aspect, which possesses the power to determine the deployment of armed forces. In times of functioning hegemony, the state controls the monopoly on military might and thus power is centralized in the hands of the hegemonic group and its allies. For this reason, Wolfgang Fritz Haug views the political level as a state-defined, “non-violent” space, provided with rules and “surrounded” by the state’s armed forces; he emphasizes that this space imposes on all confrontations its own – political – forms. “These forms that rest on concrete institutions, in their ways of regulation, determine the consciousness and the agency of socialized individuals” (Haug 1987, 172). Therefore the political is a “certain socially established, ideological form of praxis” (ibid. fn2).

According to Gramsci, historical development “oscillates continually between the first and the third moment, with the mediation of the second” (1971, 183). So, hegemony can be defined as the political process of transforming the economic and politically formed relation of forces into an extensive structure of domination, which functions through interplay of enforcement and production of consensus. The space of struggle for hegemony is in civil society. This term is mostly used today (and especially by media opinion pages) in a normative manner, to name a desirable goal for how humans should treat each other: recognizing the highest ideals of civi-
lization, peacefully settling disputes, untroubled by gender hierarchies, class divisions, racism, and other evils. However, in Gramsci’s thought ‘civil society’ is an instrument of analysis and means all fields of struggle for political leadership, beside the state apparatus in a stricter sense. In civil society, the hegemonic bloc seeks to win “consent” for its aims by framing questions in such a way that they appear to support the general interests of society; this permits the bloc to realize the essential elements of its own particularistic interests. Furthermore, in civil society, when dominant ideologies meet common sense, they are reified, becoming common sense itself. Nevertheless, civil society is also the space of oppositional movement, of demands for alternative analyses of social moments, of uncovering the particularistic interests shaping the ruling ideologies, and of attempts to formulating new, different general interests. At large these struggles constitute the ethical-political preconditions for policy; from civil society stem the patterns of meaning on which policy relies. Therefore it is a significant site for sexual politics, too.

Cultural struggles take place in every institution. Thus only methodically, not organically, can one distinguish between ‘political society’ (the extended state of national and municipal authorities, and of state-controlled organizational or party-based associations) and ‘civil society’ (sites of which include private associations, circles of friends, etc.) – but “in actual reality” the two of them “are one and the same” (160). Furthermore, although not visible at every moment or in every contention, civil society struggles over controversial policies are always also struggles for the constitution of society at large. If the hegemonic bloc loses consent, it will need to resort to open violence to maintain dominance. If the means of coercion fail, dominion would collapse completely. For this reason the bloc must regard civil society as a foundation pillar of domination and bolster it: civil society guarantees the stability of liberal democracy. On the other hand, all new groups that attempt to displace the old rulers will first have to assemble, develop an agenda and gather their forces. Therefore civil society is important for oppressed and minority social groups as well.

The entirety of won, lost, and ongoing battles creates the preconditions for subsequent struggles: their constellation constitutes a Foucauldian ‘dispositif,’ a configuration that prescribes its own continuation. With Gramsci we may detect the economic, political, and military moments inscribed in this term. While Foucault mainly sees dispositifs as regulators of the practices of knowledge production and self-conduct, we find them, above all, regulating the organization of interests in a society. So, hegemony — as a political and economic matter of fact — is sovereign, deciding whose interests will be articulated, in which ways, and how these interests will be mediated and asserted. Knowledge production and individual self-conduct are highly relevant fields in establishing hegemony but equally important is that hegemony realizes itself in the economic level (a point systematically underestimated by Foucault) and through the deployment of military and police forces.

With the conceptual tools I have now described, Gramsci studied history and then-current situation of antediluvian south Italy, as well as the Fordist capitalism emerging in the US at his time. However, his questions and notions remain relevant for researching the changed form of global capitalism that we live in. Sketchily outlined, Fordism relied on a class compromise between big industry and finance capital as hegemonic, and qualified white male skilled workers as part of the hegemonic bloc, while white women were primarily housewives or had lower-paid unskilled jobs. Migrant and racial minority workers were employed mostly in high labor content sectors (men in industry or public service, women more often in light industry and household service) or were self-employed in small trade (family enterprises). This class compromise (in Europe) was administered by national welfare states; most of the time social struggle was pushed into corporate forms such as wage negotiations between employers’ federations and labor unions. Lifestyles were conditioned by interweaving mass production, mass consumerism, and mass culture (guided by an emerging commercial culture industry),
while the state regulated the moral social field. The gender regime was “straightened” by rigid heterosexual norms; all deviant forms were vilified, criminalized and/or made absolutely impossible (See Ronsin in this book). This rigid mode of heteronormativity played a role also in workforce regulation: it allowed unequal wages for men and women, discounted the economic value of household work done by women, and constituted heterosexual masculinity as the force behind trade unions, etc.4

Today’s situation stands in significant contrast to Fordism, which becomes obvious in particularly in examining the shapes of heteronormativity then and now. The restrictive model has been displaced by a controlled sexual individualization: since the 1960s, new social movements focused on civil equality for women, racial minorities, gays and lesbians, etc. have eked out liberation though the old patriarchal model of civil society. Countless sexual and gender images, roles, self-conceptions, have subsequently emerged. But these remain hierarchically composed in compliance with the heterosexual matrix. The changes achieved were recaptured and constrained as a consequence of the upheaval of high-tech global capitalism. This mode of capitalist production relies on both individualization of its subjects (to make use of their individual creativity, to avert collective resistance) and commodification of all and everything, including human sensualities (Hennessy 2000). The complex hierarchical arrangement of sexual and gender forms compares functionally to that of workforce regulation as a frugal old stratification. In this scheme, as fields of production developed they were connected to subjective creativity needing the inimitability of each subject as major resource. Production and creativity are structured more by the self-governance of individuals than by discipline. Its primary mode of discipline is the entrenched underlying continuance of older relations of domination that have seemingly been overcome in favor of liberal equality, even while potent vestiges of them are available to constrain the now allegedly free individuals.5

The economic structure of the hegemonic bloc has also considerably changed. The rise of the new mode of production has levered sections out of the working class, transformed them to self-employed workers, and integrated their upper strata (providers of high-tech services, software engineers, and other creative minds who normally work with the new means of production) into the bloc, while disempowering casual and regularly employed laborers as well as parts of the higher qualified working class. The changes provide women and racial minorities with new opportunities for advancement but, by no means all of them.

In contrast, the outcome has been a flexible differential integration, where a tiny elite is given chances to make it, even up to CEOs in head offices of economy, politics, administration, or media, while the majority is spread over much less promising jobs, differently successful but still keeping hope, or as complete outcasts as they were before (this is often mainly a migrant's or a transsexual's fate). Altogether, former clear hierarchical lines of gender, class, migratory status/nationality, sexuality, etc. are replaced by an ambivalence arising from their overlap and interaction, mutual amplification and balancing, combined with extensive economization of lifeworld (Lebenswelt). This has material consequences for sexual politics.6

The dispositif of CSD

CSD is shaped by interplay of sexual individualization and liberal democracy. The diversity of its participants, who are not connected within one political project, is an invitation to draw political gains from the event — and the numbers of people present even amplifies the desire to make use of it. Claims made in the name of this crowd carry some political weight. This leads directly to competition for ‘legitimate’ representation of the non-heterosexual field for events like CSD. Clubs and professional projects specialized in policymaking are able to participate in the endless, laborious meetings and thus have an advantage in this process.7 They are clearly motivated by material interests because they receive state subsidies only when they have a community supporting them. CSD’s arrangement at large is shaped by a particular ideological construction: organizers and the majority of participants share a gay, lesbian, homosexual, or
similar self-identity. It is precisely this identity that is the reason for the party and thus allows CSD to speak in the name of those who attend, even though it is not necessary for every reveler to agree who does and who does not belong.8

The identity-political cathexis is inoperable, since CSD has turned into a consumer-cultural amusement. But here exactly is where its inner limitations lie: there are no more shared interests that can easily be coordinated and represented by lobbying organizations. Yawning political boredom sprawls and endangers all claims of representing anything. For this reason Berlin CSD has, apart from its professional organizers, a free and accessible structure, CSD-Forum, for volunteers to discuss and chose its political demands and the parade’s route. However, to prevent criticism from members of the Forum, participation rights have been downsized over the years. Of course, what has also been downsized is people’s desire to be involved. So functionaries were overjoyed when a group of young activists joined and submitted their cute political slogan, “Berlin Stands Queer against Right-Wing”. Moreover, the slogan perfectly conformed to feel-good government policy statements. Thus the clause became a statement competing for legitimate representation. It allowed organizers to deny any accusations of de-politicization even though only a few CSD officials understood how much they had lucked out, after all the extensive media coverage.

Limits of re-politicization

Once formulated by the CSD-Forum through the participation of the “queer against right-wing” group, the March’s political claims were disseminated by Berlin’s lesbian and gay media. The first ten of these claims document the CSD’s attempt at politicizing the march.

Queer against right-wingers — unafraid through Berlin’s streets

Bisexuals, Intersexuals, Lesbians, Gay Men, Transgender Persons, and Transsexuals demand:

— Politicians should issue clear guidelines and statements against right wing groups
— Politicians should use more sensitive language so as not to pass on prejudices or use stereotyping names [plakative Schlagwörter]
— Investigation of the causes of right-wing violence, instead of conciliation
— Prevention of violence must become “Chefsache”9
— Allocation of more money for educational projects to fight prejudice and work for integration and enlightenment
— New efforts against right-wing violence through prevention work with boys and young men aimed at changing male role behavior
— Government appointees committed to anti-discrimination and queer issues who will serve as contact persons at the federal level
— Official reparations for lesbian and gay victims of Nazism and Paragraph 17510
— Recognition of persecution due to sexual orientation as grounds for granting asylum to refugees
— A queer culture instead of the German “Leitkultur”11, 12

Let us ignore the question of whether CSD participants supported or rejected these ten demands; there are no polls or other data to answer this question reliably. Rather these demands are (almost) meaningless: they do not describe or analyze a given situation, they do not explain why these particular claims are made, and it does not suggest what would be accomplished if they were met. The claims themselves are also rather weak: ‘politicians’ should set clear limits on right-wingers and speak more sensitively. This was easy to demand in 2001, after the so-called “Uprise of the Propers” — a governmental initiative against growing right-wing violence in Germany that consisted in many programmatic speeches and slightly more money for youth social work — so it might be counted as admission ticket to the liberal-democratic discourse. Then, the causes of right-wing violence should be researched — but no
hint of where to look for them. Sure, “prejudices” are mentioned twice. No word, however, on the fact that racist attitudes are contradictorily connected with processes instituted by capital realization — processes that produce precariousness and poverty, competitiveness on the labor market and other culturally reshaped conflicts, from which right-wing confratres draw their magnetic force. No word either about the ideological forms that — multiplied and turned into complete destruction under the Nazis — are established in German common sense (i.e. in discursive praxis at large), take at least implicit effects and found docking points for right-wing extremism through the present.

Both of these points would be essential in order to fully develop a “strategy against the right wing.” First, there is no reference here to racism at all; only later, when communication and behavior in subcultures are addressed, are migrants at least mentioned. The second point, exposure to German history, is charily touched in demanding “official reparations for lesbian and gay victims of Nazism and Paragraph 175.” A third point, recognized links between certain forms of masculinity and right-wing extremism and demands “preventive [social] work.” The fourth point would probably require a debate on authoritarianism to settle it. But to what extent might this become a topic so long as there are also calls for the prevention of violence to be Chefsache? Altogether the appeal mirrors the basic structure of CSD: it lacks an internal strategic direction and is only the means for deploying the strategies of assorted political actors who know how to use this outlet. The effort to (re)politicize the matrix itself, i.e. to couple CSD with genuinely antiracist and antifascist claims, failed — at least in this case.

Racism in liberal-democratic representation

One person who could indeed make the “prevention of violence” as Chefsache was the honored guest speaker at the final rally of the march, the president of Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse. His invitation and participation symbolize the closing of ranks with liberal-democratic establishment. Thierse said, “for more than a year now, we intensely debated right-wing violence.” Again and again the question had been raised “why in particular young people and mainly in the East of Germany do so violently beat other humans, even stomp them to death.” But he did not discuss the very reasons this debate had brought to light. It was made clear at the start who the ‘We’ is and who is ‘Evil.’ Later he announced, “Right-wing extremism and xenophobia arise from the middle of society” but he did say a word about how and why they originate in this middle. Instead he announced, “We must not allow neo-Nazis to define who does belong to us and who does not.”

He addressed CSD directly next. Thierse remembered the homosexuals who were persecuted under Nazism and advocated a memorial for them. How “we position ourselves regarding homosexuality,” he continued, is “above all a question of tolerance and acceptance.” Though “sexual orientation” is not a moral issue, how we deal with it is indeed an issue. Here the president established a hierarchy for tolerance: tolerance should first be directed to partnerships when they are established in “loyalty and faithfulness, respect and solidarity, fairness and love.” According to Thierse, Berlin is an open-minded city and the mayor’s open admission of his homosexuality is “good.” It followed a little off-the-cuff remark, “I have been married for 28 years to the same woman, and think it’s good!”

Both parts of his speech — the first on the danger neo-fascism represents for democracy, and the second on society’s attitude toward homosexuality — spoke in the name of the majority in a “democracy that lives on diversity, on plurality in society.” He named the opposing political forces: the supporters of liberal democracy and those outside, the right-wing margin. But he did not try to say “who does and does not belong to us.” This might be understood as a problem of representation, underneath which — and this is precisely my argument — lies an equalizing inequality that challenges political action against racism and heterosexism.

His speech simultaneously exposed and concealed racism. Thierse spoke about “racism, xenophobia and violence” but only that perpetrated by neo-fascists. The fact that liberal de-
Democracies also constitute themselves sometimes violently through racist exclusions, remained unaddressed. He illustrated the odiousness of neofascist violence noting: “In Berlin and other big cities it is a matter of course that homosexual couples walk down the street holding hands, but in many rural regions this remains risky. Particularly in the so-called ‘nationally liberated areas’ homosexuals are assaulted and hounded.” This example seemed custom-tailored to the crowd standing in front of him, since he saw them only as homosexuals. But, racist aggressions make the main part of right-wing violence. He did not ignore this, but neither did he directly address victims of racist violence, even though they stood in front of him, too. Thus the racially marked subjects were remarkably visible and invisible at the same time: they heard the speech, but were noted only in that their enemies were denounced.

In doing so, Thierse took a white ‘native German’ point of view and disambiguated CSD to exactly the same definition. Explicitly he stated that right-wing strategies aim at the racist exclusion of racially marked ‘Others’ in order to construct a homogeneous community. But he remained silent about liberal-democratic strategies that grant equality to all residents but with a differential integration of ‘Others.’ (A strategy that maintains its borders by selective recruitment of the workforce or exotization and sexualization of cultural difference.) In differential integration, exclusions must be restricted to keep the arising racist stratification utilizable. Here, utilizability rules the content and form of liberal-democratic representation: difference is considered necessary (‘democracy relies on diversity, on plurality,’ as the president stated); so difference must remain and, from there, also the impulse to doom not only right-wing violence, but the desire for homogeneity that supports it, too. The primacy of utilizability needs to stay invisible, because invisibility allows the illusion to evolve. The hierarchy inherent to difference cannot be abolished without overcoming the societal relations in which production and the utilization of difference are bound.

**Sexuality and racism — modulations of contradictions**

The CSD awarded its first Civil-Courage-Prizes in 2001. The activist group “queer against right-wing” received one for their consensus-enabling slogan; another went to a secondary school where students had committed themselves against xenophobia. Paul Spiegel, chairman of the Central Consistory of Jews in Germany, was honored as a voice that had criticized the mendacious rhetoric of the “Uprise of the Propers” and had insisted that politicians assume personal responsibility for agitating and implicitly encouraging violence. Besides representing a tribute to a specific person, this prize was an intervention into the liberal-democratic field: it supported a discourse position that in the name of civil rights, and claims protection for the racially marginalized. The award showed that it might indeed be a reasonable matter for non-heterosexual minorities to sustain such civil rights positions, allowing them to claim protection and sexual freedoms, too.

Nevertheless, another award showed these positions to be highly contested in non-heterosexual subcultures as long as sexual citizenship is not directly attacked. By awarding a prize to Schwules Überfalltelefon (Gay Victims Hotline) of Man-o-Meter, CSD honored a project that had been criticized for years because of its – conscious or unconscious – racism. In reporting anti-gay violence, the Hotline’s depictions of gay bashers include stereotypes of “southern descended” offenders, are frequently assumed to be non-“Germans,” and generally suggest the homophobic attacks are committed mainly by young male immigrants.

The CSD Civil Courage prizes can be critiqued on multiple points. First, is the racism of this non-heterosexual subculture. Its privileging of whiteness is visible when considering the contradictory connection between individual homophobic acts and the structural heterosexism of society. Structural heterosexism emerges exemplarily from Thierse’s attempt to joke, ‘By the way: I am married for 28 years with the same woman, and I think this is good!’ His by-the-way comment is framed by the German constitution, which in Article 6, codifies the protection of heterosexual marriage as a national objective. The president speaks from the point of norma-
tive heterosexuality. From here he names the crowd before him as homosexual, obfuscating all other sexualities and genders. From this heteronormative position, he dictates the conditions under which tolerance will be conceded: to homosexuals who live in partnerships of faithfulness and love. Here, too, he can laud the mayor for not letting himself to be blackmailed because of his homosexuality. Again, in speaking of Neonazis – by whom “homosexuals are assaulted and hounded” – he makes other forms of inequality disappear while maintaining the structuring liberal-democratic field. The individual offence is embedded in a matrix of societal structures; the offence violated the rules and the president condemns them but the violent act is enabled and discretely supported.

The Hotline highlights only direct, personal attacks and represents attackers as the racially defined Other. Clearly this is an attempt to take majoritarian Germanness as a starting point, and thus to attach oneself to the unmarked discourse position inside the core of differential integration. It is indisputably legitimate to criticize this racist representation. But in addition, it should also be noted that MoM is hiding the connection between concrete and structural violence. Offenders act in the name of a norm, which is stamped in the German constitution: that there are and shall be two (and only two) genders, hierarchically arranged, clearly distinguishable in body and behavior, and tied together by erotic desire and faithfulness. This very heterosexual norm structures and allocates speaking authority, the president speaks as representative of the norm, the Hotline speaks as an outcast. MoM’s (racist) attachment to majority must fail, since the liberal-democratic majority is constituted not only racially, but heteronormatively as well.

Possible uprisings of the Improvers

Funny enough, it was the political slogan “against right wing,” that actually averted a repolitization of CSD: the deep roots of racism and heteronormativity in liberal democracy was neither noted nor made an object to political action. Because all ‘problems’ were projected onto the right-wing margin, the hegemonic constellation did not come into view at all. But, how could differential integration — the unequal, and inequality producing allocation of protection, freedom, social affiliation, participation, etc. — be made a point of an attack in which sexual and antiracist politics could meet? On that, three tentative and short notions:

1. Representations of dissidence. The experience of marginalization represented by participants, implies a potentiality of malcontent and protest, but CSD’s identity-based political and authoritarian structure forecloses attempts for adequate expression. For example, somebody who has had bad experiences with a liberal heterosexism that casually employs extreme violence might well refuse to hear the president’s heteronormative rhetoric and his veiled comparison to the moderate liberal center versus a violent right-wing fringe. Likewise collapsing the crowd’s identity to “homosexuals” should bother some people who do not (want to) this label put on themselves. And protests could arise, too, from the president concealing the roots of heterosexism and racism in both liberal and right-wing politics as well as from silencing victims through misrepresentation of the victims. Such protests do not need a shared identity, nor comparable experiences of oppression. They could start individually and later connect different personal histories in the very process of resistance. The frolicking crowd’s mood could prevent this from happening – although protests can start from a good mood, too. In addition, the basic acknowledgement of a homosexual/non-heterosexual citizenship by the president generated applause and good feelings about “belonging” as Berlin’s mayor is celebrated as ‘one of us.’ Thus to articulate dissatisfaction (a precondition for political protest), CSD’s hierarchic configuration had to be disrupted and irreverence celebrated. Voluptuous reclaiming and generalization of non-conformity necessarily belong to the repolitization of a dissident sexual movement.

2. Capacity to act. For several years now, a tradition of dissident CSD events have been held that emerged from criticism over the commercialization of the mainstream CSD, that is
its (economic) utilization of difference.20 These alternative CSDs are not only an anti-authoritarian form of fun, but their content consists of criticizing societal relations from non-heterosexual speaking positions. Although such criticism all-too-easily tends to divide the world into “good” and “bad” homosexuals/queers (and thereby attests more to the attendees’ moral integrity than to political analysis). At the same time this scheme is inverted through parodic inflection. The self-ironic set-up contains underused possibilities for overcoming the ritual condemnation of white majoritarian Germanness in favor of real attempts to represent queer diversity: Non-heterosexual communities are exceedingly diverse and this inner heterogeneity could manifest a new political subject (today recognizable in buds, at best) by way of replacing the politically correct ‘speaking for’ with a (queerly collective? collectively queering?) ’acting jointly.’

3. Queer friendships. A hitherto underestimated (or hardly even conceived) source of social change is queer friendships — i.e. forms of affective attachments that cross the margins of genders and sexual classifications as well as heteronormative kinship concepts. (Such friendships are not tied to certain identities; e.g. het-people may be involved, if heteronormativity for them constitutes a problem that they work on.) Affective attachment produces an interest in the situation of the Other, and thereby makes recognizable differential integration’s mechanisms of marginalization, beyond one’s own concerns. These friendships motivate a political capacity to act (joint actions/demonstrations, fictitious marriages with illegal migrants, etc.). And, in practice they make imaginable a life not governed by utilization of difference.

In negotiations and struggles around a society’s exclusions and inclusions develops a complex, changing system of participation and chartered rights that mirrors the constellation of forces, and offers a means of struggle for recognition and social justice for the minorities defined by it. With every single interaction, each intervention into the constellation of forces, this constellation itself is at stake. This might be a good reason to risk one’s own marginalization and thereby constitute oneself a political subject of diversity, developing social relations not determined by utilization, but spread under the star of friendship.

Bibliography


Notes:
1. “Berlin stellt sich que(e)r gegen rechte Gewalt”; “que(e)r” is word-play between “queer” and “crosswise” or to “stand in the way of.”
2. I use ‘heteronormativity’ as term of wider comprehension that includes hetero/sexism (i.e. violence and direct discrimination), gender inequality, oppression structures and so forth. The term conceives Butler’s “heterosexual matrix” (cf. Butler 1990, 151 fn 6) as the organizing principle of societal gender relations: it enforces the human to exist in form of two genders — clearly different in body and behavior, hierarchically arranged, and in sexual desire exclusively related to each other. On the significance of heteronormativity in theory of society see Wagenknecht (2004).
4. The latter aspect can excellently be studied in Stephen Daldry’s film “Billy Elliot” (2000), where the confraternity of the miners in strike is constituted by exclusion of the ‘others’, namely women and queers — cf. Wagenknecht 2003.
5. This allows for using ‘difference’ (i.e. origin from a lower rank of the traditional hierarchy strata) as a resource of creativity that might pay well. It is a well of unforgettable individuality, but on the other hand the individual must not insist on criticizing the hierarchy itself all-too-much or it will be replaced soon enough by somebody else who is easier to handle.
6. My short outline is not at all meant to be complete. I neither focused here on globalization and transnational struggles for hegemony, nor on open-market policy or reforms of the welfare system. For detailed analyses see e.g. Dieter Plehwe et.al. 2005.
7. In Berlin this has been for years the socio-cultural centers Mann-o-Meter (MoM) and Sonntagsclub (SC) as well as the political association Lesben- und Schwulenverband in Deutschland (LSVD). — MoM was founded late in the 1980s by the [West]Berlin Gay Network TBS to coordinate AIDS-prevention. But soon MoM made itself independent and started competing against TBS for the money spent by Berlin municipalities. SC emerged in the 1970s as a group of homosexual citizens in East-Berlin. First the GDR-authorities refused to officially recognize the association; 1985, when it finally became registered, it was the first gay and lesbian group that did not meet in private rooms or Christian parish halls. Both projects offer to this day relevant counseling and support to people in need — MoM as a gay project; SC as a mainly lesbian and gay one, giving space to bisexual and trans people as well. LSVD was founded 1990 in Leipzig as Gay Association in the GDR, but was renamed actually already before German unification. Thereafter West-German gay functionaries speedily came to enter it. Since 1999, as then indicated by the organization’s name, lesbians are desired members. Today LSVD is oriented on lobbying and claims to be the biggest representation of homosexuals in Germany.
8. For a thorough critique on identity politics, see Hark (1999).
9. Chefsache swings between “top priority” and the words literal meaning, “principal’s business.”
10. A national prohibition against homosexuals, Paragraph 175, was added to the Reich Penal Code in 1871. It read, “Any unnatural sex act committed between persons of male sex or by humans with animals is punishable by imprisonment; the loss of civil rights might also be imposed.” The NSDAP amended Paragraph 175 in 1933 to close what were seen as loopholes. See also Stanley in the volume, for the effect of Paragraph 175 on German-held Polish territories.
11. *Leitkultur* claims an original, native, pristine German Culture (which of course never existed) to be the defining culture in Germany.

12. http://www.siegessaeule.de/csd/forderungen.html, this page is no longer available; the text (without title) is documented at http://2001.csd-berlin.de/?content=id0007&language=deutsch (retrieved 05/07/2005). The claims quoted are amended by more demands that copy those of previous years.

13. However, the labeling as “lesbian and gay” is not correct, for it reconfigures the victims to today’s identity categories. – For a critique on identity-political occupations of remembrance see Wagenknecht 2005.

14 http://2001.csd-berlin.de/?content=id0020&language=deutsch (retrieved 07/05/2005); following quotations there as well.

15 On Dec 12 2003 the Bundestag, the German parliament, finally decided to build this memorial. In 2005 a project contest takes place, the start of construction is announced for 2006.

16 Statistics published by *Schwules Überfalltelefon/MoM* do not confirm this prejudice. Christoph Ahlers (2000) analyzed the 673 cases reported between 1994 and 1996. He treats his data to be significant – I disagree for the following reasons: (1) According to insufficient documentation, in 90 cases could not be checked, if there was any relevance of the victim’s (actual or by the offenders supposed) sexuality; for 166 cases such a relevance had to be excluded. Despite this, the statistic does not rely on the lasting 417, but on all cases the project had heard of. (2) These cases were spread over town very disproportionally – e.g. from the concrete dormitory districts far-off in East-Berlin almost none were reported. So, the statistic may record less the extent of homophobic violence than the project’s acceptance among victims (which is maximum in district Schoeneberg, the project’s quarter). (3) To find out if a certain social group is more homophobic than others, research cannot be based on a variable (named “nationality of the offender(s)”) that consists in pure speculations – some more information is necessary than only a look in the moment of the attack. With that information, then, one had to probe if the group members’ portion in the total number of offenses is significantly higher than their portion in total population. Ahlers does not even try to prove this.

17 The connection between marriage and heterosexuality was latterly confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court’s sentence on the ‘Law for the termination of discrimination of same-sex partnerships — civil unions’: “It is part of the content of marriage itself, as it is retained despite social change and associated changes of juridical organization and as it is coined by Basic Constitutional Law, that it is the uniting of a man with a woman into a partnership, which is intended to be permanent, is founded in free decision under protection of the state […], in which man and woman stand as equal partners […] and may freely decide on the organization of their cohabitation […].” (BVerfG, 1 BvF 1/01, 17.7.2002, 87; references to earlier judgments omitted) Furthermore: “If the legislator by way of establishing norms would contribute to a loss of marriage’s function, it would violate the encourage commandment as fixed in art. 6, paragraph 1, Basic Constitutional Law.” (103) So, in Germany marriage is the heart of the heterosexual norm and is not at all challenged by the so-called Homo-Marriage.

18 Representation is, as Antke Engel (2002) puts it, the “praxis of mediation between constitution of the subject and domination, with which takes place the implementation of hegemonic [cultural] forms, their contestation, but also the production of marginalized or sub-cultural forms” (223). So it is clearly the primary field of queer politics — a field “characterized by irreducible interdigitations of material and discursive moments” (ibid.). Within this very framework, I am interested in the question how to turn marginalized and sub-cultural forms into contestations of the hegemonic ones? — Surely this is a much too big issue than to be answered here.

19 This sounds easy and might be understood wrong. I should like to refer here to Althusser’s term “overdetermination”: “If […] a vast accumulation of ‘contradictions’ come into play in the same court, some of which are radically heterogeneous – of different origins, different sense, different levels and points of application – but which nevertheless ‘merge’ into a ruptural unity, we can no longer talk of the sole, unique power of the general ‘contradiction.’” (1977, 100 — italics there) So, in liberating political struggles the overdetermined contradiction is processed into collective capacity to act, and this might happen on CSD as well.

20 But see Pisankaneva in this volume.
WALKING THE STREETS: THE U.S. PROSTITUTION RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Antonia Levy

Introduction

Prostitution may be called the oldest profession in the world, but it is by no means the most accepted. Since ancient times, prostitutes have been stigmatized in most societies, held in moral contempt and their work criminalized or tightly regulated. Despite a United Nations convention calling for the decriminalization of prostitution in 1949 and sexual liberation movements of the 1960's, prostitutes all over the world still experience – in varying degrees – violation of their human and civil rights as well as legal restrictions on the exercise of their profession.

The rise of social movements and identity politics in the last half-century have given birth to prostitutes’ rights movements, with a growing number of sex workers’ collectives all over the world. But while the main goal of these rights organizations has been for the most part the same – the complete decriminalization of prostitution – there have been striking differences in the rationales for and the anticipated consequences of their activism. Depending on two opposing feminist interpretations of sex work as a social and individual phenomenon, prostitution is seen either as one of the many manifestations of the subordination of women in a patriarchal society that demands abolition, or as a legitimate form of labor that should be decriminalized that would permit sex workers access to human and employment rights comparable to the benefits enjoyed in legitimate forms of labor.

Despite the activities of several national and local sex workers’ rights organizations, the act of prostitution is still illegal in the U.S. with the exception of certain rural counties in the state of Nevada. In contrast, many European countries have introduced legal changes decriminalizing prostitution in varying degrees, mostly by giving the state control of this portion of the sex industry through taxation, work-zone restrictions, licensing, and health checks.

The participation, influence, and success of prostitution rights’ organizations on law reform and the policy-making process have varied widely from country to country: from active involvement and professional legalization in the Netherlands to the “failure” of the movement in the U.S.. Explanations for these different outcomes can be sought through analyzing the respective social and political environments of the nation of each movement. Specifically, through comparison with the gay rights movement and by an adaptation of the resource mobilization theory of social movements, some of the particular problems facing a movement for the rights of sex workers in the U.S. are revealed.

History and Legal Situation: Between Sacred Act and Unchaste Crime

Prostitution, often referred to as the oldest of professions, has by no means been “a single trans-historical, transcultural activity” as this cliché might imply. For example, around 3000 BCE in the cities of Mesopotamia and Egypt the Great Goddess Innana was herself identified as a “prostitute,” the prostitute-priestesses in her temples worked at the center of the religious as well as economic and political power of their time.

Prostitution exists today in every country in the world with varying peculiarities according to differences in national culture, laws and economics. In most societies, even in countries where prostitution is decriminalized, sex workers continue to be perceived as immoral and suffer social exclusion and marginalization. Furthermore, the sphere of prostitution often gets
restricted to female sex workers – despite the well-documented existence of male prostitution – and feminist critiques particularly address the sex-specific biases of laws and in law enforcement. One example of this moral double standard is the disproportionate rate of the prosecution of (female) prostitutes as opposed to their (male) clients.  

In the last thirty years several developments have shaped both national and international legal frameworks around prostitution as well as the organization of the greater sex industry. The rise of social movements and “identity politics” has led to more attention on gender equity as well as human rights for minorities and stigmatized groups, including sex workers. AIDS anxiety worldwide has produced policies for “harm reduction,” which in many countries have given rise to health promotion projects providing care and advice to prostitutes. Furthermore, the social and economic changes on the local and international level, like the widespread reduction of state benefits and increased mobility including migration and sex tourism, have altered the structure of the sex industry thus constituting a context for legal change and new directions in activism for the sex workers’ rights movement.  

Prostitution: Framing a Discourse

The development of law and policy regulating prostitution has been influenced by the wider philosophical and jurisprudential understandings of the issue, which differ markedly depending on the social and moral perspective of the argument. A discussion of fundamental philosophical questions – like the basic relationship between body, private property, and labor – is beyond the scope of this paper. Focusing on the prostitution rights movement, and in order to draw a picture of contrasting views, it is possible to say that the various ideological constructions of prostitution center around two poles.

On the one hand, prostitution is considered as a matter of sexual liberation, privacy and freedom, as a profession providing sexual (or even therapeutic) services. With the advent of liberation efforts in the 1970s, activists introduced the term “sex work” to refer to all types of employment in the commercial sex industry as well as to distinguish their terminology and efforts from those of abolitionists. This “sex work” position, favored by pro-prostitution rights activists, owners of the sex industry and some liberal politicians, claims that prostitutes have a principal right to sexual self-determination and professional choice.

In contemporary society prostitution, for some women, offers a good enough standard of income for shorter working hours and some degree of autonomy and independence for those working for themselves.

From this view, prostitution is seen as a legitimate form of work like any other wage labor, and thus all facets of it should be decriminalized. Here, decriminalization is understood as the repeal of all laws prohibiting prostitution – when being a consensual adult sex activity – as well as all state intervention, control and regulation of the commercial sex industry, except for laws regulating any other occupation. It is put in contrast to mere legalization; i.e. state regulation of the industry typically through licensing, registration, and compulsory health checks, as is the case in Nevada’s brothel system.

By claiming the right to control their own bodies as well as the right for freedom of choice, the freedom of travel and the freedom of association, prostitution rights’ activists demand the repeal of laws that prevent prostitutes from controlling their private lives, managing their business and organizing associations. Here, an important emphasis is being put on the distinction between voluntary prostitution resulting from an individual decision, and the forced prostitution of non-consenting adults and children, arising primarily from illegal trafficking. A significant impetus behind this argument is the claim that decriminalizing voluntary sectors of sex work could at the same time help in prosecuting forced prostitution.
The opposing view sees prostitution as inherently a matter of the inequality and exploitation of women—a view held mainly by radical feminists and abolitionists—and focuses mainly on female sex work. This position presumes that male control over female sexuality is a basic tenet of patriarchal ideology; women are defined as objects and deprived of the right to their own sexuality. Prostitution is a consequence of the general subordination of women and reflects the double standard of sexual behavior and the economic exploitation of women by men. As one abolitionist argued in 1982:

As feminists we abhor the exploitation of women's sexuality by profiteers, and some of us feel, instinctively, that prostitution supports an objectification of women's sexuality and of women, that is somehow related to the pervasive violence against us.

Here, prostitution is understood as a system that serves to condone and legitimate the discriminatory treatment of women, a social institution that “reduces women to a sexual commodity to be bought and sold and abused.” Consequently, since it is a human right to be free from abuse and prostitution in a patriarchal society is considered sexual exploitation, all forms of sex work should be abolished. Many radical feminists and the abolitionists among the rights movements oppose the legitimization of prostitution at all. Those taking this position feel that by criminalizing all illegal activities of prostitution, strengthening penal measures to control clients and pimps, and implementing educational programs designed to shame male clients about exploiting women, work training projects for prostitutes and other welfare structures, the demand for prostitution would ultimately be eliminated.

Both of these positions on prostitution recognize the injustice in existing discriminatory practices against prostitutes that prevent sex workers equal access to social and legal services and disenfranchises them politically. In a similar way, they also use the language of human and civil rights to support their arguments in an attempt to shift the debate about sex work away from discourse about sin, sex and crime towards a discussion about work, choice and civil rights.

But depending on their moral and social understanding of prostitution, different conclusions can be drawn. While the decriminalization position asserts the right to self-determination and the existence of voluntary prostitution, abolitionists focus on the ultimate elimination of the perceived necessity to sex work. From this point of view, permitting women to choose sex work, facilitates the perpetuation of a condition which involves the sale of a woman’s body and results in the objectification and dehumanization of the seller or prostitute, a depressed condition which cannot be altered or improved simply because prostitute women are allowed to prostitute.

These opposing views and demands frame also the public policy discourses on prostitution that are promulgated by various factions within the prostitution rights movement in the United States.

Prostitution: Rights and Movement in the United States

Throughout most of U.S. history, there was little regulation of prostitution under common law. Before World War I, most jurisdictions regulated soliciting through the enforcement of vagrancy laws. States laws specifically prohibiting prostitution were not enacted until the 1920s, after a long muckraking campaign against “white slavery.”

Today in the United States prostitution remains illegal, except in a few rural counties in Nevada with populations less than 250,000 where the state strictly regulates brothel prostitution. Federal immigration laws prohibit anyone who has ever been worked as a prostitute
from visiting or remaining in the U.S., either as a tourist or as a resident; any convictions for
prostitution either in the U.S. or in another country automatically bars American citizenship.
Nonetheless, a quasi-legalized brothel system has developed in many cities under the strict
control of municipal police departments.19

Prostitutes’ rights campaigns emerged, alongside other social movements, in the early
1970s in the United States. As opposed to previous efforts promoting the rights of sex workers,
mainly by women’s rights groups, prostitutes themselves defined this new movement.20

One of the first such organizations was COYOTE (“Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics”),
found in San Francisco by Margo St. James in 1973 and still in operation. One of its main
goals was and is to speak from the perspective of prostitutes about their human and civil rights.
Similar organizations were formed in other parts of the U.S.; among them PUMA in Massa-
chusetts, Prostitutes of New York (PONY); CUPIDS in Detroit, and PASSION in New Orleans.
Like COYOTE, these groups were mostly small, sometimes with only a few active members:
some are transient, others persistent. Of those that survive, many have changed their focus
from advocacy to other issues related to prostitution, like child abuse, health issues or violence
prevention.

The more persistent groups include the California Prostitutes’ Education Project (CAL-
PEP, today PENET) and the National Task Force on Prostitution (NTFP). NTFP was founded
in 1979, by Priscilla Alexander, as an umbrella organization for prostitutes and prostitutes’
rights organizations in different parts of the United States.21 It held its first national conference
in San Francisco, and expanded its purpose in 1994 to involve organizations and individuals
who support the rights of prostitutes and other sex workers.

These organizations share as their main objective the full decriminalization of prostitution.
Some of them oppose mere legalization since they view registration, licensing, and compulso-
ry health examinations as inherently oppressive. Through insisting on prostitutes’ basic rights
to occupational choice and sexual self-determination they claim that prostitution is a form
of legitimate labor. Along with abolishing the existing prostitution laws their goals include
ensuring the right of prostitutes to bargain with their employers, to inform the public about a
wide range of issues related to sex work, to promote the development of support services for
sex workers, including health and legal assistance, and to end the public stigma associated with
sex work.22

Despite active and diverse networks of prostitution rights organizations, especially in the
early years of the movement, the efficacy was rather limited, leading one scholar to the call the
movement a “failure.”23 This becomes evident particularly when comparing their achievements
with the changes in prostitution policies in other countries, where sex workers faced similar
moral and legal restrictions and where comparable rights movements emerged. Resource mo-
bilization theory permits us to analyze many of the factors for a movement’s failure or success.
A study of the structure of the movement, the complex field of players in the politics of pros-
titution as well as the wider political and social climate a particular movement is embedded
permits a more accurate evaluation of its achievements.24

The “Failure” of the Movement in the U.S.

In his analysis of COYOTE, Weitzer (1991) applies the resource mobilization theory of
social movements25 to explain the “failure” of the prostitution rights movement in the U.S.26
The reasons are manifold. Most of all the movement is lacking human and financial capital. Its
sub-cultural foundation, important for the material organizational and psychological support
of a movement, consisted of never more than a handful of activists and many inactive, immo-
ibilized members.27 Also, the few available material resources, particularly funding, decreased
substantially with the growth of political conservatism, the failure of mainstream women’s
movement to support decriminalization, and the rise of concerns around AIDS in the 1980s.

One important factor weakening the movement, often unaddressed in the literature, are the conflicts of interest among sex worker activists, originating in the fundamental ideological divisions among feminists on prostitution. While rights organizations like COYOTE or NTFP demand the full decriminalization of prostitution and its legitimization as a form of legal labor, other groups – also campaigning for changes in prostitution policy – partly contest these objectives. For example, WHISPER (Women Hurt in System of Prostitution Engaged in Revolt) or the United States Prostitutes Collective (U.S. PROS) regard the distinction between free and forced prostitution as a distraction and view all commercial sex as a virulent form of coercive heterosexuality “undertaken out of desperation,” which should ultimately be eradicated. Abolitionist groups advocate not the rights of prostitutes as workers but the right to escape from prostitution. This fundamental ideological division among activists, which to an uninformed public all seem to promote prostitution rights, adds another obstacle to the endeavors of both sides.

Furthermore, the prostitution rights movement failed to build strong alliances, that might have offset the lack of internal resources. Contacts with both national and international affiliates are fairly loose, and the cooperation of the few supporting organizations, like the American Civil Liberties Union or mainstream women’s organizations, stay half-hearted due to the stigmatization of prostitution. For the same reason, the attention of mass media, a crucial factor in the success or failure of new social movements, have been very limited and often negative, affecting the acquisition of outside material resources and opportunities to influence public opinion.

The success of a “deviance liberation movement” can be measured in part by its impact on popular attitudes, local and national legislation, as well as official acceptance of the movement. So far, the prostitution rights movement in the U.S. has failed along most of these lines. Studies on moral attitudes or “tolerance of nonconformity” have indicated that the movement does not appear to have successfully defused popular myths about prostitution and that most Americans still favor its criminalization.

Also, the movement’s achievements, in terms of official acceptance, have been few. Police departments have rarely altered policies in response to the movement’s pressure, rejecting proposals for liberalization in fear of rising street crime. COYOTE’s lobbying of Congress in 1976 for a resolution on decriminalization failed. Consultation, sustained negotiation and formal recognition, as indicators of official acceptance of a movement, were developing in some cities, but these talks focused mostly on health issues rather than prostitutes’ civil rights. In general, most authorities and politicians still consider prostitution rights as “a moral crusade,” or “a risky issue” in terms of political advantages. In the words of sociologist Ronald Weitzer:

An important factor is that speaking out about prostitutes’ rights when you are a prostitute involves a good deal of personal risk; it is difficult to sustain the effort without financial and political support. For many people and organizations, prostitution is still an extremely controversial issue. For most legislators, it remains a joke except when it is used to gain prominence by attacking prostitutes.

Here, Weitzer draws a comparison to the struggles of other deviance movements, such as those for gay rights, abortion rights, and the rights of mentally ill patients. Deviance liberation movements work under an "extremely heavy yoke of disrepute" and have to cope with more moral as well as practical obstacles than most other rights initiatives. Besides facing the standard organizational and structural problems of all new social movements, they must additionally overcome the stigmatization of their life-style and the risk of low self-esteem among potential members. The fear of physical and psychological harassment can also be a major
obstruction to their organization and mobilization.\textsuperscript{35}

Regarding this continuous non-success of the prostitution rights movement in the U.S., a comparison with the gay rights movement helps to point out more specifically the internal and external limitations on policy initiatives for sex workers’ rights. As a deviance movement, gay organizations like prostitutes’ rights groups have had to confront public opinion that once condemned their sexuality as immoral, resulting in extremely low support for their objectives. Despite this similarity, the gay rights movement in the U.S. has achieved remarkable organizational development, gained access to political elites, lobbied successfully for the passage of gay rights ordinances, attained supportive media coverage, and influenced AIDS-related politics.\textsuperscript{36}

This impressive success can be attributed to the broad support base of the movement composed of members from many segments of society with good incomes that fund and support political mobilization. Comparatively, the prostitution rights’ movement in the U.S. lacks a pre-existing social networks or subculture and remains in a weak position to overcome its lack of moral capital to attain its goals.\textsuperscript{37}

Contrasting the two movements this way, Weitzer sees evidence for the main hypothesis of mobilization theory, namely that ideological and moral factors are secondary to material and organizational variables when considering a social movements’ success. In other words, Deviance liberation movements are not sentenced to fail because of high levels of perceived immorality. [They] may prevail [on] authorities … if they aggregate and mobilize the material and human resources of a mass base of constituents or well-endowed, influential third parties.\textsuperscript{38}

When comparing the performance of the U.S. movement to the achievements of sex workers’ rights movements in other countries – which faced similar moral obstacles as well as deficiencies of material and human resources like their U.S. counterpart – the conclusions drawn from the perspective of resource mobilization theory seem to be overly restricted to materialistic-organizational explanations. A closer look on the circumstances facilitating the success of prostitution rights movements in European countries partly supports the assumptions of mobilization theorists. At the same time it can be shown that the specific political climate as well as the constellation of players on the national political stage determine to a great extent the influence a movement might have on the policy-making process.

Prostitution Policies in Europe

In the last two decades the legal regulation of prostitution is changing in many countries around the world, with a significant shift in the balance between prohibition, legalization and decriminalization. The growth of organized prostitution and the globalization of the commercial sex industry have provoked ambiguous tendencies with demands for tighter control of some activities and a more liberal, legalized regime for others. Especially in Europe, several countries have taken a view that regards prostitution as part of the realm of sexuality and a matter of individual freedom and personal choice. In general, a legal distinction has been drawn between free and forced prostitution, whereby street walking has become decriminalized and the regulations on illegal forced prostitution, in the form of trafficking, pimping and procuring, have been enforced, although not without complaint.\textsuperscript{39}

Here, a comparative look at the specific outcomes of the rights movements’ efforts in the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden demonstrates how particular national moral environments and certain constellations within the rights movement and sex industry can have a determined influence on law reforms.

The national legislation on prostitution in the Netherlands tended toward abolitionism, like many other European countries. Nevertheless, in many cities the prohibition on brothels
coexisted with informal “red light districts” that allowed some governmental control. With the increasing globalization of prostitution in the early 1980s, efforts were made to change existing prostitution laws. First, licensing was advocated both to deal with public order complaints and to improve prostitutes’ occupational status. This resulted in parliamentary recommendations in 1984 that called for the decriminalization of brothels and acceptance of business activities of prostitutes but were not adopted.40

In 1985, the leading prostitution rights organization in the Netherlands, De Rode Draad (Red Thread), was founded. In the subsequent years, activists were able to represent their demands for the legalization of prostitution on many central and municipal government committees – a fact that had quite a substantial effect on legal reforms in subsequent years.41

In October 1999, the law to abolish the general ban on brothels and to legalize voluntary prostitution was passed. At the same time, penalties against those involved in the organization of involuntary prostitution were profoundly increased. With this decision the Dutch government took the position of prostitution rights advocates that rejects the abolitionist equation of prostitution with slavery, emphasizes both trafficking and “prostitution as work” and thus demonstrates the distinction between forced and voluntary prostitution.42

The differences with the U.S. can be attributed to several factors. Interestingly though, the change in legislation is not attributed to a change in public opinion toward prostitution. The moral attitude of the Dutch people however is not different than that of other countries in the European Union. Prosecution is not considered acceptable behavior and prostitutes face the same condemnation and stigma. But there is a typical element in Dutch political practice, called pragmatism, which makes it possible to see the sex industry as just another social phenomenon.43

In other words, the development of Dutch prostitution laws should be understood within the wider political culture in a country where a pluralist and pragmatic political tradition is creating an accommodation between highly polarized interests. Also, the liberal law reform in the Netherlands can be traced to specific historical developments in national sex laws: trafficking has been on the national political agenda for a long time because of the high proportion of migrant prostitutes in many Dutch cities.44 Furthermore, the new laws were supported widely by the sex industry and by sex worker rights activists. For example, the shift to licensing of brothels has been favored by operators as a way to control competition among them. Their hope is that the distinction between licensed and unlicensed operators, meaning good and bad, will encourage businesses to clean up their image and work for quality controls that will diminish the links between prostitution and vice crimes.45

Discussing the initial effects of the new law, the Red Thread believes situation for most sex workers has and will further improve, permitting sex workers full social, legal and employment rights. Nevertheless, illegal sex workers – illegal immigrants, underage prostitutes, or drug users – are excluded from these advantages and their already illicit situation is even worsened by enforced legislation.46 Even if the law recognizes the self-determination of sex workers, its limitations undermine its effectiveness since there is no attempt to address the rights of non-European Union citizens to work, nor to develop economic alternatives to prostitution.47

Prostitution rights activists in Germany recognized the constraints of Dutch prostitution policies and addressed these issues in their demands. According to the German Civil Code of 1901, prostitution was classified as an “offence against good morals.” Under the Third Reich, a 1943 law to combat venereal disease (Geschlechtskrank-heitengesetz) declared prostitutes the exclusive transmission vector for sexually transmitted diseases, and forced them to undergo regular and frequent medical examinations. Because of these laws, sex workers were refused full employment rights, social security benefits or health insurance, but if officially registered,
they were required to pay income tax.

Since late 1980s, Parliament has regularly debated a bill to reform the law on venereal diseases that would abolish mandatory testing and end the legal stigmatization of prostitutes. While the prostitution rights movement in Germany, with organizations like “Hydra” in Berlin or “Madonna” in Bochum, is considered “particularly strong” is was not until the 1998 election of an alliance of Social Democrats and the Green Party that progress was made. In June 1999, a draft bill recognizing prostitution as labor entered Parliament and the “law on [the] regulation of legal relationships of prostitutes” (Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse von Prostituierten) passed in December 2001. Prostitution was decriminalized and regulations on legal operations of brothels were extended. With the law, sex workers now are entitled to receive full employment rights and equal legal treatment.

In learning a lesson from the Dutch experience, prostitution activists in Germany object to the exclusion of sex workers who use illegal drug users and who do not have immigration papers, because their access to social services remains difficult under the new law. Furthermore, they call for the immediate abolition of repressive measures towards migrant workers.

While reforms of prostitution laws in the Netherlands and Germany show similar patterns – the combination of strong rights movements and particular historical situations of liberal political environments – changes in legislation regulating prostitution in Sweden offer an exception of the liberalization rule.

According to a 1999 law, Sweden declared “prostitution is not a desirable social phenomenon” and therefore the purchase of sexual services is prohibited. By criminalizing the client rather than the prostitute, Sweden reversed the logic of its earlier legal regulations. Sex workers are considered the weaker party in the contract, as female victims of exploitation and abuse.

Swedish regulation offers an example of a “broad attempt to tackle violence against women through strengthening and extending abolitionist policies that define all forms of prostitution primarily as social problem.” It was preceded by a twenty-year effort on the part of the social-democratic government to address prostitution as a social issue and to install a welfare system for women in the sex industry. The problem of prostitution is seen to consist of a socially unacceptable behavior and the law reform aims to solve the problem by removing demand thereby encouraging and helping workers back into mainstream society.

Recent developments in the Swedish sex industry seem to run counter to the intentions of the new legislation. The immediate reaction after implementation was a tenfold decrease of prostitutes working visibly on the street. As the new regulation forces both voluntary and forced prostitution underground, and new outreach methods are both time-consuming and labor intensive, social workers find it increasingly difficult to contact sex workers. Also, critics speculate that the abolitionist legislation could result in the migration of Swedish prostitutes to neighboring countries.

Conclusion and Outlook

Reviewing the specific reasons for the “failure” of the prostitution rights movement in the U.S. and placing it in the context of international experiences of law reform on prostitution, it can be shown that organizational factors as well as the wider political climate determine a movement’s performance, acceptance and eventually its success. The examples of legislative changes in the Netherlands and Germany document the important impact specific political constellations or traditions have on law reform of moral concerns.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the prostitution rights movement in the U.S. has failed both due to material and internal restrictions and because of a national “moral majority hegemony.” Additionally, public preoccupations with social disorder and abuse prohibit this discussion in the mainstream political agenda. In contrast, pragmatic political cultures of other
countries have created a positive space for advocacy and enforcement of sex worker interests.\textsuperscript{53}

Generally it can be said that the reduction or abolition of legal restrictions on voluntary prostitution improves the protection of basic human rights for prostitutes. Studies show countries with the most restrictive legal systems, like the U.S., have more problems with violence against prostitutes and the involvement of juveniles in prostitution than countries like the Netherlands or Germany with less restrictive laws. As the example of Sweden illustrates, reversing the law to punish clients in an effort to eradicate prostitution does not achieve the desired result but has a negative effect on the situation of prostitutes.\textsuperscript{54}

The door is open to the argument that exploitation … is best tackled through enforcing existing human rights and labor conventions and by decriminalizing all forms of prostitution so that sex workers have access to the same national and international protection as all other workers and citizens.\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, to answer the question why prostitution rights in the U.S. are still unrealized, further research should focus on the specific moral and political situation in which the movement is embedded. Keywords include moral double standards, influence of religious values on politics, regulation of female sexuality, influence of abolitionist factions of the rights movement on political agendas. Also, further comparisons to the struggles and successes of other deviance movements along these lines might lead to more profound and informed results.
Bibliography


Notes:
1 Scambler and Scambler 1997: xi.
2 The former Soviet Union, China and Cuba have undertaken large-scale projects to “rehabilitate” prostitutes in order to eliminate prostitution, yet prostitution continues to exist. (see Alexander 1987: 187-8)
5 See for example O'Connell Davidson 2002; Schwarzenbach 1998. Questions include: Do the body's sexual capacities constitute property in the person and is it impossible to detach sex from personhood without moral harm? Does prostitution law violate woman's right to engage in voluntary transfers of his/her rightful property, or does the prostitution contract violate his/her natural right to dignity? etc.
7 O'Neill 1997: 3.
8 See West 2000: 106.
9 Prostitutes Education Network (a); Alexander 1987: 209.
10 “Committee to Decriminalize Prostitution” 1996. Alexander 1987: 210
16 Edwards 1997: 76-77. Comparison is drawn to Plato’s “Slave Analogy”: if slaves are given rights to their own enslavement, does that alter the fundamental existence of their slavery?
For example, prostitutes are not allowed in bars or gambling casinos, or to accompany a client in the street or to a restaurant. They must register as prostitutes and are not allowed to reside in the same community in which they work. They are regularly tested for diseases and HIV. See Alexander, 1987, 190.

20 Prostitutes Education Network (a)

Even though there are several definitions of “new social movements” Weitzer argues that the prostitution rights’ movement in the U.S. should be considered “an organized effort to promote social change, using both institutionalized and non-institutionalized means.” See Weitzer 1991.

In short, resource mobilization theory places emphasis on the material and organizational variables when assessing a movement's performance and achievements: the degree to which initiatives are able to mobilize resources, build effective organizations, locate charismatic leaders, win third party support, and attract mass media attention determines the success of a movement.

In 1989, Margo St. James estimated that only 3% of COYOTE members were prostitutes.

The demands of abolitionists such as WHISPER or the Coalition against Trafficking in Women have been more influential, particularly at an international level on the UN and UNESCO because trafficking marries concerns about international crime and vice with third world exploitation.

Many Americans still associate prostitution with the spread of venereal diseases and public violence. Also, a survey using the sample of 1500 adults from throughout the U.S. found that only a substantial minority of 18% thought prostitution should be legal while 75% thought it should be illegal.

But see Chateauvert and Hekma, both in this volume, who argue that the success of the GLBT movement can be traced to the movement’s efforts to distance itself from sexuality issues.

For example health project workers in the Netherlands report acute problems of access to illegal sex workers that are attributed to their fear of more intense prosecution.

Unlike the laws in other countries, Germany does not criminalize the domestic partners of sexual workers as pimps or panderers.

Prostitution is a much smaller phenomenon in Sweden than in other countries. While in Sweden, an estimated 2500 prostitutes work in a population of 8.5 million (0.3 per 1000 inhabitants), in the Netherlands 25000 prostitutes work in a population of 16 million (1.9 per 1000 inhabitants).
RESPECTABILITY, SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP: COMPARING THE U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS AND GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENTS

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Historically, the struggle for civil rights in the United States has required unenfranchised populations to become “respectable” in order to attain full citizenship. Respectability is a form of public representation, the ways a person – or a group – behaves as represented in the news media, in popular culture, and perhaps importantly for our purposes, in academic literature. This “front,” as anthropologists Drake and Clayton suggested in the 1945, was especially important for the up-and-coming “hincty” Negroes, the African American strivers of the South Side who spent considerable dollars trying to keep up with the Joneses of white Chicago. It is the same “front” that queer shamers denounce when GLAAD, the Gay and Lesbian Advocates And Defenders, defends the respectability of (white) gay (men) in the media.

Respectability should be viewed as a movement tactic used by social change and identity-based organizations. The goal of citizenship – the attainment of political rights, civil rights, and social rights by subject groups – is a massive undertaking. Movements may list as their goal the reform of public law, and even constitutional amendments, but an equally critical achievement is attaining the respect of fellow citizens. Without that respect, identity-based organizations must overcome government resistance to the enforcement of laws written to protect newly won rights and privileges.

Is there anything wrong with “respectability”? “Education,” a broad term implying the inculcation of shared values and heritage and achieved through formal schooling overseen by government, is inextricably linked to respectability. It is through such schooling that people learn respectable public behavior and civic ideals, the markers of a civilized society. Thus, progressive ideology holds education as an indication of “mankind’s progress” from barbarism; some critics view such indoctrination as ham-handed efforts to inculcate bourgeois values into working class children. Indeed, this is one way to read T.H. Marshall’s classic 1950 essay, “Class and Citizenship.” Education, he argued, permits the lower classes to make “good choices” to differentiate between good and bad behaviors, and thus public education – if based on a true merit system – will elevate the entire society. Thus, one key measurement of a nation’s “progress” is the educational attainment of its people. The demonstrable links between women’s education and fertility rates is the basis of major UN and World Bank initiatives in “developing” countries. So, as justification for public funding of education, the demand for “respectability” has its uses. Identity-based movements deploy the tactic of respectability in order to enhance their power.

All of this of course, begs the question: “respectable” by whose standards? Schooling for a capitalist society, as economists Bowles and Gintis argued two decades after Marshall, actually tends to limit choice and individualism by its demand for rote recitation, factual memorization and the deadening routinization of classes begun punctually at the bell. Differentiating between “good” and “bad” choices involves making distinctions based on culturally inculcated values: you may think wearing white is “bad” choice of clothing for a funeral, while in most Asian cultures, it is the only “choice.” The Bush Administration promotes an abstinence curriculum, teaching students not to have sex until marriage. (The abstinence-only message is also a restriction on US funding for HIV education programs outside of the U.S.) That is the “re-
spectable” way for young people – and for adults (especially the dark-skinned) – to behave.

Many laws and regulations punish those who fail to behave, particularly in their sexual behavior. Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas held that private, consensual sex between adults should not be criminalized, it is doubtful that the State of Oklahoma will abolish its laws making adultery, fornication and sodomy felony offenses. (Indeed, Oklahoma would have difficulty gaining admission to the EU!) Legislators in Virginia have also announced that they retain similar sex laws, including one that penalizes both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, because they send a “moral” lesson. In this, the Virginia legislators are simply open about their moral disapproval, while other government officials are subtler in enforcing regulations governing sexual conduct. One consequence of the abstinence-only curriculum is a noticeable shift away from providing supportive social service programs for pregnant teenagers.

Unmarried, pregnant teens (and teen mothers) figure largely in the respectability tactic of identity-based citizenship movements. Representing sex out of wedlock, moralists judge pregnant girls as sluts who do not know how to say “no.” Some feminists may call them victims of predatory adults, particularly of male relatives, girls who cannot say “no.” Neither side permits young women to say yes without shame, because to do so challenges morality and thus, respectability. I will return in a moment with examples of young women’s sexuality in the civil rights movement.

Respectability carries with it expectations regarding a person’s public or sexual conduct. In order to win the rights of citizenship, identity-based movements have expended resources to defend their sexual morality and to prove their conformity to the gender role conventions of the middle-class. New citizens are expected to embrace the family lifestyles, moral values and heterosexual behaviors of middle-class white America. Perhaps one key determinant of an immigrant group’s success in the U.S. is to ask whether the group’s culture is conservative on sexuality matters. Long ago, historian Elizabeth Pleck noted that Italian immigrants, with a strong family bonds and marital history, seemed to have an easier time integrating in the early twentieth century than Irish immigrants who, while sharing Catholic values, tended to migrate to the U.S. as single women and men.

Acculturation into “mainstream” American society, however, is stressful, not the least for identity-based organizations. In every movement for the rights of minorities – of various races, ethnicities, genders, and sexualities – people have simultaneously fought to retain the social and cultural distinctiveness that makes them different from the mainstream. For most racial and ethnic groups, shared values regarding sexuality, and particularly female sexuality, help surmount cultural distinctiveness. The most tangible – and telling – example of these shared sexual mores is endogamy, which is declining but still prevalent. While groups may share sexual mores, there is still opposition to intermarriage. Long after the almost poetically named Loving v. Virginia decision in 1968 abolished laws against the marriage of whites and African Americans, opinion polls in the U.S. still show one quarter of those surveyed disapproved of mixed-race marriages. "Would you want your daughter to marry one?" remains a contentious question.

This question of marriage – or more accurately, sex – underlies the debates of the American civil rights movement. Racial integration, and especially “social equality,” were fighting words. Leaders of civil rights organizations, such as Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (the NAACP), and Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (a separate organization), frequently denied that their goal was social equality. The brutal lynching of 14-year-old Emmett Till for “whistling” at a white woman soon after the Supreme Court struck down school segregation in 1955 was a harsh – and an oft-repeated reminder – of whites’ attitudes toward interracial sex. (Or, more accurately, sex between Afri-
can American men and white women.) Northern whites who thought de jure segregation was wrong nonetheless agreed with Southern whites on the issue of interracial relationships.

Of course, criminalizing interracial marriage (and in some states, fornication) did not eliminate it. Much more than law kept interracial sex a “dirty secret.” A cornerstone of racism is the myth that African Americans – that “tropical people” – are more sexually active than those from the “frozen north.” The “black beast rapist” and the “promiscuous” black woman are twin fictions created by whites to justify rape. This myth permitted white men to rape black women with impunity (a “willing” woman can’t be raped), and established, automatically, that all black men wanted to rape white women. Civil rights organizations spent tremendous amounts of time and money defending black men accused of sexual crimes; the Scottsboro “Boys” in the 1930s and the Emmett Till case in 1955 are just two of the best known examples; in 1951, one man was imprisoned for “reckless eye-balling” of a white woman.

In an atmosphere like this, civil rights organizations had to carefully plan their legal and political strategy. Plaintiffs in civil litigation were carefully screened; those who closely adhered to the highest ideals of civic virtue were sought. It is not surprising that almost every father who served as a plaintiff in the school desegregation cases leading to Brown was a veteran of World War II or Korea, all were married, and most were homeowners. Their honor, their respectability, could not be challenged in the press or by the defending jurisdictions. To make over the image of Mrs. Mamie Bradley, the mother of Emmett Till, the NAACP and even Life magazine portrayed her as a war widow who continued to show her patriotism by working in a Chicago armaments factory.

Then there is Mrs. Rosa Parks, and Claudette Colvin and Mary Louise Smith, three African American women who challenged the bus segregation ordinance of Montgomery, Alabama. Why is it, then, that Rosa Parks, “the tired dressmaker” became the symbol of African American resistance? Claudette Colvin and Mary Louise Smith also refused to comply with the segregation ordinance, and yet civil rights leaders in Montgomery did not press their cases for desegregation. Why? Claudette Colvin, a 15-year-old, straight A student at the city’s only high school for blacks, refused to give up her seat to a white when the bus driver ordered. The enraged driver called the police who dragged the girl, kicking and screaming off the bus, where she was handcuffed and jailed. A few months later, in October 1955, 18-year-old Mary Louise Smith was arrested, also for refusing to move to the back of the bus.

One argument for not taking up either of these earlier cases is that black leaders weren’t yet prepared to fight. While this may be true, the politics of respectability – of the girls’ public behavior – also explains leaders’ reluctance. Some viewed Colvin’s angry reaction to her arrest as disrespectful of the law and of the police. Smith’s case, which several organizers wanted to fight “all the way to the Supreme Court,” was even better. But when she became pregnant out-of-wedlock, organizers quietly dropped her case. The respectability of Mrs. Rosa Parks, the “quiet” married lady who had no children, who worked at a white-owned department store, and whose husband was a barber, was difficult to challenge. The pattern of choosing plaintiffs whose respectability was unquestionable remained a key factor in the success of the African American civil rights movement.

Organizers also used the tactic of respectability when engaged in non-violent demonstrations. When the Montgomery Bus Boycott was successfully won (through a Supreme Court decision and action by the Mayor and the city’s downtown businessmen) in December 1956, the Montgomery Improvement Association specifically suggested that black bus patrons “observe ordinary rules of courtesy and good behavior… In sitting down by a person, white or colored, say ‘May I’ or ‘Pardon me,’ as you sit. This is common courtesy.” The confrontational student-led sit-in movement that began in February 1960 also employed this tactic, recommending that men dress in suits and ties, and women in dresses. All should carry their books,
prepared to study quietly which sitting at lunch counters waiting to be served.

Despite the best efforts of activists to show themselves as citizens possessing virtue and honor, domestic intelligence agents sought to expose any connection to “Communists and moral degenerates” they could find. Under Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover, civil rights leaders were under constant surveillance, including wiretaps without warrants, bugging of hotel rooms and offices, and the presence of FBI agents acting as infiltrators. While we now know that Hoover and his second in command were long time companions (an underground tunnel connected their homes in Southeast Washington, DC), the FBI director was obsessed with disrupting the Movement. The FBI threatened to expose Martin Luther King as an adulterer, a conclusion reached after a listening to a bug planted in a motel room. Hoover himself described King as “a ‘tom cat’ with obsessive degenerate sexual urges.”

Fear of “sex-baiting” created dilemmas for gay and lesbian organizers in the civil rights movement. Bayard Rustin, the man who taught Martin Luther King the principles of non-violent resistance over the winter of 1955-1956 and who organized the 1963 March on Washington, was fired from the Fellowship of Reconciliation (a forerunner of CORE) in 1952 after his conviction on a “morals charge.” Other gay men remained closeted. A. Philip Randolph, the “Dean” of the movement, the president of the only national black trade union, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and organizer of the first March on Washington in 1941, was Rustin’s mentor, and a gay man. Pauli Murray, another veteran of the first March on Washington, trade union organizer, civil rights attorney, founder of the National Organization for Women (NOW), and the first African American woman ordained a priest of the Episcopal Church, and a lesbian. Finally, there is Dorothy Height, also a 1941 March veteran (some might remark that a pattern is emerging here), the protégé of National Council of Negro Women founder Mary McLeod Bethune, who assumed leadership of that group in the early 1950s and remains Chair of the Board today.

The (heterosexual) male leaders of the Movement, many of them trained theologians, deliberately kept Rustin in the background, fearful the movement be discredited for permitting “degenerates” to assume leadership positions. Led by Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, there was an attempt to bar Rustin from serving as the lead organizer the 1963 March on Washington, but King intervened (along with Randolph) to support Rustin’s appointment. The lesson for other gays and lesbians in the Movement was clear: do not reveal you’re gay, and above all, do not get arrested – at least on a morals charge. For Murray and Height, the women’s movement offered some refuge; within NOW and NCNW, the lavender herring would not be exposed for several more years. In any case, it appears that the FBI was more concerned about gay men’s sexual behavior than the secret lives of lesbians.

These examples show the ways that opponents used narratives of “perverted” sexuality to destabilize and divide activists in the African American civil rights movement. They also demonstrate the importance of respectability to the movement, in establishing the “fitness” of African Americans for citizenship. Despite this sex-negative, and sometimes overtly homophobic history, for the gay and lesbian rights movement in the United States, the civil rights movement has served as the main template. Political and legal strategists have closely studied the lessons of the early 1960s, going so far as to pave their own “Road to Brown” with a series of cases aimed at achieving equal protection for gays and lesbians. Legislative efforts to win employment rights, immigration rights, and federal protection from anti-gay violence have also followed along the same general lines that African Americans took in the 1950s and 1960s.

From a legal standpoint, this strategy has merit. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 adopted to implement the 13th Amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery, civil rights are defined as:
The right...to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by all white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.

The right to make and enforce contracts, for example, includes the right to marry and the right to hold a job. The right to inherit and convey property, covers all those cases in which one partner dies and his (or her) family challenges the will. The right security of person includes the right to not be molested – or bashed, or killed: the Matthew Shepards, the Saskia Gunns, all the named and unnamed gays, lesbians, trans, and bi-folk victimized by homophobes. And to be subject to like punishment: that 19-year-old Matthew Limon should not face 10 years in a Kansas prison for homosexual sodomy with his 14-year-old lover, while heterosexual “Romeos & Juliets” face merely misdemeanors for violating the state’s sodomy law. Without question, queer people are denied civil rights in the United States.

For that reason, organizations such as the Human Rights Campaign, pursue what I call the “white picket fence” strategy. This strategy envisions that the goal of the gay rights movement is to bring happiness and protection for (white) middle-class, same-sex couples, with kids (adopted or perhaps through artificial insemination) with good jobs, living in a suburban house surrounded by a white picket fence. To accomplish this bourgeois version of family life, the couple requires legal recognition of their partnership – they need marriage equality. They need inheritance rights, they need adoption rights (and for lesbians, access to AI technology), they need anti-discrimination protection on the job, they need partners’ benefits for health insurance, they need Social Security/pension survivor benefits for their spouse and for their children, they need equal credit to obtain their mortgage, they need the federal income tax benefits accorded to parents and married couples, and I suppose, they need their mommy van Subaru station wagon and their au pair from Eastern Europe or their Hispanic maid. This is the photograph HRC runs in the national print media to appeal for marriage equality for gays and lesbians. (See illustration). This image – the same image that GLAAD and Servicemembers’ Legal Defense Network also promotes – is a calculated image of respectability. It appeals to “mom & apple pie” to persuade the public that gays and lesbians are not a threat to the family or to American values. It purposely disengages gays and lesbians from the “Communist threat” with which queers had been associated since the McCarthy era, and from the pedophilia, incest and bestiality accusations of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and U.S. Senator Rick Santorum, Republican of Pennsylvania.

For indeed, it is sex that HRC and most other gay rights organizations avoid. Afraid that the old bugaboos that made homosexuality “obsessive degenerate urges” and “perverted” would undermine their demands for equality, the strategy has been to avoid talk of sex altogether. We are led to believe that the white picket fence keeps homosexual in the home, where the presumably monogamous couple refrains from open sexual displays in front of the children, perhaps even refrains from sex altogether. Is “lesbian bed death” the goal of these lesbian-feminist leaders?

Indeed, this is the argument made by conservative (Catholic) gays such as Andrew Sullivan. Legalize marriage and the threat of the homosexual predator, the dark room denizen, the locker room lecher, disappears. Gay sex can then be confined to the privacy of the home, reigned in and limited to a long-term partner. If this is the strategy of the marriage equality campaign, then there is no need to decriminalize sex. Indeed, to preserve “marriage,” the gay rights organizations should join conservative legislators to seek equal enforcement of adultery and bigamy laws.

On the issue of marriage – or rather same-sex sex – the gay rights movement falters, just
as the civil rights movement faltered on interracial sex. Limiting queer liberation – sexual liberation – to an identity-based movement, limits sexual expression. Sexuality is not a civil rights issue. It is a human rights issue. Freedom of sexual expression for consenting individuals cannot be limited to “civil rights” claims. Liberty will be won through recognition of human dignity, not by creating false fronts of respectability.

An agenda devoted to promoting freedom of sexual expression, to advancing honest consent between sexual partners, and to guaranteeing the bodily integrity, are the keys to queer liberation. They are also the keys to ensuring women’s (sexual) freedom and equality, and for citizen-subject “others” against who criminal sex laws are unequally enforced. Sexual rights are not distributed equally. Rather, they have been reserved for citizens, who have traditionally been male, and in the United States, those of European descent, and since the twentieth century, heterosexual. Sexual freedom means self-determination of the body, the right to engage in consensual sexual acts with other citizens, and the right to information about sexual and bodily matters. Citizen-subjects have historically been denied these privileges; they are refused access to abortion and sexual health care, victimized by rape, incest and abuse, their sexual conduct criminalized, and even prohibited from learning about sex and the human body. Unlike generally understood democratic rights and liberties such as freedom of speech, due process, privacy, and equal citizenship that are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and in EU Convention on Human Rights, sexual liberty remains a goal. But it is fundamental to the full enjoyment of citizenship.

In the development of public policies, and in the creation of campaign strategies to win sexual citizenship, activists should ask themselves the following three questions:

1. How does the policy advance the decriminalization or de-stigmatization of human sexuality? Of sexual expression?
2. How does the policy promote freedom of sexual expression or the access to information?
3. How does the policy protect the integrity of the human body, or advance freedom of bodily choice?

Moving away from an identity-based movement whose goal is simply “gay” rights will lessen the usefulness of “respectability” as a tactic. It will mean that activists can accomplish the larger goal of sexual citizenship – of human rights – that will, of necessity and by appeal, draw together a diverse coalition of people. Michael Warner, in The Trouble with Normal, included the leather guys, the drag performers, the bathhouse patrons, the freaks, the queers, and other folks who have been shut out of the movement in the effort to “normalize” gay people. I’d suggest we might try to include heterosexuals! Adultery is still a crime for (heterosexual) married folks: sexually active parents, straight and gay, can lose custody of their children; and SM is not just a gay thing, as the Rubber Ball and SM events around the U.S. and in Europe attract thousands of patrons annually. “Perv & Proud” as my Spanner Committee tee shirt reads, or as my San Francisco sex workers’ trade union tee shirt says, “U.S. Out of My Underwear” are two potential slogans for such a movement.
Bibliography

Notes:
1. Drake; Cayton 1962.
5. In Cott; Pleck 1979.
7. In this paper, I use the common term "civil rights organizations" to refer to what may be better understood as identity-based organizations whose goal is full citizenship for group members. While the Marshallian "civil rights" is limited to rights in court, civil liberties, and right to employment, in the U.S., "civil rights" encompasses political rights and social rights as well.
8. In *McLaughlin v. Florida* (85 S.Ct. 283 [1964]), an important case leading up to Loving v. Virginia, the Court recognized that imposing additional criminal penalties on interracial fornication violated the equal protection clause.
9. Berry 1999: 202-243. In 1951, Matt Ingram was convicted of assault, "rape by leer" “because of the way he allegedly looked at a white girl” 30 meters away, and served two and one half years in North Carolina prison until his conviction was overturned, ibid, p. 227.
12. Ola Mae Quartermain, arrested in Albany, Georgia in January 1962 for violating using “vulgar language” after a bus driver told her to move to the back of the bus. Her specific words were: “I paid my damn 20 cents and I can sit where I want.” See O’Reilly 1989.
14. “Integrated Bus Suggestions,” leaflet distributed to bus protestors, reprinted in Martin Luther King,
Stride Toward Freedom, pp 144-5.

15 O’Reilly, Racial Matters, p. 136.

16 For a detailed discussion of the gender issues and organizing problems of the 1941 March on Washington, see my dissertation, (Chateauvert, 1992), chapter 6. On Bayard Rustin, the recent documentary “Brother Outsider” examines his life as a gay man in the civil rights movement (see also http://www.rustin.org). Dorothy Height does not “come out” explicitly in her new autobiography Open Wide the Freedom Gates, (2003) but conversations with associates as well as a close, but not wishful, reading of the book, strongly indicates her sexual preference. Pauli Murray, Song in a Weary Throat: An American Pilgrimage (1987). My outing of Randolph has been met with some furious denials from other (heterosexual) (African American) historians and biographers, but I am relying on interviews with people who knew him both early in his career in New York in the 1920s, and late in his career, after the March on Washington and the death of his wife in 1963.


18 I attended graduate school with Jo, of the “Jo and Theresa” lesbian couple the Human Rights Campaign uses in this campaign. A copy of the New York Times ad is available at: http://nmmstream.net/hrc/downloads/ad_campaigns/nyt031017jo_teresa_kids.pdf


Why Are “Pro-Family” Groups Attacking This Family?

Jo and Teresa live in Maryland. They’ve been in a loving, committed relationship for 13 years and have three children — Julia, 12, Matthew, 9, and Ben, 2. Between 15-hour work weeks, soccer practices and never enough time in the day, they face all the same joys and frustrations as any other parents — but without the same protections.

Because the government won’t give them legal protections, Jo and Teresa’s children don’t qualify for full Social Security survivor benefits if one of them dies even after all those of painless years. And if one of the kids gets sick, in some states they could even be denied the right to visit them in the hospital because they aren’t “family.” And Jo and Teresa aren’t eligible for OCOBRA health coverage for each other or for family medical leave or for paid medical leave.

Why talk about this now? Because extreme political organizations like Focus on the Family and the Family Research Council are playing politics with the lives of families like Jo and Teresa. These so-called “pro-family” groups claim that providing basic protections to devoted gay couples would bring about “the end of society as we know it.” They even want to amend the U.S. Constitution to deny any legal protections for gay partners and their families.

Meanwhile, gay and lesbian couples in long-term, committed relationships (parent eligible for government-sponsored civil marriage licenses and the legal protections they provide). Although no government should ever tell religious institutions what they can marry, the government should not discriminate in providing civil marriage licenses to my devoted couple.

Jo and Teresa and their children deserve the same legal protections any other loving family.

All Families Deserve Protection

Tell your elected representatives not to play politics with the Constitution. Take action on the web at www.hrc.org.